Draft for a Truce Government

In the following weeks, I proposed the formation of a government of armistice as a solution for Romania to exit the current political crisis: an independent prime minister, a clear and limited mandate, and a political agreement that would allow the country to have a government with full powers again.

On July 1, Ilie Bolojan publicly spoke about the possibility of a "government of armistice," with a clear duration and precise objectives. It was an important moment because the formula began to enter explicitly into the vocabulary of one of the main actors in the current political crisis.

In the days that followed, the idea of a government of armistice was increasingly taken up and discussed in the political space. Yesterday, at the invitation of the President of Romania, the leaders of the pro-Western parties met at the Cotroceni Palace for a new round of discussions regarding the formation of the government, and the formula of a government of armistice explicitly reached the discussion table.

Some labeled yesterday's meeting as a failure because no agreement was immediately reached and no name for prime minister was announced. However, I believe that the meeting represented a step forward.

After weeks dominated by vetoes, accusations, and "red lines," the parties sat at the same table again. They began to use a common vocabulary: exit from the crisis, dialogue, political solution, independent prime minister, equidistance, and government of armistice.

It is true that we do not yet have an accepted formula. But we have an important change of paradigm: the discussion is no longer exclusively about who wins and who loses, but also about how the political system can be unblocked.

It is good that President Nicușor Dan brought to the same table the parties that do not question Romania's membership in the European Union and NATO. It is equally important that the discussions confirmed the need for a solution now, not in the fall, and that early elections do not represent the answer that Romania needs.

And yet, we continue to hear, almost fatalistically, that "there are no solutions." Some view the current political crisis like the "sack of salt": they anticipate all possible misfortunes, explain why each option cannot work, and inevitably reach the conclusion that nothing can be done.

I believe that solutions exist.

What follows is one of them.

I do not claim that it is the only solution or that it is perfect. There can certainly be other formulas, perhaps even better ones. But to find them, one elementary thing is needed: those who have the responsibility of forming a government must talk to each other.

No constitutional algorithm and no political formula can replace dialogue. When parties refuse to talk to each other, any problem becomes impossible to solve. When they agree to negotiate in good faith, solutions also appear.

In this logic, I present below a possible architecture of a government of armistice.

It is a working draft, not a closed list. It starts from the structure of the government formed in June 2025 and from the idea that exiting the crisis does not require a complete renegotiation of the power relations.

The formula combines institutional continuity, political responsibility, and selective technocratization.

1. Independent, equidistant, and institutionally compatible prime minister

The central point of the formula is the designation of an independent prime minister, in accordance with the direction outlined in the discussions at Cotroceni.

The prime minister of a government of armistice must be a neutral person, without current or past political commitments and without obligations to a party. He must not be the representative of one of the camps nor the instrument through which a party indirectly gains control over the government.

The profile requires:

real political independence, present and past;

relevant experience in public administration and/or in government;

knowledge of Romanian political and institutional mechanisms;

the ability to dialogue and work with all parties that support the government;

European and international credibility;

experience in leading and coordinating complex structures;

absence of personal electoral stakes;

the ability to negotiate and arbitrate, not to represent one camp.

In addition to all this, there is an essential condition: the prime minister must have a relationship of institutional and political compatibility not only with the parties that support the government but also with the President of Romania.

In a complicated period, Romania cannot afford a new conflict between the Victoria Palace and the Cotroceni Palace. The prime minister and the president do not have to think identically, but they must be able to work together, have mutual institutional trust, and coordinate the major files that require cooperation between the two components of the executive.

The independence of the prime minister is essential precisely because the government would be a mixed one. Some ministers will be political, others independent or technocrats. However, all must function as a single team.

The prime minister would not be the representative of a fifth power center. He would be the guarantor of the political armistice and the coordinator of the government.

2. What does a government of armistice mean

Armistice does not mean a new long-term political alliance nor the disappearance of the differences between PSD, PNL, USR, and UDMR.

The parties retain their identity, programs, options, and political objectives.

That is why an armistice agreement does not contradict the internal decisions by which a party sets limits or prohibitions regarding future political collaborations, including the PNL decisions regarding political collaboration with PSD.

An armistice is not a new political coalition in the classical sense and does not obligate parties to change their long-term strategies. It represents a temporary understanding, with clear objectives and deadlines, to allow the functioning of the state during a period of blockage.

Armistice means the temporary suspension of political confrontation for control of the government and the renunciation, for a determined period, of the logic of successive vetoes and "red lines."

No one wins everything. No one loses everything.

No party imposes its prime minister. No party is obliged to capitulate in front of another. The parties agree, for a limited period, to support a common formula that allows the state to function.

