Europe could operate with multiple levels of integration, common public services, and a central role for Ukraine and Moldova.

The European Union should accept that not all member states will always advance at the same pace and should build formulas through which groups of countries willing to cooperate more deeply can act without dismantling the common project, according to a Carnegie Europe report. The proposals range from differentiated integration and phased accession to a European public service for youth, common universities, permanent citizen assemblies, and transforming Ukraine and Moldova from the peripheries of the continent into pillars of European security and resilience.

In short, the report starts from the idea that the architecture of the EU has largely remained that established by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, although Russia's war against Ukraine, the possible partial withdrawal of the United States, the weakening of competitiveness, and the rise of illiberal governments have radically changed the environment in which Europe operates. Several authors propose a Union with different levels of participation. Some states could cooperate more deeply in defense, taxation, industry, or foreign policy, while others would remain outside these projects without leaving the EU. The rules should prevent both permanent vetoes and the emergence of second-tier members. The enlargement process could be divided into stages. Candidate states that meet the conditions regarding democracy, the rule of law, and foreign policy could first receive associate member status, then near-complete access without veto rights, and, after fulfilling all obligations, full membership status. Some proposals aim to build a European identity through common experiences: six months or a year of public service in another European country, EU-funded universities and research institutes, expanding Erasmus, establishing European public media institutions, and multilingual education that allows communication among citizens. Ukraine and Moldova are presented as sources of experience in defending societies against war, hybrid attacks, and foreign interference. The report argues that a reorganized Europe should progressively integrate them and allow these states to lead projects in security, digitalization, democratic resilience, and combating disinformation.

The report "Europe from Scratch: Visions for a New European Order" brings together contributions from eleven experts whom Carnegie Europe asked to imagine how European cooperation could be built if current structures did not limit the available options from the outset.

The exercise does not propose the immediate dissolution of the European Union and its replacement with a single formula. The authors examine different principles and models for a Europe capable of responding more quickly to security, economic, technological, and democratic issues.

The starting point is the difference between repeated calls for reform and the limited institutional changes made in practice. After the eurozone crisis, Brexit, migration in the second half of the 2010s, the pandemic, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, European leaders have repeatedly called for the transformation of the European project.

The basic structure of the EU has remained, however, close to that established by the Lisbon Treaty. The Union continues to combine decisions made jointly by European institutions with areas in which national governments retain control and can block collective action.

This combination allows states to remain together, but slows down decisions at times when their interests diverge. Recent years' experience has shown that one or two governments can delay sanctions, financial aid, foreign policy measures, or Union reforms.

The problem could be amplified by enlargement. A Union with over 30 members would bring together economies, political systems, and perceptions of security that are even more diverse than those currently existing.

Several authors believe that the response should not be to force all states to participate in every policy in the same way. They propose recognizing differentiated integration as a normal feature of the European project.

The model already exists. Not all EU states use the euro, and the Schengen area has included member states and countries outside the Union for varying periods. Cooperation in defense, justice, and internal affairs has also developed through formulas with variable participation.

Frank Schimmelfennig proposes that this practice should receive a clear framework in European treaties. States that wish to advance in a field should be able to form a group without a non-participating country blocking the initiative.

Such a mechanism should establish the minimum number of participants, the obligation of transparency, and the possibility for other countries to join later. States that believe that a differentiated formula infringes their rights should be able to contest it before the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The same rules should prevent groups of states from building parallel agreements that undermine European institutions or the single market. The objective is flexibility within a common legal order, not fragmentation into competing organizations.

Schimmelfennig also proposes a procedure through which states can withdraw from certain forms of integration without completely leaving the Union. The possibility would be limited to areas where participation is not already uniform for all states.

Conversely, countries that do not comply with the rules of a common policy could be suspended from that structure. Such mechanisms already exist in certain forms of cooperation in defense and could be extended.

Janis Emmanouilidis goes further and describes three possible levels of action. The first would use the existing EU tools more intensively, such as enhanced cooperation among a group of states.

The second would be an "open supranational vanguard," made up of countries willing to cooperate outside the current treaties when EU rules do not allow progress. The structure would remain open to all members who accept the obligations and should maintain compatibility with European law.

This vanguard could be used in defense, common procurement, industrial capacity, and response to aggression. It could also include states outside the EU, such as the United Kingdom, Norway, Ukraine, or other countries with similar interests and values.

The formula should not become a permanent competing organization with the Union. Projects developed outside the treaties would be integrated into the EU framework when political conditions allow it.

