Belarus is becoming an advanced military base for Russia, and the EU needs to change its strategy, warns an ECFR analysis.

Belarus is becoming an increasingly important component of the Russian military apparatus and is approaching the status of an advanced operational base for Moscow, which extends Russian military pressure along the eastern border of the European Union, according to an analysis published by the European Council on Foreign Relations. The author, Vasil Navumau, argues that the sanctions and diplomatic isolation imposed on Minsk have not prevented the deepening of military integration with Russia and recommends that Europeans pursue a strategy aimed at maintaining a certain Belarusian autonomy from the Kremlin.

In short, the ECFR analysis argues that Belarus has evolved from a logistical base behind the front for Russia to a potential advanced operational point, with military infrastructure, missile systems, and Russian nuclear capabilities installed on its territory. Approximately 2,000 Russian soldiers are currently concentrated around air defense systems, training centers, logistical facilities, and existing Russian military installations in Belarus. The author believes that the European policy predominantly based on sanctions risks reducing Minsk's economic alternatives and increasing its dependence on Russia, without addressing the issue of militarization. ECFR recommends strengthening support for Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, maintaining diplomatic and technical contacts with Belarus, and conditioning any concessions on verifiable actions, including the release and treatment of political prisoners. The proposed strategy does not aim to bring Belarus closer to the West or legitimize the regime of Alexander Lukashenko, but to prevent the transformation of the country into a permanent and fully integrated base of Russian military power.

The military relationship between Russia and Belarus has changed significantly since the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, according to the ECFR analysis. Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory for military equipment, aviation, railway infrastructure, hospitals, and airfields, and served, in the early phases of the war, as a starting point for ground operations towards Kyiv and Chernihiv and for missile and aviation attacks. The author argues that after this stage, Moscow began to transform the infrastructure initially used for logistical support into a more permanent military presence, closer to the model of an advanced operational base.

According to the policy brief, Russia has approximately 2,000 soldiers in Belarus, concentrated around air defense systems, training centers, logistical hubs, and existing Russian military installations. Between 2022 and 2023, ammunition transfers from Belarus to Russia are said to have exceeded 130,000 tons, and joint training centers, depots, armament facilities, and transport corridors have been modernized under the Russia-Belarus Union State programs. The author believes that this infrastructure now provides Russia with a greater capacity to support operations on the western flank.

The nuclear dimension represents one of the main concerns of the analysis. The Constitution of Belarus was amended in 2022 to allow the storage of Russian nuclear weapons, and Russia subsequently deployed Iskander systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads on Belarusian territory. ECFR states that hypersonic Oreshnik missiles were moved in early 2025 to a location estimated by experts to be about 60 kilometers south of Minsk, bringing additional Russian military capabilities closer to EU and NATO states.

The analysis describes this evolution as Belarus's transition from a "rear-operating base," primarily used for logistics, maintenance, and strategic depth, to a possible "forward-operating base." The difference is important in the author's argument: such a transformation would allow Russia to use Belarusian territory more directly for the deployment of personnel, military infrastructure, joint training, and future operations. The author does not claim that Belarus has directly entered the war in Ukraine with its own troops, but argues that military and institutional integration with Russia has reached a level that alters the risks for neighboring states.

One episode analyzed in the document concerns four signal relay stations discovered by Ukrainian services in the Gomel and Brest regions in June 2026. The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, called on Belarus to dismantle them, and the author states that the facilities were subsequently removed or shut down, without public confirmation from Minsk. ECFR treats the episode as an indication that Lukashenko retains a certain capacity to make decisions separate from Moscow, although the document acknowledges that there are also reports suggesting that the facilities may have been destroyed by Ukraine.

This margin of autonomy represents the central point of the author's recommendations for European policy. Instead of treating Belarus exclusively as an extension of Russia, Europeans should identify areas where Minsk can still make its own decisions and use diplomatic and economic pressure to prevent irreversible military integration. The proposed objective is not the rapid transformation of Belarus into a democratic or Western-oriented state, but the reduction of the risk that its territory becomes permanently a platform for Russian military power.

The policy brief is critical of the effectiveness of the current European policy predominantly based on sanctions and isolation. The author argues that the reduction of trade and economic relations with Europe after 2020 and especially after the invasion of Ukraine has created a space that Russia has occupied through trade, financing, and access to markets. Moscow has become an essential market for Belarusian goods such as dairy products and petrochemicals, and the diminishing of Western alternatives would have increased Lukashenko's regime's dependence on Russia.

