A Democratic return to the White House would not automatically restore the old relationship with Europe

The American elections on November 3 do not elect a new president. Beyond the vote for Congress, ECFR and Carnegie research shows why a potential Democratic administration in 2029 would not guarantee a return to the former distribution of transatlantic responsibilities.

On the eve of the American federal elections of November 3, 2026, Europe has reasons to follow not only who will control Congress, but also what kind of foreign policy is taking shape within the Democratic Party. The election does not choose a new president, and a possible Democratic return to the White House after the 2028 elections remains a scenario. However, ECFR and Carnegie analyses show why even this scenario would not guarantee the restoration of the former transatlantic relationship. The disagreements concern America’s international role and its costs, not merely Donald Trump’s style.

In brief

1.The American elections of November 3, 2026 establish the composition of Congress; they do not elect a new president. A Democratic administration installed in 2029 would depend on the outcome of the 2028 presidential election.

2.ECFR researchers identify three Democratic orientations that seek profound changes to the system, institutional reform, or a return to the American liberal tradition. These have different priorities regarding military spending, NATO, and cooperation with Europe; the study does not predict who will lead the party.

3.Stephen Wertheim of Carnegie shows that U.S. external ambitions are in tension with Americans’ willingness to bear their costs. Therefore, even an administration favorable to allies might ask Europeans to assume more responsibility for their own defense.

4.NATO retains its commitment to collective defense. The target for investment in defense and security is 5% of GDP by 2035, with at least 3.5% for defense proper and up to 1.5% for related expenditures; this is not a level already reached by every ally.

5.Europe can strengthen its defense and build cooperation with Americans in technology, the economy, and education. These preparations would reduce dependence on a favorable electoral outcome without implying a break in relations with the United States.

In the ECFR study Life of the party, Célia Belin, Chris Herrmann, and Nevada Joan Lee analyze campaign messages, programs, and interviews to explain the differences within the Democratic opposition. The research is qualitative. It does not measure the share of each orientation through a poll and does not establish who will win the 2028 presidential nomination.

The authors distinguish three types of responses to American problems. Those called revolutionaries consider the imbalances structural and call for profound changes, including to spending priorities. Reformists see institutions that can be repaired by limiting corruption and the influence of private interests. Supporters of a return to the American liberal tradition emphasize defending institutions and alliances against right-wing populism.

For Europeans, the differences matter more than the labels. An orientation critical of militarization may want a more autonomous Europe, but may reject increased military spending at the expense of social programs. An institutional reform agenda could open cooperation on combating corruption, taxation, or technology regulation. Attachment to NATO may favor continuity of the alliance without implying that the American contribution remain unchanged.

These positions are not exclusive programs, and politicians may combine elements from several orientations. Nor can the attitude toward Ukraine be reduced to a choice between unconditional support and abandonment. The form of assistance, the use of force, diplomacy, and the conditions of negotiations are distinct issues. The study provides a map of the debate, not the mandate of a future administration.

Stephen Wertheim discusses another part of the issue in The End of Primacy Without Pain, published by Carnegie on October 21. His argument is that Washington’s global ambitions face a more difficult international environment, while domestic willingness to bear the necessary costs remains limited.

The consequence is not an inevitable withdrawal. The United States could mobilize greater resources, narrow its objectives, or continue with incomplete adjustments and instability. These are possible developments discussed by the author, not a timetable for leaving Europe and not the study’s sole recommendation.

For European governments, this reasoning changes the preparation question. It is not enough to find interlocutors in Washington who are more favorable to alliances. They must understand what contributions and commitments can be politically sustained in the United States, including under leadership that wants cooperation. American domestic interests will not disappear through a change in diplomatic tone.

The article already published by 2eu.brussels on the limits of a Democratic Congress addresses the legislature’s power and support for Ukraine. This analysis concerns a different horizon: the competition between conceptions of America’s role and what it may mean for the transatlantic relationship after the next presidential elections. None of the outcomes is known in advance.

The institutional reference point remains the commitment to collective defense. The NATO summit declaration in The Hague of June 25, 2025, reaffirms it and establishes a commitment to invest 5% of GDP in defense and security by 2035. At least 3.5% targets defense requirements proper, while up to 1.5% may cover related expenditures. The 2035 target is not spending already achieved by every ally.

Separately, in a written discussion published by Carnegie on July 1, 2026, Wertheim describes the prospect of conventional defense led more by Europeans, while retaining the American nuclear umbrella. This is his interpretation of a redistribution of burdens. It should not be confused with a NATO decision that has already set all the details, force levels, and timelines for such a model.

A change in responsibilities can have important consequences even without denouncing the treaty. Available capabilities, planning, logistics, and the ability to sustain operations matter, not merely the percentage of spending. Larger budgets do not instantly turn into equipment and trained personnel.

European preparedness should not be built solely around defense. The ECFR study points to room for cooperation with American interlocutors in areas such as economic regulation, technology, and education. These ties do not replace security guarantees, but they can give the relationship common objectives beyond the dispute over military contributions.

For the EU, a prudent approach would combine this cooperation with reducing vulnerabilities over which it can act directly. This does not mean treating the United States as an adversary or rejecting a future rapprochement. It means that European plans should be able to function even if a friendly American partner demands greater responsibility, changes priorities, or cannot secure domestic support for all the desired commitments.

After the November 3 vote, the official results will alter the immediate political circumstances. They will not, by themselves, answer the question about the future presidential administration. For Europe, the test remains whether it can build a useful relationship with several possible political Americas without basing its security on the promise of a complete return to the past.

https://2eu.brussels/ro/analysis/de-ce-europa-nu-se-poate-baza-pe-revenirea-la-vechea-relatie-cu-statele-unite-dupa-trump