This is the meaning of the armistice: the political conflict does not disappear, but is temporarily suspended where it hinders the functioning of the government.

3. A clear and limited mandate

The government of armistice should function based on a written political agreement and have a clear mandate, precise objectives, and a term established from the beginning.

One option would be for the armistice to function until February 15, 2027.

This period would give the government the necessary time to overcome the current blockage, ensure the functioning of the administration, and manage the main ongoing files, without turning the armistice formula into a permanent political solution.

The mandate should focus on explicitly agreed objectives:

fiscal-budgetary stability;

implementation of the PNRR;

absorption of European funds;

preparation and negotiation of the future European financial framework;

management of major foreign policy and security files;

functioning of the administration and public services;

preparation and conduct of the new school year under normal conditions;

management of the energy situation;

continuation of reforms and fulfillment of commitments already made by Romania.

Until February 15, 2027, the parties would have the necessary time to clarify how they want to move forward and how they assume, together or separately, responsibility for governing the country. The armistice agreement should not limit in any way the subsequent political options of the parties. It does not change their identity, their internal decisions, the future alliances they can negotiate, or their electoral objectives.

If, at the end of the period, the parties consider that the formula works and want to continue it, they can negotiate this. If they want another form of government, they are free to build it.

The armistice has a beginning and an end. What follows after it is decided politically, at the right moment.

4. A limited mandate, but full powers

The temporary nature of the mandate does not mean a weak government.

The great advantage of this formula is that the government would be invested by Parliament and would have full powers.

Romania would exit the situation of a dismissed or interim executive, with limited capacity for action, and would have a government again that can adopt public policies, initiate bills, make administrative decisions, and credibly represent Romania on the European and international stage.

A politically limited mandate can be exercised by a government that has all the necessary constitutional tools.

5. Continuity and political representation at the level of deputy prime ministers

A government of armistice needs an independent prime minister, but also a solid political link with the parties that support it in Parliament.

From this arises the important role of the deputy prime ministers.

The formula proposes maintaining the current political deputy prime ministers, both for continuity and so that each of the four parties has a strong political voice within the government, sufficiently authorized to participate in major decisions and to maintain the link between the government and the party it represents.

At the same time, to make the government more compact and to link political authority to executive responsibility, each political deputy prime minister would also receive direct leadership of a portfolio:

Marian Neacșu – PSD: deputy prime minister and minister of Transport and Infrastructure;

Cătălin Predoiu – PNL: deputy prime minister and minister of Internal Affairs;

Radu Miruță – USR: deputy prime minister and minister of National Defense;

Tánczos Barna – UDMR: deputy prime minister and minister of Culture.

In the same logic of a more compact government, the discussion regarding the position of independent deputy prime minister, currently held by Oana Gheorghiu, can also be viewed.

The maintenance of this function should not be considered automatic. It remains to be negotiated, both regarding the person and the necessity of the position, and if it is maintained, its concrete mandate.

6. A more compact government, without destabilizing the political formula

Through this formula, the number of government members is reduced.

PSD loses a distinct place in the government numerically, as the Ministry of Transport no longer has a separate minister. However, PSD does not lose the Transport portfolio, which is taken over by the PSD deputy prime minister, Marian Neacșu.

Similarly, UDMR loses a distinct place in the government numerically, as the Ministry of Culture no longer has a separate minister. UDMR does not lose the Culture portfolio, which is taken over by the UDMR deputy prime minister, Tánczos Barna.

In the same logic of compacting, the position of independent deputy prime minister can also be analyzed.

The reduction in the number of government members should not be viewed, therefore, as a mechanical redistribution of power between parties. The criterion is building a more compact and functional formula, while maintaining, as much as possible, the overall political balance.

7. Continuity where change would produce costs

A government of armistice should not change ministers just to demonstrate that it is a new government.

Where there are ongoing files, assumed reforms, European milestones, or sensitive administrative moments, continuity may be more important than change.

At Finance, maintaining Alexandru Nazare would ensure the continuity of fiscal-budgetary policy, the relationship with European institutions, and the commitments related to the PNRR.

At Investments and European Projects, maintaining Dragoș Pîslaru would ensure the continuity of the implementation of the PNRR and the management of European funds.

At Education and Research, maintaining Mihai Dimian is justified by the period of national exams and the preparation for the new school year. A new change of minister at this moment would produce an unnecessary administrative cost.

At Labor, the return of Petre-Florin Manole can ensure the continuity of the reforms and commitments being implemented.

At Energy, the solution remains to be negotiated, but the return of Bogdan Ivan would be natural in a complicated energy context and would ensure the continuity of ongoing files.

