Strategic communication in times of war

Strategic communication in times of war

The Romanian authorities still do not communicate ideally and it is normal for them to be criticized. However, I see a frenzy among some public commentators here throwing, at any cost, anathemas and incendiary reputational bombs at the Romanian authorities regarding the incidents with the drone in Galați, respectively the maritime drone that exploded in the Port of Constanța

If the drone had targeted a Russian tanker that left Năvodari at 9 am, how is it explained that the Ukrainian drone was identified in the port of Constanța at 6 am? The drone would have had to wait for hours in a crowded port area to intercept a ship that was not even in motion yet. This is not technically impossible, but it is a very risky way of operating and we should find out if the Ukrainians could have planned such madness. Otherwise, the question of what a Russian tanker is doing in a Romanian port is legitimate and that is why the official communication of the Romanian state must switch to turbo mode, with coordination, serious vectors, and a more alert flow of clear information.

Still, I remain of the opinion that the war propaganda conducted on the territory of Romania, regardless of which side it comes from, is intensifying and must be treated as such under conditions that unnecessarily vulnerable key institutions of the country. Too many Romanian citizens are actively involved in promoting it, with an energy, resources, and force that is at least curious.

The main lesson from the incidents in Galați (the Russian drone that the Russians continue to lie about not being theirs) and Constanța (the Ukrainian drone that the Ukrainians have transparently acknowledged belongs to them) is that political leaders must first all come out of the passive mode of the last 4 years in which they promoted an absurd narrative focused on two erroneous lines of communication: the war in Ukraine does not affect us and that, in any problem, NATO protects us. The population must be prepared to understand that we are in proximity to a hard war, that there are real security risks for Romania, that some cannot be combated, and that the first line of NATO defense on the territory of our country is the Romanian Army together with the other institutions in the national defense and public order system.

This approach is vital not only to increase the resilience of citizens, to get everyone out, and citizens and commentators out of the atmosphere of hysteria, but also for the formation of another culture and reaction reflexes within the institutions that ultimately depend on the strategic political directions of the country outlined by the political factor and the natural civilian command in a democratic regime.