Atypical electoral developments and possible trends for the 2028 elections

The last six months have brought several atypical electoral developments, but ones that may suggest possible trends for the parties in 2027, a pre-election year that will set the framework for the competition in the 2028 local and parliamentary elections.

1. After the PSD-AUR no-confidence motion that brought down the pro-European coalition government led by Ilie Bolojan, the PNL gained approximately 6 percentage points in one month, reaching 20-22% in May 2026, a record and a completely atypical development in such a situation. Subsequently, the five months of grueling interim government completely eroded the electoral support suddenly accumulated by the PNL, which returned, in November 2026, to its April 2026 scores. For the PNL, opportunities for growth in opposition remain, centered around a leader, Ilie Bolojan, who has maintained a coherent profile and a reasonable level of trust.

2. The PSD lost 3-4 percentage points at the time of the no-confidence motion, reaching, in May 2026, an all-time low in INSCOP polling. The five months of opposition and interim PNL-USR-UDMR government allowed the PSD to almost completely recover the heavy losses suffered at that time. And taking over the government brought it another, natural, increase of approximately 4-5 percentage points in November 2026, up to a score of 22-24%. Clearly, the prospect of rapid erosion as a result of solitary participation in a difficult government, during difficult economic times and in the middle of the winter season, is a plausible hypothesis. But neither can the possibility of a surprise—a stabilization in electoral support—be completely ruled out, if the PSD manages to achieve what now seems impossible: to deliver at least one relevant reform or a serious reduction in wasteful public spending.

3. AUR benefited from exceptional stability in electoral support, with a steady score of 38-40% over the past 18 months. Until November 2026, when AUR fell, for the first time and rather abruptly, to a score of 34-35%. That is, a significant loss of 4-5%, probably former Social Democratic voters, who appear to be returning, temporarily or not, to a PSD that has returned to government. It remains to be seen whether AUR is going into a tailspin or whether this is merely a momentary setback, as we have seen with other parties as well.

4. The USR quickly lost approximately 3 points after the no-confidence motion, reaching 9% in May 2026. It remained at this level during the long interim period. Until November 2026, when, following the formation of the PSD government and its refusal to vote for the Government, the USR quickly recovered its losses and returned to 12-13%.

5. Tested for the first time in November 2026, the hypothesis of a PNL-USR Alliance obtained an unexpectedly high score among mobilized voters, at 32%, just 3 points below AUR. If it materializes, and the pains of bringing it into being are not exhausting, such a political project has a chance of becoming a landmark in the 2028 elections. Subject to a few conditions. It must be more credible in opposition than AUR, even attract this party’s more moderate voters, and rise above the inevitable “agitations” of partisan bubbles.

6. Amid this entire political roller coaster, half of Romania’s population says it would vote for a newly established party. The only problem is that such a party, although not impossible to establish, is difficult to… launch. There would be room for such a project, and potential leaders as well (for example, Victor Ponta has consistently maintained a trust level above 20%), while some parties are approaching the threshold (SENS), but the time remaining until 2028 is, in fact, very short. For everyone who wants to enter or remain in the political game.