The European Policy Centre supports that the European Union needs an economic deterrence doctrine.

The European Policy Centre states that the European Union already has important economic tools, but it is not perceived by Washington and Beijing as being willing enough to use them. The authors propose a doctrine of "reactive assertiveness," with clear red lines, pre-prepared mechanisms, and proportional responses to economic coercion.

The European Policy Centre argues that the European Union needs to move from economic openness to a more credible form of deterrence, in a context where global competition is increasingly defined by economic coercion, subsidies, technological dependencies, and pressures on supply chains. In the analysis "From openness to deterrence: Europe’s doctrine of reactive assertiveness," Georg Riekeles and Varg Folkman assert that the problem for Europe is not the lack of tools, but the lack of a credible perception that these tools will be used when the Union is under economic pressure.

In short

1. The European Policy Centre states that the European Union needs a clearer economic doctrine, not just adjustments to existing trade tools.

2. The authors argue that Washington and Beijing are not convinced that Europe is willing to bear economic costs in response to coercion.

3. The analysis proposes a doctrine of "reactive assertiveness," based on clear red lines and pre-prepared proportional responses.

4. EPC also proposes discussing a European instrument inspired by Section 301 of U.S. trade legislation, for quicker responses to systemic distortions.

The EPC analysis starts from the observation that the European Union already has strong economic levers. The single market provides access to one of the most important consumer and investment areas in the world, and the Anti-Coercion Instrument gives the European Commission the ability to respond to unjustified coercive actions against the Union or its member states.

According to the authors, the problem is that economic power does not produce deterrence if other actors do not believe it will be used. EPC notes that both the United States and China tend to reduce in their calculations Europe’s willingness to bear economic costs in the event of a confrontation. This perception weakens the Union's ability to prevent trade, technological, or industrial pressures.

Riekeles and Folkman argue that the European Union can no longer separate competitiveness from economic security. Industrial erosion becomes a strategic vulnerability, dependencies create coercion risks, and supply chains have become geopolitical assets. In this logic, industrial policy, trade policy, and economic security must be treated together.

The doctrine proposed by EPC is called "reactive assertiveness." It would not seek permanent confrontation and would not mean generalized protectionism. It would mean establishing clear red lines, pre-preparing response mechanisms, and applying measures automatically, proportionally, and quickly when economic coercion, dumping through overcapacity, discrimination, or systemic market distortions arise.

The authors assert that current European tools remain too fragmented, too slow, and too legally dependent on procedures built for an era when the international trading system was more stable and centered on the World Trade Organization. In the face of systemic shocks, such as industrial overcapacity in sectors like chemicals or machinery, traditional product-by-product reactions may come too late.

One of the central proposals of the analysis is to examine a European instrument inspired by Section 301 of the American Trade Act. Such a mechanism would allow for rapid investigation of systemic distortions, assertive behaviors, and macroeconomic destabilization, with the possibility of adopting proportional measures before European industrial ecosystems are irreversibly affected.

EPC emphasizes that such an instrument should not be built against a specific country. The stake would be European credibility: the Union's ability to convey that economic pressure, dumping through overcapacity, or discriminatory market access restrictions will have consequences, including on access to the single market.

The analysis also proposes discussing a stronger institutional capacity for managing cross-cutting economic risks, including through a possible European Economic Security Council. Such a framework would allow for the assessment of scenarios in which trade, technology, finance, industry, and security overlap.

The discussion comes at a time when the European Union is trying to adapt its economic model to the competition between great powers. China is accelerating industrial and technological self-sufficiency, the United States is increasingly using strategic economic policy tools, and Europe is seeking to avoid dependencies that could limit its political autonomy.

For EPC, Europe’s realistic goal is not a return to the period of hyper-open globalization nor a reshaping of China’s behavior. The goal is a resilient coexistence, in which the Union can continue to prosper without Washington or Beijing determining its strategic choices.

https://2eu.brussels/ro/stiri/european-policy-centre-sustine-ca-uniunea-europeana-are-nevoie-de-o-doctrina-de-descurajare-economica