The 2027 elections could multiply deadlocks over the budget and EU enlargement, warns a Carnegie Europe researcher

Stefan Lehne examines the risk that political changes in France, Italy, Poland, and Spain could make European compromises more difficult. Unanimity makes some decisions vulnerable to opposition from a single government, but differences among Eurosceptic parties and the constraints of coalitions limit the scenario of general paralysis.

Elections in 2027 in some of the European Union’s largest states could make agreements on the budget, enlargement, and support for Ukraine more difficult if they bring several Eurosceptic forces to power, warns Stefan Lehne, a researcher at Carnegie Europe in Brussels. In his analysis, the main risk is an increasingly difficult-to-govern Union that loses its ability to respond to economic and security problems, even if member states do not seek to leave it.

In brief

1.Stefan Lehne identifies a risk of deadlocks that would be harder to overcome if several large states came to be led by Eurosceptic forces. His assessment focuses particularly on France, Italy, Poland, and Spain and does not present a victory for the radical right as inevitable.

2.The multiannual budget and the accession of new states require unanimity in the Council. Other legislative acts can be adopted by qualified majority, which limits the ability of a single government to stop a decision.

3.Pressures could also be seen in more restrictive rules on migration or in the weakening of climate policies, the author anticipates. The support of some center-right parties and the composition of coalitions would influence the outcome.

4.Radical-right parties remain divided over Ukraine. Lehne recommends multiannual commitments to protect the continuity of support and considers the gradual loss of the EU’s capacity to act a more plausible risk than an immediate rupture.

Lehne focuses his assessment on France, Italy, Poland, and Spain. He considers that a political change in a large state would have consequences more difficult to absorb than the isolated opposition of a smaller government. A serious deterioration in the Franco-German relationship would affect the negotiation of compromises, while several mutually supportive Eurosceptic leaders could make deadlocks more difficult to overcome.

“A larger group of Eurosceptic leaders with similar views could lead to paralysis,” the researcher writes. The warning concerns a scenario conditioned by election results and subsequent alliances. Lehne emphasizes that the rise of the radical right is not inevitable and that parties in this political family differ both in their radicalism and in their positions on certain European issues.

Decision-making rules explain where difficulties could arise. The EU Council must decide unanimously on the multiannual financial framework, the accession of new states, and, with certain exceptions, the common foreign and security policy. In these areas, opposition from a single government can prevent agreement; abstention does not have the same effect.

For legislation adopted by qualified majority, however, a government does not have an individual veto. The usual rule requires the support of at least 15 of the 27 states, representing at least 65% of the EU’s population, while the blocking minority must include at least four states. The ability of some parties to win elections therefore does not automatically translate into a joint capacity to block all European legislation.

The 2028–2034 budget shows why the electoral outlook matters before the vote. EU leaders have called for an agreement by the end of 2026, to allow the related legislation to be adopted in 2027. The financial framework requires unanimity in the Council and approval by the European Parliament. Lehne believes that the proximity of election campaigns reduces governments’ willingness to compromise and narrows the time in which negotiations can advance.

In France, the presidential election is scheduled for April 18, 2027, with a possible second round on May 2. Regular legislative elections are scheduled for 2029, in the absence of a dissolution of the National Assembly. This distinction limits the timetable presented by Lehne, which also includes French legislative elections in 2027. The researcher considers that a radical-right victory in the presidential election could put particularly strong strain on European cooperation.

The influence of these parties could also manifest itself through changes in policy content, without completely blocking them. Lehne anticipates pressure for more restrictive rules on migration and asylum and for the weakening of environmental and climate legislation. For such changes, the radical right would need the support of center-right politicians, which the author considers likely. Developments therefore also depend on the choices of traditional parties.

There are also factors that may limit confrontation. Coalition partners can moderate Eurosceptic positions, while repeated negotiations within EU institutions make antagonizing other governments costly, Lehne explains. He gives the example of Giorgia Meloni, whose approach to Ukraine and certain European policies he describes as constructive. In his assessment, the benefits of the internal market and institutional ties make an immediate rupture of the Union unlikely.

Ukraine highlights the limits of a presumed common agenda of the radical right. The parties are deeply divided over the war, the researcher says, although he expects resistance to the costs of European support to increase in several countries. Lehne recommends strengthening commitments to Kyiv through multiannual programs, to reduce the risk that a change in national majorities would call into question the continuity of aid. This is the author’s recommendation, without any guarantee that such programs would eliminate political disputes.

The longer-term risk also concerns compliance with common rules. Lehne believes that possible democratic backsliding and violations of the rule of law could matter even more than the negotiating positions of new governments. His conclusion is that a Union unable to advance economic policy and security may gradually lose relevance as decisions are sought through other forms of cooperation. In this interpretation, the elections will test both who can block an agreement and who can still build one.

https://2eu.brussels/ro/news/alegerile-din-2027-ar-putea-multiplica-blocajele-asupra-bugetului-si-extinderii-ue-avertizeaza-un-cercetator-carnegie-europe