ANALYSIS Four years of war in Ukraine: What the front looks like and what the chances for peace are, while the conflict continues to change Europe

Four years after the large-scale invasion, the Ukrainian front finds itself in a precarious balance: Russia maintains local initiative in the east and north, but Ukraine is regaining ground in the south and maintaining essential defensive lines, while the war of attrition is increasingly being decided in trenches, in industry, and in public opinion, not just on the map.

The prospects for a lasting peace in 2026 are, in essence, very slim: Ukrainian, Western, and regional experts are more likely to talk about fragile ceasefires, "freezing" the front, or imposed agreements, rather than a fair and stable solution. Moreover, the informational war and the lack of communication from the Romanian authorities make public opinion increasingly permeable to alternative narratives.

What does the front look like in February 2026, four years into the war: where is the fighting taking place

In the south, Ukraine has regained the initiative: Ukrainian forces have liberated over 200 km² and a series of localities at the border between the Zaporozhye and Dnipropetrovsk regions, taking advantage of the blockage of Russian access to Starlink and effective strikes on Russian logistics.

ISW notes that Ukraine has pushed the front line in the directions of Novopavlivka–Oleksandrivka–Huliaipole, while Russia is losing the ability to maintain compact lines, leading to a "porous" front, with interspersed positions.

In northern Ukraine, Russia is trying to create a "buffer zone" in Sumy and Kharkiv, but advances are limited, fragmented, and costly; in Kupiansk, Ukrainians have recaptured positions, and the Russians control less than 3% of the city, being "in a fight for survival" within it.

In Donbas, Russia is pressing on the Lyman–Sloviansk and Kostyantynivka–Drujkivka axes, with small infiltrations confirmed, but without making decisive territorial changes; after four years, Moscow continues to fight for medium-sized cities like Pokrovsk, without having achieved complete control over Donbas.

Who holds the initiative on the front

Militarily, Russia dictates the pace in the east (Donbas) and on the Sumy–Kharkiv axis, but pays a disproportionate price, being optimized for a slow, infantry war, with massive monthly losses (tens of thousands of people). In the south, the initiative returns to Ukraine, which exploits the vulnerabilities of Russian communications and logistics, forcing Moscow to stretch its reserves over a very long front.

A study cited by the New York Times and other media estimates approximately 1.2 million Russian military and nearly 600,000 Ukrainian military dead, wounded, or missing in almost four years – a ratio of about 2.5 to 1 in favor of the defender, but at a devastating cost for both societies.

Occupied territories: what Russia controls after 4 years

The ISW map shows that Russia continues to occupy about one-fifth of Ukraine's internationally recognized territory: Crimea, large parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, the land corridor to Crimea (Mariupol–Melitopol–Berdiansk), and significant strips in Zaporozhye and southern Kherson.

Unlike 2022–2023, we no longer witness rapid territorial gains: after years of offensive, Moscow has only managed to expand the occupied area by about 12% compared to the moment of invasion, at a human cost unprecedented for a military power since World War II.

Ukraine has already recovered significant areas around Kherson, Kharkiv, and now, gradually, in southern Zaporozhye, but has failed to break the Russian land corridor to Crimea.

Where is the fighting fiercest these days

The hot axes around February 24, 2026 are:

northeast of Kharkiv region (Vovceansk–Kupiansk), the Lyman–Sloviansk area, and the "fortification belt" in Donbas, the southern front around Oleksandrivka–Ternuvate–Huliaipole, where the Ukrainian army advances meter by meter, using micro-combat groups and drones.

The drone war has become the defining element of the conflict: Armand Goșu observes that "the drone war has practically changed the face of warfare entirely," with Ukrainian units working in small teams of three people, capable of maneuvering weapons, drones, and providing first aid on the battlefield. Where has Putin's war shifted its stakes after four years

Historian Armand Goșu emphasizes, in an interview with HotNews, that Vladimir Putin "does not want to stop this war, because he considers himself at an advantage and believes it will last a little longer until Ukraine collapses."

At the same time, he notes that the morale of the Ukrainian population remains "healthy" and that society is unwilling to "cross the red lines," even under conditions of huge losses and prolonged mobilization.

Goșu warns that Russia's strategic objective is not just Ukrainian territory, but the erosion of Western support for Kiev, and in Romania, he says, Moscow "has managed to confuse public opinion and make it no longer understand what is happening," including through television and networks, some fueled by money and influence from intelligence services.

