Europe must prepare for renewed US pressure after the November elections, an EUISS analysis warns

Giuseppe Spatafora proposes that Europeans should be able to suspend energy purchases or investments in the US to deter coercion, while maintaining cooperation in areas of common interest. A change in the congressional majority would not eliminate transatlantic tensions, and using military access as a means of pressure would entail risks for Europe’s security.

Europe should prepare measures that would make potential US pressure on allies more costly, without provoking a rupture that would weaken its defense, recommends Giuseppe Spatafora in an analysis by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). The author warns that the US midterm elections in November do not guarantee a more predictable relationship with Washington, even if Republicans lose control of Congress.

In brief

1.US elections in November do not guarantee a normalization of the transatlantic relationship, Giuseppe Spatafora finds. Even a Congress controlled by Democrats might focus on domestic policy, while Donald Trump could resort more often to executive orders.

2.The author proposes suspending certain forms of economic cooperation if Washington resumes pressure on its allies. Energy purchases and investments in the US are examples of possible instruments, whose credibility depends on Europeans’ willingness to bear the costs.

3.The EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument already has a review and negotiation procedure, with response measures as a last resort. The analysis’s recommendations regarding the suspension of cooperation do not represent adopted European decisions.

4.A rupture with the US could weaken European defense before military dependencies are reduced, the analysis warns. The author calls for maintaining cooperation on Ukraine and NATO and providing de-escalation channels alongside deterrence measures.

In the published analysis, Spatafora proposes combining cooperation with the United States with a more credible response to economic or political coercion. Options include suspending certain energy purchases or blocking investments in the US if pressure returns. These are the author’s recommendations, not measures announced by the European Union.

The argument starts from the limitations of a change in the majority in Washington. A Congress controlled by Democrats could constrain the administration through the budget and hearings, the researcher acknowledges. But the new legislators might focus on domestic issues and confrontation with the president, without prioritizing the removal of tariffs or reversing troop reductions in Europe. Nor is the outcome of the election, especially in the Senate, certain.

In addition, stronger opposition in Congress could push Donald Trump to resort even more to executive orders in foreign policy, Spatafora believes. Political failures may constrain the administration, but “they will not eliminate the deep sources of transatlantic tensions,” he writes. The analysis thus calls into question the hope that the president’s electoral difficulties would automatically turn into concessions for Europeans.

To explain what might work instead of waiting, the author returns to the confrontation over Greenland. According to his account, Europeans combined troop deployments with commercial pressure, including the threat of reactivating retaliatory measures targeting €93 billion worth of US imports and signaling the possibility of using the Anti-Coercion Instrument. Spatafora believes that this response, together with limited domestic support for annexing Greenland, contributed to the US administration’s withdrawal.

The European Commission explains that the Anti-Coercion Instrument, in force since 27 December 2023, entails a procedure, not an automatic retaliation. The Commission examines the case, the Council establishes the existence of economic coercion, and the EU seeks a negotiated solution. If these efforts fail, response measures may be adopted as a last resort and may target, among other things, goods, services, investments, or public procurement.

Spatafora proposes that Europeans should be able to suspend cooperation in areas important to Washington if it resorts to coercion again. Energy purchases and investments would thus become means of increasing the cost of pressure on allies. Their credibility, however, depends on Europeans’ willingness to bear their own costs, the author warns. A threat that is difficult to implement would have a more limited deterrent capacity.

The military option is riskier. The analysis raises the possibility that some countries might threaten to restrict US military access in Europe in response to pressure in other areas. Spatafora points out, however, that such a threat could be credible only for some allies, while others would refuse to jeopardize security cooperation. A complete rupture with the US could weaken deterrence before Europeans are capable of defending themselves.

European unity is another condition that cannot be taken for granted. In the case of Greenland, territorial integrity and the indivisibility of the single market facilitated a common response, the author argues. Future pressure could, however, be designed precisely to divide the member states. Coalitions of countries willing to act together, useful in preparing defenses, are not necessarily sufficient when the single market is targeted. Spatafora also recommends distinguishing real threats from statements primarily intended to dominate the media agenda.

Deterrence should be accompanied by a negotiated way out of the crisis. Spatafora identifies NATO Arctic Sentry and the trilateral talks with Denmark and Greenland as examples of options that facilitated de-escalation. In its presentation on 11 February, NATO described Arctic Sentry as an activity to strengthen security in the Arctic and the High North, led by Joint Force Command Norfolk, which brings together Alliance and allied activities in a common operational approach.

Cooperation should be protected where interests remain common, the researcher argues. He points to Ukraine’s defense industry, coordination of the country’s reconstruction, and the transfer of responsibilities within NATO, so that no deterrence gaps emerge. In his assessment, these relationships can give Europe the time it needs to strengthen its defenses and reduce critical dependencies. The condition is that maintaining cooperation must not reinforce in Washington the belief that pressuring allies brings benefits without costs.

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