The third option, presented as a last resort solution, would be the creation of a new supranational entity by a core of states. This would have common institutions with executive and legislative powers, decisions made by majority, and its own fiscal resources.

Such a federal core would only become relevant if blockages in the EU became permanent and if more governments actively sought to reverse integration. The author emphasizes, however, the risks: duplicate institutions, new political borders in Europe, and tensions between participants and non-participants.

Elena Lazarou proposes another form of flexibility, called "LEGO Europe." In this model, all states would continue to jointly establish the general political direction, but the implementation of decisions would be divided into modules in which countries participate based on capacity and interest.

Support for Ukraine could be organized, for example, through distinct modules for military training, equipment supply, energy, infrastructure, and reconstruction. Each module would have rules, participants, resources, and pre-established objectives.

Once the political decision is adopted, the module could be activated without resuming all negotiations. Non-EU states could participate in projects where there are common interests.

Ukraine could enter before accession into modules regarding security, energy, and digital infrastructure. The United Kingdom and Norway could participate in certain foreign policy or defense projects without becoming members of the Union.

The report also analyzes changing the accession process. Teona Giuashvili proposes a three-stage system that would offer concrete benefits before full membership.

In the first stage, a candidate state that has strengthened democracy and the rule of law, aligned its foreign policy, and advanced in technical chapters could receive associate member status. This would not have representatives in EU institutions but would benefit from more funds and recognition of an irreversible path towards accession, as long as reforms continue.

The second stage would be the status of a new member in transition. The country would receive most of the rights of EU membership but would not immediately have veto rights and could gradually enter some policies.

After a set period and after fully meeting the rules, the state would automatically transition to full membership status. The model aims to provide political results earlier and reduce the risk that a single government could block the integration of a candidate country for years.

Frank Schimmelfennig warns, however, that staged accession should not create permanent second-tier members. The conditions for obtaining all rights must be clear, periodically assessed by the Commission, and applied through decisions that cannot be arbitrarily blocked by a single state.

The report does not limit the reconstruction of Europe to institutions and procedures. Several contributions argue that deeper cooperation cannot function without stronger social ties among citizens.

Erik Jones argues that Europe is not primarily an institutional design problem. Even the best rules will function poorly if people do not believe in them and do not consider themselves part of the same political community.

He proposes extending exchange programs to secondary school students and a more varied distribution of destinations. Direct contact between people from different regions should become a more common experience, not a privilege limited to university students.

Jones also proposes clearer presentation of the economic ties between states. Products could have labels showing which European countries contributed to components, funding, production, and distribution.

Companies could indicate the percentage of content or European cooperation, so that citizens can see how the internal market connects economies and jobs.

The author recommends focusing on concrete and easily understandable benefits. The elimination of roaming fees is presented as an example of an apparently technical measure that has changed citizens' perceptions of the utility of the EU.

Daniel Baer proposes a European public service for people aged 18 to 26. Participants would spend six months or a year in another European country, working in civil, humanitarian, or possibly military service.

The program would aim for young people to work together and experience a society different from the one they were born into. Candidate states could participate voluntarily to build social ties before accession.

Baer also proposes a European public network of universities, technical schools, and research institutes funded from the EU budget and open to all European citizens.

Instead of each state trying to build separate costly infrastructures for biomedical research, artificial intelligence, or other advanced fields, common institutions could concentrate resources and provide access across the continent.

Another proposal is the creation of European public media institutions. These could collaborate with national and local newsrooms, produce content for the European audience, and provide an alternative in the informational space affected by propaganda, external interference, and automatically generated material.

Baer also supports the expansion of education in English as a common additional language, without replacing national languages. The argument is that political and economic elites already communicate in English, while a large part of the population remains outside the common European conversation.

Several contributions also call for greater direct involvement of citizens in decision-making. Kalypso Nicolaidis imagines a permanent assembly of European citizens, whose members would be randomly selected, and a third would be replaced annually.

The assembly would not remain in Brussels but would meet in different cities and regions. It would connect local debates, analyze European policies, and compel institutions to respond to recommendations.

The goal would not be to replace the European Parliament or elections. Deliberative participation and electoral representation would function together, and citizen involvement would not be limited to occasional consultations without effect.

Hendrik Nahr proposes a multi-chamber European structure. One would represent states, another regions, another elected citizens, and a fourth would include permanent forms of direct participation.

Competences could be distributed based on the domain, so that the people and territories most directly affected by a decision could effectively participate in its adoption.

