EU enlargement could redraw the blocking minorities in the Council, a "Think Tank Europa" analysis shows

The accession of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkan states could significantly alter the mathematics of certain votes in the Council of the European Union even if the current qualified majority rules remained unchanged, according to an analysis conducted by Think Tank Europa and presented by its authors in a commentary published by Carnegie Europe. The simulation shows that enlargement would change not only the number of participants in the vote, but also the share of the population represented by different coalitions and, consequently, their ability to form blocking minorities.

In brief

A qualified majority currently requires the support of at least 55% of the member states, which must represent at least 65% of the EU population. A blocking minority requires at least four states, and the population criterion becomes decisive in close votes.

Think Tank Europa estimates that Poland and Ukraine together would represent approximately 15.5% of the population of an enlarged Union. The analysis shows that Ukraine, together with Moldova or with Western Balkan states, could have altered the outcome of certain contested European votes in the past.

The simulation uses the Nature Restoration Law and the EU–Mercosur trade agreement to show how such coalitions could have operated. The exercise is counterfactual and does not assume that future member states would automatically reproduce the positions assigned to them in the scenarios.

An alternative formula previously proposed by a Franco-German group of experts would change the thresholds to 60% of the states and 60% of the population. Think Tank Europa estimates that this option would make blockages formed by new members more difficult, but would at the same time reduce the relative advantage that population gives the Union’s largest states.

The current qualified majority system combines two criteria. To adopt a decision, at least 55% of the member states are required—currently 15 out of 27—and they must represent at least 65% of the Union’s population. A blocking minority must include at least four states, meaning that enlargement can change the outcome even without a formal change to the percentages, because both the number of states and the distribution of the population change.

The Think Tank Europa analysis tests this issue using European votes that have already produced fragile majorities. The authors do not attempt to predict the future positions of Ukraine, Moldova or the Western Balkan states, but introduce these countries into hypothetical configurations to see how easily the thresholds required to adopt or block a decision would change.

One example is the EU Nature Restoration Law. In the vote used for the simulation, states representing 30.9% of the Union’s population opposed the text. The Think Tank Europa model shows that, in a Union including Ukraine, adding it to the camp opposing the act would have been sufficient to turn the existing coalition into a minority capable of blocking the decision under the conditions analysed.

A second example concerns trade policy. The authors use the EU–Mercosur agreement to test a possible eastern coalition made up of Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Ukraine and the Western Balkan states. In the scenario constructed by the analysis, such a grouping could become powerful enough to influence or block certain trade decisions adopted by qualified majority.

This does not mean that the states listed would necessarily form a stable political alliance after accession. Governments’ preferences can change from one file to another, and the current candidates do not hold identical positions on trade, agriculture, the environment or the budget. The simulation measures the possible arithmetic power of coalitions, not the political likelihood of their formation.

The authors nevertheless draw attention to material interests that could become relevant in certain negotiations. They identify Poland and Ukraine as two economies with important agricultural sectors and consider that future discussions on the EU’s agricultural policy, cohesion and budget could create other negotiating lines between beneficiary states and net contributors, including Western European economies more focused on industry and services.

One of the solutions analysed is the 60/60 formula presented in the debate on institutional reform by a Franco-German group of experts. Instead of the current ratio of 55% of the states and 65% of the population, adopting a decision would require 60% of the states representing at least 60% of the Union’s population.

Think Tank Europa finds that this formula would change the results of the simulations. In the scenarios analysed, an eastern coalition including Ukraine would no longer be able to block either the Nature Restoration Law or the EU–Mercosur agreement in the configurations tested.

The change would nevertheless have an effect unrelated to enlargement. Raising the threshold concerning the number of states and lowering the population threshold would give greater weight to the principle of equality among states and reduce the importance of demographic size. The analysis thus estimates a relative reduction in the power of France, Germany and Italy, even in a scenario in which the Union received no new members.

The distribution of losses would not be identical. According to the simulation, France would preserve its influence better than Italy under the 60/60 formula, which would create different interests even among the largest states when they negotiate possible changes to the voting system.

The issue predates the current wave of enlargement. Before the 2004 accession, the Union renegotiated voting weights to integrate the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland was then given 27 votes in the Council, very close to the 29 assigned to France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, in a system that preceded the current formula based on a double majority.

The current institutional context shows that the issue is already recognised at EU level. The 2023 Granada Declaration establishes that the Union’s internal reforms and the preparation of candidate states must advance in parallel, while the European Parliament subsequently called for an examination of how qualified majority voting should be adapted to preserve a balance between large and small states in an enlarged Union.

The Parliament has also supported broader use of qualified majority voting for certain intermediate stages of the accession process, while the final decision on admitting a new state remains subject to unanimity. The debate thus concerns two different issues: how new members are admitted and how the Union will function after they have voting rights.

The Think Tank Europa analysis does not argue that enlargement should be postponed, nor does it establish an optimal formula for the Council. Its conclusion is that admitting new members will redistribute institutional power even if the treaties and voting thresholds remain unchanged, while choosing a new formula would in turn produce winners and losers among the current member states.

https://2eu.brussels/ro/news/extinderea-ue-ar-putea-redesena-minoritatile-de-blocaj-din-consiliu-arata-o-analiza-think-tank-europa