Although INSCOP has published several polling data points in recent days, the highlight of the week remained the package concerning voting intentions—or, I should say, voting preferences… And yes, there has been a decline for AUR, from 39% in September 2026 to 34% in November. Since INSCOP has stuck to the figures rather than prophecies, the observation that some support had shifted from AUR to PSD emerged only when empirical evidence existed to support it.
Of course, we have discussed these matters before—that intention is one thing and is correlated with an election context, while preference is an orientation that may not benefit from an immediate electoral context. Although, these days, who knows?
A first observation is that, by using two calculation bases—respondents who chose a party from the list versus respondents who chose a party from the list and declared that they would definitely vote—we find that, in AUR’s case, there is no difference in its score between the two scenarios. Although PSD remains in second place and is up compared with September, there is a 3% difference between the two scenarios, with the figure calculated among voters who say they would definitely vote placing it at a slight disadvantage. In PNL’s case, the two scenarios are also relatively equal, while for USR, which is in fourth place, there is again a difference of around 3% between the two hypotheses, but the higher score appears among voters determined to participate, not among the hypothetical electorate, as in PSD’s case.
Of course, the electorate is not a sack of potatoes that can be moved from one cart to another, and percentages must be read in relation to each individual whole, not merely compared from one month to the next. But the transfer of preferences from AUR to PSD, if we look at voters who say they are determined to participate, from September to November, is highly plausible. It is also consistent with PSD’s recent success regarding the formation of the government after the long-drawn-out interim period (let us call it that…), as well as with a series of messages appealing to an electorate sensitive to at least some sovereigntist issues. Let us not forget what we established some time ago, in another article: AUR’s electorate is quite complex and consists of several clusters, depending on people’s grievances, rather than being ideologically homogeneous. And once again, let us not forget that AUR’s electorate at one point grew primarily at the expense of PSD’s, especially when sympathizers emerged among the older population. Initially, AUR was a political option largely confined to a younger electorate with a fairly specific profile in terms of other sociodemographic characteristics.
To paraphrase a famous saying, it appears that PSD is beginning—or at least trying—to win back its electorate, sending signals that are not necessarily sovereigntist but instead focusing on the issues and concerns that led this electorate to join AUR’s supporters. Their thesis was that, during the cohabitation with PNL, the pro-Europeanism versus sovereigntism polarization— not everyone agrees with these labels, but for now they are useful—created the impression that PSD was no longer addressing part of its electorate, or at least did not acknowledge some of its concerns. How much of this electorate PSD can win back remains to be seen and also depends on what AUR does next, just as the dynamics of AUR’s electorate may also depend on the still-unresolved AUR–Călin Georgescu duality.
The same data also show that the prospect of a PNL–USR alliance is well received by the electorates of both parties and would currently place this potential alliance in second place in the political rankings.
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