The proposal responds to the perception that EU institutions are hard to understand and that responsibility for decisions is difficult to identify. In a reorganized structure, citizens should be able to find out who made a decision, by what mandate, and how it can be changed.

Nahr also supports building a European digital democratic union. Europe should develop its own technological ecosystems, reduce external dependencies, and include democratic rights and values in the design of technologies, not just in the rules applied after their emergence.

Digital tools could support permanent consultations, transparency, and a European public sphere. Automatic translation and cross-border platforms could allow the circulation of information between national media spaces without eliminating linguistic diversity.

The report assigns an important role to countries outside the western core of the EU. Teona Giuashvili proposes transforming the European Political Community into a more operational platform, organized around peace, crisis preparedness, public goods, and citizen contact.

A European Peace Community could conduct mediation and political missions in conflicts on the continent and could include a mutual assistance clause if trust in the protection offered by NATO continues to decline.

A European Preparedness Community would coordinate responses to natural disasters, health crises, cyberattacks, and disinformation. A European civil protection corps could be created to provide direct assistance in emergencies.

A European Public Goods Community would coordinate digital, energy, and transport infrastructure between the EU and neighboring states. Participants would identify common projects and work with the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

A European Citizens Community would expand Erasmus, programs for young workers, and transnational assemblies. These structures would operate in parallel with EU enlargement, without replacing it.

Anastasia Pociumban argues that Ukraine and Moldova should be moved from the periphery to the center of the new European order. Both countries have developed experience in adapting institutions, mobilizing society, and responding to Russian aggression and hybrid attacks.

Ukraine can offer accumulated knowledge on the battlefield, while Moldova has experience in protecting elections and combating influence networks and disinformation.

The report proposes that Ukraine could lead a European coalition in the field of security and resilience against hybrid attacks. Estonia, Moldova, and Ukraine could coordinate initiatives in digitalization and technological development.

Agencies managing such projects could be located in the countries leading them, not automatically in Brussels or in Western European states.

Pociumban also supports the reversible nature of integration. A candidate state that abandons reforms could lose the access obtained, but the same rule should apply to current members who violate European values or systematically block common decisions.

In this model, EU membership would no longer be treated as a status obtained definitively regardless of subsequent behavior. The level of integration would depend on compliance with clear criteria and timelines for both new and existing members.

Rosa Balfour shifts the discussion beyond the continent and calls for the EU to abandon the idea that it must become a great power in the classical model of the United States, China, or former European empires.

She describes the Union as an asymmetric power: strong in trade and regulation but dependent on allies for security. Europe should leverage its advantages through coalitions built around global public goods.

These could include the energy transition, combating climate change, human-centered technologies, navigation safety, maritime security, and biodiversity.

Coalitions should not necessarily include the EU as a bloc. Groups of European states could cooperate with countries from other regions when there are common interests and principles.

Balfour warns that the EU's global influence is affected by double standards. The differences between the European response to Russia's war against Ukraine and the response to Israel's operations in Gaza and Lebanon have weakened the Union's credibility with international partners.

Restrictive migration policies, security agreements with authoritarian regimes, and competition for raw materials are other areas where EU behavior can conflict with the values it invokes.

Chris Bickerton contests the idea that reforms can only be designed by experts and institutions. He argues that profound change cannot occur without debates and mandates obtained in national elections and referendums.

In the field of security, citizens could be asked whether they want to maintain NATO, build a separate European organization, or abandon a common regional structure. The outcome could empower Europe but would provide a clear democratic mandate for the chosen direction.

Bickerton applies the same logic to artificial intelligence. Europe should not only pursue the speed of adopting norms but should use national democratic debates to establish the social role and limits of technology.

Richard Youngs, the editor of the volume, proposes that the year 2028 become a possible moment for the re-founding of the European project. Before this, states could organize a year of public debates, participatory assemblies, and consultations with civil society.

The process could culminate in a referendum that would offer citizens more real options: weaker cooperation, integration in circles, new institutions, or a political union close to a federal state.

The proposal comes at a time when integration is extending to sensitive areas such as defense and when the EU is discussing common resources and possible European taxes to finance the budget.

The report does not present the authors' consensus on a single model. Some contributions call for deeper integration, others for more flexibility, and some shift the center of reform from institutions to citizens and society.

The common idea is that maintaining the current structure without changes can lead to paralysis. Europe must decide how it can act quickly without losing democratic legitimacy, how it can accept new members without creating inferior statuses, and how it can build common cooperation without forcing all states to participate in the same way.