At Environment, Diana Buzoianu represents a natural continuity option.

8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs – a portfolio with a special institutional logic

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be viewed in a different logic from the other portfolios.

Due to the nature of the constitutional and institutional responsibilities in the field of foreign policy, very good collaboration between the President of Romania, the prime minister, and the minister of Foreign Affairs is necessary.

For this reason, special importance should be given to the option or recommendation of the President of Romania for the leadership of the MFA, in consultation with the designated prime minister and the parties that support the government.

The main criterion should be the appointment of a career diplomat, with experience, external credibility, and in-depth knowledge of the files.

Luminița Odobescu is an example of a profile that meets these criteria. She has diplomatic and governmental experience, knows the European and Euro-Atlantic files, and can immediately take over the leadership of the ministry. Her appointment would also contribute to a better balance between women and men in the composition of the government.

In this context, I would like to specify that the names indicated are indicative. I do not have Luminița Odobescu's consent to mention her in this article, and I have not consulted with any of the persons whose names appear as possible options for a potential government of armistice.

I mentioned them, however, to underline a simple thing: Romania has capable people who can assume governmental responsibilities with professionalism, decency, honesty, and respect for institutions. We do not lack competence or people who know administration, European files, foreign policy, economy, education, health, or other essential areas of governance.

The problem is not the absence of the right people. The problem is the ability of political actors to identify them, to accept them, and to build around them a formula of trust and cooperation.

The final solution, of course, in this case, must result from consultation between the President of Romania, the designated prime minister, and the parties that support the government.

9. Selective technocratization, not artificial depoliticization

The "armistice" formula does not propose a fully technocratic government.

In certain areas, however, the appointment of independent professionals can contribute to reducing political tension, increasing executive competence, and facilitating agreement.

In Health, the appointment of an independent minister may be considered. Cătălin Cîrstoiu is a possible profile example: publicly known, with professional and managerial experience, and with a good knowledge of the medical system.

In Agriculture and Economy, technocratic solutions can be identified.

In Justice, Radu Marinescu can represent a continuity solution.

This is not, however, a closed list.

10. The situation by parties

PSD

PSD retains all six areas of political responsibility:

Marian Neacșu – deputy prime minister and Transport;

Petre-Florin Manole – continuity at Labor;

Bogdan Ivan – possible continuity at Energy;

Radu Marinescu – possible continuity at Justice;

an independent or technocrat at Health;

an independent or technocrat at Agriculture.

PSD loses a distinct place in the government structure by integrating Transport into the portfolio of the deputy prime minister, but retains all six portfolios and has six government members, including the deputy prime minister who accumulates Transport.

PNL

PNL retains the four areas of responsibility:

Cătălin Predoiu – deputy prime minister and Internal Affairs;

Alexandru Nazare – Finance;

Mihai Dimian – Education and Research, independent;

Dragoș Pîslaru – Investments and European Projects.

The major change is at the level of government leadership: PNL loses the position of prime minister, which returns to an independent.

The position of independent deputy prime minister, currently held by Oana Gheorghiu, also remains to be negotiated.

USR

USR retains:

Radu Miruță – deputy prime minister and Defense;

Diana Buzoianu – continuity option at Environment;

at Economy – a possible technocratic solution.

Regarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USR may partially lose direct influence over the appointment of the minister. Such an adjustment, however, has an institutional justification: bringing the leadership of the MFA back into the area of career diplomats and ensuring very good collaboration between the foreign minister, prime minister, all parties that support the government, and the President of Romania.

UDMR

UDMR retains both areas of responsibility:

Tánczos Barna – deputy prime minister and Culture;

Cseke Attila – Development.

UDMR loses a distinct place in the government numerically by eliminating the separate position of minister of Culture, but does not lose the portfolio. Culture remains under the responsibility of UDMR and is taken over directly by the deputy prime minister.

11. A draft of negotiation, not a closed list

This formula is a working draft and negotiation, not a definitive list.

The independent persons mentioned are examples of profile and possible options. They can and must be negotiated between the parties that will support the government and the designated prime minister.

The designated prime minister must have a real role in forming his own team.

The general formula should also be agreed, in principle, by the President of Romania, so that the new government starts not with the premises of a new institutional conflict but with the perspective of functional cooperation between the Victoria Palace, the Cotroceni Palace, and the parliamentary majority.

Changes in the distribution of some portfolios are also possible if the designated prime minister and the parties reach an agreement and if the overall balance of the formula is maintained.

What is important is that the negotiation should not be restarted entirely from scratch and should not bring the crisis back to the starting point.