This conclusion, however, does not lead to the recommendation of a general lifting of sanctions. The author emphasizes that the regime in Minsk continues political repression, human rights violations, and support for Russia's war in Ukraine, noting the existence of 879 political prisoners at the time of writing the analysis. The proposal is that any potential European concessions, including high-level diplomatic contacts or a limited relaxation of some sanctions, should be linked to measurable and verifiable actions, such as the release of identified political prisoners, the cessation of politically motivated arrests, and access for international humanitarian organizations.

ECFR compares in this context the European approach with that adopted by the United States. According to the analysis, Washington has pursued a more transactional policy, using calibrated relaxation of sanctions in exchange for the release of political prisoners; the document mentions the release of 123 individuals in 2025 in the context of the relaxation of some American restrictions on the Belarusian potash industry. The author believes that such agreements have produced limited humanitarian results but have not changed Belarus's strategic and military alignment with Russia.

For member states bordering Belarus, the recommendations focus more on security. Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia are described as being simultaneously exposed to military pressure, border incidents, and hybrid actions, and ECFR recommends that support for these states be more clearly integrated into a European defense and crisis management strategy. The author proposes better coordination between military preparedness, diplomatic signaling, and channels aimed at avoiding accidental escalation.

The document notes that Poland closed its border with Belarus during the Zapad military exercises in September 2025, and Lithuania subsequently closed its border for a month after meteorological balloons entered its airspace from Belarus. In Latvia, authorities recorded up to July 21, 2026, a total of 8,413 attempts to cross the border during the year, in the context of migratory pressure attributed to Minsk. ECFR places these incidents in a broader category of hybrid risks that add to the Russian military presence.

Another recommendation is to maintain functional communication channels within Belarus. The author suggests keeping working diplomatic contacts through the embassies of member states in Minsk, intermediaries, or direct technical lines that can be used for exchanges regarding military movements and other sensitive developments. The purpose of these contacts would be to reduce the risk of miscalculations and maintain an alternative to channels exclusively dominated by the structures of the Russia-Belarus Union State.

ECFR also recommends continuing support for Belarusian small and medium-sized enterprises, including companies operating in exile or trying to reduce their dependence on the Russian market. The document notes that the EU and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development promised in 2022 approximately 4 billion euros for SMEs that relocated their activities outside the country and suggests exploring ways to support independent economic capacity within Belarus.

Support for civil society and the diaspora remains a separate component of the proposed strategy. The author argues that exile has become a structural instrument of the regime's repression and that activists, journalists, researchers, and civic organizations forced to leave the country should be treated by Europeans as a long-term political and social resource. The EU should, according to the analysis, provide more predictability regarding residence, access to the labor market, and recognition of qualifications for Belarusians in exile and consider surveillance, digital intimidation, and pressures on families remaining in Belarus as European security issues.

The EU has allocated, according to the document, approximately 200 million euros since 2020 to support the Belarusian population, and ECFR recommends more stable funding for independent media, research organizations, and civic initiatives in exile. The author also suggests continuing programs aimed at youth and civil society, including Erasmus+, the European Solidarity Corps, and cultural projects funded by the Commission.

Regarding the political opposition, the analysis recommends continuing dialogue with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and democratic organizations in exile, without treating them automatically as the only future alternative to Lukashenko. The author believes that such contacts provide European institutions with a better understanding of Belarusian society and institutions and can maintain the political and civic infrastructure necessary for any future change.

The strategy proposed by ECFR thus seeks to avoid the exclusive choice between total isolation and normalization of relations with the regime in Minsk. In the short term, the priority should be to prevent the transformation of the Russian military presence in Belarus into a permanent and irreversible reality and to limit the deployment of Russian conventional and nuclear weapons. In the long term, the author does not propose a Belarus aligned with the West, but a state sufficiently autonomous to resist its transformation into a permanent base for Russian military power and capable of maintaining manageable relations both with Europe and with Russia.

Belarus and Russia have formed the Union State since 1999, a supranational framework through which the two countries have gradually deepened their economic, political, and military cooperation. Integration accelerated after the political crisis in Belarus in 2020 and after the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The policy brief "In the bear’s paw: How Europeans can loosen Russia’s grip on Belarus" was published by the European Council on Foreign Relations on August 20, 2026, and is signed by Vasil Navumau, a researcher at the University of Siegen and a former visiting fellow at ECFR. ECFR specifies that publications represent the opinions of the authors and do not reflect the collective positions of the organization.