Militarily, ISW shows that Moscow is preparing for new partial mobilizations, in a regime of "calls" from reserves, while trying to strengthen its jamming and interception capabilities of Western satellite communications – a sign that the Kremlin is preparing not only for the prolongation of the war but also for a possible future conflict with NATO.

Ukrainians in Romania: life between two worlds

Four years after the attack, Ukraine has "10 million people fewer" – dead or gone – and the face of the war is clearly seen in the diaspora: Oksana, a refugee from Ismail, tells HotNews how she "squeezed her whole life into a suitcase" when her mother, suffering from cancer, was evacuated for treatment abroad.

Arriving in Bucharest with her 8-year-old son, Oksana says she received "selfless help" from some Romanians she did not know, and her second child was born here – a biographical detail that transforms Romania from a transit area into a space of belonging.

After four years, the family lives and works in an after-school center of a foundation, where refugee children receive a warm meal, Romanian lessons, and do homework and sing Ukrainian songs – a form of cultural resilience in an exile that is prolonged.

Every time she returns home, to Ismail, Oksana describes nights "when the whole night is shot at," and her body reacts with trembling at the sound of bombings, but her desire remains "to return to the sun, to home, to family" once the war is over.

For her, "what is happening in Ukraine is an example for all of Europe" – a country that "has stood up to Russia" in a way that she does not know if any other European state would have succeeded.

Russian Marina Ovsyannikova: from the Kremlin stage to exile

Marina Ovsyannikova, the journalist who interrupted in 2022 the main news broadcast of Perviy Kanal with an anti-war placard, today describes Russia as an "informational gulag," where propaganda has created a "bubble" that swallows even people with previously liberal views.

She observes that, after four years, she can no longer speak of "Putin's war": "many Russians genuinely support everything that is happening," and independent media, exiled and underfunded, are losing the "information war" against institutions like Russia Today, with budgets of hundreds of millions of euros.

Her gesture in 2022 had mainly a psychological effect: it conveyed to anti-war Russians that "they are not alone" and showed the Kremlin that there are people against the war even within the propaganda apparatus. Ovsyannikova warns, however, that the potential exodus of elites and propagandists has not occurred on a large scale because the West has simultaneously blocked the regime and its entourages, pushing them back towards loyalty to Putin.

Regarding the future, the journalist believes that Russia needs a new "Cold War 2.0" from the West, with coherent sanctions and a common strategy, and democracy could return only after a long transition period, perhaps another 25 years.

Romania, four years into the war, blames Russia less for the conflict amid disinformation

The INSCOP survey conducted at the end of January 2026 shows a deeply fractured public opinion: 44.5% of Romanians believe that Russia will win the war, while only 23.4% still indicate Ukraine as the future winner, with percentages practically reversing compared to 2022.

When asked "what needs to happen to stop the war," 35.4% believe that Ukraine should make territorial concessions, while 53.3% believe that Russia should withdraw and return the territories – a decrease in the "principled" camp compared to 2023 (from 64.7%).

Regarding Romania's role, 42.6% of respondents say that our country should not provide any kind of assistance to Ukraine, while a third prefers only humanitarian support, and only 10.5% support military aid.

Another set of data also indicates a long-term perception: only about 30% of Romanians believe that the war will end in 2026 through a peace agreement, while almost a third fear that Russia could trigger a new war in Europe in the next three years.

Armand Goșu links this "moral slippage" – in which the victim and the aggressor are placed on the same level – to the "information chaos" in the Romanian media, from television stations that "implicitly or explicitly have been on Russia's side" and opaque networks, including from the services area, that roll out anti-Ukrainian narratives.

The war in Ukraine, four years in, can no longer be described as either a "Russian lightning strike" or a "decisive Ukrainian counteroffensive": it is a long-lasting conflict in which the military front, the resilience of a traumatized society, Russian propaganda, and the moral fatigue of the Western public intersect at a turning point, and decisions in 2026 – in Kiev, Moscow, Berlin, Washington, and Bucharest – will determine whether this attrition turns into a frozen conflict or the beginning of a real de-escalation. Less than 55% of Romanians still believe that Russia is guilty of starting the war in Ukraine, a significant decrease compared to May 2022.

"The increase in the proportion of those attributing blame to actors other than Russia indicates not only polarization but also a diversification of geopolitical interpretative frameworks among the population against the backdrop of constant efforts to influence the population. These developments are due to the absence over the last 4 years of bold lines of strategic communication assumed by the political class and that clearly and consistently project Romania's critical interests," explains last week's founder and CEO of INSCOP Research, Remus Ștefureac.

