AMLA says that money laundered through properties can fuel the increase in housing prices.

Money derived from illegal activities and investments in properties can contribute to the increase in housing prices by raising demand in the market, stated Bruna Szego, president of the Authority for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, during the joint hearing of the ECON and LIBE committees of the European Parliament, held in Brussels on July 15, 2026. She described the real estate sector as one of the most exposed non-financial areas, due to the high value of transactions, the use of complex corporate structures, and the differences between national control systems.

In short, properties allow for the transfer of large sums through a single transaction and can be purchased through companies, holdings, or other structures that complicate the identification of the person who actually controls the money and the property. Bruna Szego stated that there are economic models and empirical evidence regarding a correlation between money laundering and the increase in housing prices. The explanation provided is that illicit funds add demand to the market and can influence prices in areas where such purchases are concentrated. The risks are not limited to banks. Real estate agents, notaries, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals who prepare, verify, or authenticate transactions can play an essential role in identifying the real beneficiaries and suspicious operations. AMLA is preparing a common risk assessment methodology and a supervision manual for national authorities to monitor the real estate market according to closer criteria. Common analyses, thematic evaluations, and comparisons between the practices of member states can also be used. The authority has not announced direct controls on ordinary buyers nor any measures to limit legal real estate transactions. The focus is on high-risk operations, opaque ownership structures, and professionals required to verify clients and the source of funds.

The real estate sector is attractive for money laundering because it can transform funds from criminal activities into a legal asset that can be held, rented, or resold. A property purchased with illicit money can give the appearance of a regular investment, especially when the transaction is split between multiple companies or jurisdictions.

Bruna Szego explained in the European Parliament that the size of the market and the high value of transactions allow for the absorption of considerable sums. Additionally, property valuations do not always follow sufficiently clear and uniform rules, which can facilitate the justification of prices that do not fully reflect the real economic value.

"The real estate market is one of the riskiest areas in the non-financial sector," said the president of AMLA. She indicated the high value of transactions, the use of complex corporate structures, and the difficulty of identifying the person who ultimately controls the property among the main risk factors.

A purchase can be made through a company, a holding, or a succession of entities registered in multiple states. When the chain of ownership is complicated enough, the real estate agent, notary, bank, and authorities may have difficulties in establishing who provides the money and who actually benefits from the property.

The issue can also affect prices. Szego stated that there is research and economic models showing a correlation between money laundering and the rising cost of housing, as illicit funds introduce additional demand into the market. The statement does not mean that money laundering solely explains the increase in prices, but indicates that it can become one of the factors amplifying pressure in certain areas.

Buyers seeking primarily to transform or hide money may accept different conditions than a family buying a home to live in. In such cases, the return on investment or the price paid may be less important than the possibility of moving and keeping funds in an apparently legitimate asset.

AMLA considers it essential to supervise the professionals facilitating transactions. In some states, notaries verify the identity of the parties and property documents, while in others their role is less significant or not mandatory for all sales. Real estate agents, lawyers, and accountants may also have verification and reporting obligations.

These professions are known in the anti-money laundering system as intermediaries who can hinder or facilitate access to illicit funds in the legal economy. Effective controls involve identifying the real beneficiary, understanding the structure of the transaction, and verifying situations where the source of the money, the price, or the relationship between the parties raises questions.

The application of rules varies, however, between member states. AMLA's annual report shows that the authority received responses from over 120 national supervisory bodies to understand the risks, available resources, and difficulties encountered in the non-financial sector.

Szego described this sector as a "blind spot" for all member states, as it includes a very large number of professionals and companies, from real estate agents and notaries to jewelry traders, car dealers, lawyers, and accountants. The level of training and the intensity of controls vary significantly between countries and professions.

AMLA is preparing a basic methodology for assessing risks in the non-financial sector and a common framework for supervision. The goal is for national authorities to better identify high-risk transactions and activities without applying the same level of control to all buyers or all firms.

The authority intends to develop explanatory materials for professionals who need to apply the rules, especially in areas where obligations are less known. These would clarify what verifications need to be made, when a thorough analysis is necessary, and under what conditions a suspicious transaction must be reported to the national financial intelligence unit.

AMLA will be able to compare the practices of national authorities through thematic evaluations and peer reviews. Such analysis can show where controls are weaker, what types of structures are used to hide real beneficiaries, and whether the same risks receive very different responses from one state to another.

Common analyses with financial intelligence units can be used when purchases involve money, companies, or individuals from multiple countries. A property can be purchased in one state, through a company registered in another, and financed from an account in a third jurisdiction, making it difficult to reconstruct the complete trail by a single authority.

The European database EuReCA, taken over by AMLA, provides information about significant deficiencies identified by supervisors in anti-money laundering systems. In 2025, it received 1,385 reports concerning 213 entities, and common issues involved customer verification, transaction monitoring, and identifying real beneficiaries.

AMLA will not directly supervise the entire European real estate market. The primary responsibility remains with national authorities, and the role of the European authority is to bring control methods closer, analyze cross-border risks, and intervene when differences between systems leave room for circumventing the rules.