12. Exiting the "eternal check"

For months, Romanian politics has been functioning like an "eternal check": every move is blocked by a counter-move, every name by a veto, every proposal by a new "red line."

No one wins. Romania loses time.

Unblocking the crisis would have immediate effects:

Romania would have a government with full powers again;

the administration would return to normal functioning;

the implementation of the PNRR and absorption of European funds would benefit from stability;

fiscal-budgetary decisions could be made with full authority;

Romania would strengthen its credibility with European and Euro-Atlantic partners;

the economic environment would receive a signal of predictability;

the parties would exit the logic of successive vetoes without any of them being obliged to capitulate politically. An armistice does not resolve all conflicts and does not have to do so.

The armistice temporarily suspends the conflict so that the state can function.

Starting from the above, here is a draft of a possible government of armistice:

Prime minister – independent, equidistant, without current or past political commitments, institutionally compatible with the President of Romania and with the parties that support the government – to be negotiated;

Deputy prime minister and minister of Transport and Infrastructure – Marian Neacșu – PSD;

Deputy prime minister and minister of Internal Affairs – Cătălin Predoiu – PNL;

Deputy prime minister and minister of National Defense – Radu Miruță – USR;

Deputy prime minister and minister of Culture – Tánczos Barna – UDMR;

Independent deputy prime minister – to be negotiated, including the opportunity to maintain the function;

Ministry of Finance – Alexandru Nazare – PNL – fiscal-budgetary continuity and PNRR;

Ministry of Education and Research – Mihai Dimian – independent – continuity for exams and preparation for the new school year;

Ministry of Investments and European Projects – Dragoș Pîslaru – PNL – continuity of PNRR and European funds;

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – career diplomat, appointed following consultations between the President of Romania, the designated prime minister, and the parties that support the government; possible option: Luminița Odobescu;

Ministry of Economy, Digitalization, Entrepreneurship, and Tourism – independent or technocrat – to be negotiated;

Ministry of Environment, Waters, and Forests – Diana Buzoianu – continuity option – USR;

Ministry of Development, Public Works, and Administration – Cseke Attila – UDMR;

Ministry of Health – independent or technocrat; possible option: Cătălin Cîrstoiu;

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development – independent or technocrat – to be negotiated;

Ministry of Justice – Radu Marinescu – possible continuity solution;

Ministry of Energy – Bogdan Ivan – possible continuity solution or an independent/technocrat;

Ministry of Labor, Family, Youth, and Social Solidarity – Petre-Florin Manole – continuity in implementing reforms and commitments made.

Postscript: politics cannot live only from scandal

Romania has been in a generalized political conflict for about four months. For over 70 days, we have not had a government with full powers.

And yet, some politicians not only refuse to stop the scandal but propose moving to an even higher level of instability: early parliamentary elections.

We could thus reach a situation without precedent: without a government with full powers and with Parliament dissolved, while the Kremlin's propaganda and its political representatives in Romania press the pedal to suspend the President of Romania.

This is no longer political strategy. It is an institutional adventure at a time when Romania needs stability, predictability, and decision-making capacity.

In this context, I cannot associate myself with either those who serve Russia's interests in Romania or with the ruffians of Romanian politics, for whom scandal is no longer a tool but a drug administered daily. And neither with those who present themselves as top politicians but confuse politics with the gutter, argument with insult, and firmness with verbal aggression.

They may have degrees, important positions, and the pretense of representing the political elite of a country. But if the public vocabulary is that of a cab driver and behavior is dominated by insult, contempt, and aggression, the title of "top politician" becomes a mere pretense.

They constantly need a new adversary, a new crisis, a new accusation, and even more political adrenaline.

Only a state cannot be governed by adrenaline, scandal, and insult.

That is why I have advocated and continue to advocate for calm, decency, responsibility, and a return to rational dialogue among political actors.

In this regard, the fact that President Nicușor Dan remains calm and rational is an advantage for Romania. Some criticize him precisely because he does not respond to the conflict with an even greater conflict and because he does not satisfy their daily need for political spectacle and adrenaline.

But the role of a president is not to fuel agitation. His role is to help institutions get out of blockage.

Romania no longer needs another round of accusations, threats, and "red lines." It needs a government with full powers, a limited and clear political agreement for a few months – for the moment – in which responsible people can manage the country.

An armistice does not mean capitulation. It does not mean that parties give up their identity or objectives. It means that they understand that, sometimes, the responsibility towards the country must be placed before immediate political advantage.

So let us exit this "eternal check," in which no one wins, but Romania loses every day.

Calm is not weakness. Dialogue is not capitulation. And responsibility should not be confused with a lack of courage.