Court of Justice rejects the €4,100 guarantee required in Estonia for candidacy in the European elections

The amount for each candidate and the 5% vote threshold for reimbursement imposed an excessive burden, with risks for the participation of small parties and people with low incomes. The Court permits proportionate electoral deposits, but requires the effective access to candidacy and political pluralism to be protected.

The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on 17 September 2026 that Estonia could not make candidacies in European elections conditional on a deposit equal to five monthly minimum wages, reimbursed only if 5% of the votes were obtained, under the conditions examined in the case. The amount of €4,100 for each candidate, applied in the 2024 election, and the risk of losing it exceeded what was necessary to deter unserious candidacies and could make participation more difficult for people and parties with low incomes.

In briefThe deposit required in Estonia in the 2024 European elections was €4,100 for one candidate and €36,900 for a list of nine. Reimbursement depended on obtaining at least 5% of the votes.

The Court considered the combination of the amount and the reimbursement conditions excessive. It examined incomes in Estonia, the deposit five times lower in national elections, and the restrictions on party financing.

The seven initially rejected Green candidates were provisionally registered and were able to participate in the election. The case remained relevant also for recovering the deposit paid, since the party did not reach the 5% threshold.

The judgment does not prohibit all electoral deposits and does not set a single European ceiling. The Estonian court must apply the Court’s interpretation in the national dispute.

The case arose from the list of nine candidates submitted by the Estonian Green Party, Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised. For a complete list, the deposit amounted to €36,900. The party paid only for two candidacies, and the electoral commission initially refused to register the other seven.

The seven were nevertheless able to participate in the elections. On 14 May 2024, the Supreme Court of Estonia ordered their registration as an interim measure, and the electoral commission complied on the same day. The dispute continued because the national court was examining the constitutionality of the rule, and the party had not reached the 5% threshold required for reimbursement of the deposit already paid. The Court of Justice’s answer may also influence the decision regarding that money.

The Estonian government argued that the deposit makes candidates assess their intentions and chances more carefully. The stated aim was to reduce unserious candidacies and votes that do not contribute to the election of a Member of the European Parliament, for a more accurate representation of the electorate. A secondary objective was to avoid unnecessary public expenditure on organising the election and covering the debates in the public media.

The Court accepted that such objectives may be legitimate and that a financial deposit may contribute to achieving them. The initial cost and the risk of losing the money may lead candidates to reflect on their motivation. States remain competent to establish the rules for candidacies, but they must respect the right to stand for election, guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and keep restrictions proportionate to the aim pursued.

In Estonia’s case, the judges examined the concrete burden of the amount. The €4,100 deposit for one candidate represented approximately 2.6 gross median monthly salaries, based on the level of €1,578 in the fourth quarter of 2023. Payment was required before registration, and money not recovered after the election remained in the state budget.

The comparison with national parliamentary elections raised another issue. There, the deposit per candidate was five times lower, although the authorities pursued the same objective of deterring unserious candidacies. The government explained the difference by the greater number of candidates required in the national election in relation to the available seats. The Court left it to the Estonian court to verify this justification, stressing that differences between electoral systems must effectively support it.

The financial risk also had to be assessed together with the rules on party financing. For national elections, there was a budgetary allocation for parties obtaining at least 2% of the vote, with no equivalent mechanism for European elections. At the same time, parties could obtain income only from sources permitted by law, such as membership fees, public allocations, donations from natural persons, and transactions involving their own assets. Anonymous donations and donations from legal persons were prohibited, and loans were subject to restrictions.

Under these conditions, payment of the deposit could consume a significant part of a party’s annual budget, alongside campaign expenses. The 5% threshold added the risk of losing the money even for a candidacy expressing important political demands that were insufficiently represented. The Court warns that a strict requirement “could prevent new parties from emerging” and would run counter to the political pluralism guaranteed by EU law.

The judges also established a limit to the argument concerning votes that do not translate into seats. States cannot combat such votes solely on the basis of the assessment that certain political programmes have no real chance of attracting sufficient support. The lack of electoral prospects does not, in itself, permit a political platform to be excluded from the competition.

The conclusions presented by Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta in November 2025 criticised more categorically the use of money to verify the seriousness of candidacies, considering that such a filter selects according to wealth. The judgment does not fully adopt this reasoning. The Court accepts that a deposit may be an appropriate instrument, but considers the amount and the reimbursement conditions in the examined Estonian system excessive.

The solution is based on the right to stand for election and the principle of representative democracy. The Court did not consider that the payment required in this case fell within the scope of protection of the right to property invoked separately by the Estonian court. After finding the mechanism excessive, the judges did not go on to examine separately whether it could be replaced with less restrictive measures, such as the signatures of support discussed during the proceedings.Case C-438/24, the solution is based on the right to stand for election and the principle of representative democracy. The Court did not consider that the payment required in this case fell within the scope of protection of the right to property invoked separately by the Estonian court. After finding the mechanism excessive, the judges did not go on to examine separately whether it could be replaced with less restrictive measures, such as the signatures of support discussed during the proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Estonia must resolve the national dispute in accordance with the European interpretation, including the implications for the deposit paid. The judgment does not establish a single maximum amount for all Member States and does not itself order the reimbursement of any amount to the party. It does, however, require the authorities to assess together the amount of the deposit and the conditions under which candidates can recover their money, so that access to European elections can be exercised in practice.

https://2eu.brussels/ro/news/curtea-de-justitie-respinge-garantia-de-4100-de-euro-ceruta-in-estonia-pentru-candidatura-la-alegerile-europene