What do Ukrainians say about the chances of peace

Former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba estimates that the chances of the war ending in 2026 are "zero," making a clear distinction between the end of the war and a possible ceasefire.

He sees a limited window for a possible ceasefire only after the end of winter 2025–2026, and only if Ukraine "comes out of winter with the will to continue fighting," and the Russians understand that they cannot achieve a military victory, despite the devastation of infrastructure and pressure on the civilian population.

International experts' assessments regarding peace in Ukraine

Analyst Olga Oliker, quoted by Europa Liberă, says that "it is unlikely that the war in Ukraine will end with a lasting peace in 2026," the most radical scenario being one in which the Trump administration could pressure Kiev to accept "most, if not all, of Russia's conditions," which would amount, de facto, to a capitulation.

A material Eurasia Review notes that as the conflict approaches its fifth year, the prospects for peace are "frozen": neither Moscow nor Kiev seem willing to make the territorial and security concessions that could support a solid agreement.

Radio Free Europe emphasizes that in the absence of rapprochement on "fundamental issues" (borders, security guarantees, the status of occupied territories), it is "unlikely" that the war will end in 2026, and a possible halt to hostilities would not necessarily mean peace, but rather a phase of frozen conflict or latent preparations for a new war.

Behind-the-scenes negotiations: the demilitarized zone and the risk of an "unsustainable peace"

Behind the scenes of the discussions in Geneva, Western and Ukrainian negotiators explored a compromise in the form of a "demilitarized zone" in eastern Ukraine, which would not be formally under the control of either party, an idea also taken from a 28-point plan promoted by the Trump administration.

Former American ambassador to Kiev, William B. Taylor, quoted by The New York Times, believes that a demilitarized zone could become part of a viable solution, but only if Ukraine's interests are strictly protected and if Washington exerts real pressure on Moscow.

An analysis by Kyiv Post summarized by Digi24 sees a "25% probability" of an "unsustainable peace agreement in 2026": Trump pressures Zelensky to accept the cession of Donbas, Putin immediately violates the agreement or waits for an internal political explosion in Kiev to intervene again and seize additional territories.

"Peace" as a tool of political pressure

The National cites experts who warn that the mere discussion of an imminent "peace in 2026" can have a corrosive effect in Ukraine: soldiers and volunteers wonder why they should risk their lives "if peace is just around the corner," which becomes part of Moscow's game to undermine the will to resist from within.

Orysia Lutsevych from Chatham House explains that the narrative of imminent peace is used to erode Ukrainian mobilization: "Why should they go to the front, if a deal is coming anyway?" – a question that is increasingly appearing in Ukrainian society.

Scenarios for 2026–2027: from imposed ceasefire to frozen conflict

Kyiv Post, through the presented scenarios, and consultants cited by Adevărul describe several possible directions: a ceasefire imposed by Washington, with Ukrainian territorial concessions; a frozen conflict with a stable but militarized contact line; or a continuation of the war at variable intensity and without a formal agreement.

European experts consulted by the International Crisis Group draw attention to the fact that any "fast-track" integration of Ukraine into Europe, combined with incomplete security negotiations, risks leading to an "artificial and unsustainable stability," in which a new Russian attack remains just a matter of time.

How future peace is seen from Kiev and Bucharest

From the perspective of Ukrainians interviewed in Bucharest, peace means first and foremost returning home and reuniting the family, not a technical formula of "ceasefire": Oksana says she wants to return to her husband and home in Ismail, but "not with the Russians there, just a few steps away," but with the guarantee that the city will no longer be bombed.

Armand Goșu warns that a "peace" based on territorial concessions would send a dangerous signal in the region, including to Romania: it would show that in 21st century Europe, military aggression is rewarded, not sanctioned, and the front line becomes a border line through simple negotiations between great powers.

At the same time, he notes that Russia is betting precisely on the fatigue of Western public opinion and the fracturing of societies – in Romania, through polls showing an increase in those willing to accept "territorial concessions" from Kiev to stop the war – to achieve a "Russian peace," not a security solution for Ukraine.

In summary, experts see in 2026 rather the prospect of a fragile ceasefire or a frozen conflict – possibly even through a bad agreement for Kiev – than the chance of a real, lasting peace that guarantees Ukraine's security and deters new Russian aggression; the stakes are not just to "stop the war," but to not enshrine, through peace, the victory of force over law in Europe.

Synthesis made with the help of a data monitoring flow provided by the media monitoring platform NewsVibe Romania. The presented analysis was enhanced with the help of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence tools.