ANALYSIS Victory on the battlefield, defeat in geopolitics: the risks of the US campaign in Iran

The US campaign (and that of Israel) against Iran was announced with maximum objectives: the destruction of Iranian military capabilities, the prevention of acquiring nuclear weapons, the neutralization of the proxy network, and, at least initially at the declarative level, the weakening or even regime change in Tehran. The experiences of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan show, however, that military superiority does not guarantee the transformation of these maximalist objectives into sustainable political results.

The risks that a technically successful military campaign could fail politically in Iran are high for several structural reasons: a resilient regime, a strong national identity, an extremely complex terrain for "nation-building", a regional environment saturated with non-state actors and strategic rivals of the US ready to fill any power vacuum. Additionally, Washington has formulated a set of objectives that are difficult to reconcile with each other in the short term (a weakened regime, but a functional state; a less aggressive Iran, but without a "humiliating defeat" that would radicalize society), which amplifies the risk of strategic incoherence.

The pattern of US interventions: tactical success, strategic impasse

Strategic literature and assessments made after Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan describe a three-stage pattern:

Phase 1 – rapid military success (defeating the enemy army, decapitating the regime, destroying critical infrastructure);

Phase 2 – power vacuum and difficulties in building a legitimate and effective local partner;

Phase 3 – insurgency, fragmentation, political fatigue in the US, withdrawal or freezing of the conflict with results far from the initial objectives.

Analyses of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan highlight three recurring defects: overconfidence in military force as a tool for political change, the absence of credible local partners, and underestimating the costs and duration of post-conflict reconstruction. In Iraq, the US managed to quickly remove Saddam's regime but triggered a process of internal fragmentation that amplified Iran's influence – exactly the strategic adversary they wanted to limit. In Afghanistan, the initial campaign against the Taliban degenerated into a war of attrition where the objective of "state-building" became increasingly politically less credible, culminating in withdrawal and the return of the Taliban to power.

Applied to Iran, this pattern could look like this: the US and Israel massively degrade Iranian conventional capabilities but fail to achieve a stable, pro-Western, or even moderately pro-Western regime; the proxy network adapts and decentralizes; the costs of maintaining a credible military posture in the region increase; and rivals like Russia and China capitalize on the perception of a new "failed adventure" by the US.

The risks of prolonging the war in Iran

A short and limited conflict would already produce shockwaves, but prolonging the war in Iran changes the nature of the crisis, from a military episode into a "system-war" with effects lasting for many years. Analyses from think tanks and European institutions outline several likely consequences:

Internal fragmentation and strengthening of the "besieged nation" narrative

A prolonged war could weaken the military capabilities of the regime, but at the same time, it would strengthen the reflex of national mobilization and the narrative of "resistance" against the West. The regime could combine repression with the symbolic exploitation of martyrdom and civilian suffering, limiting the chances of a rapid democratic transition, even if massive protests arise.

Regionalization and "proxy-wars 2.0"

The risk of regional escalation is already observed, with the involvement of Iranian proxy networks (Hezbollah, Houthis, militias in Iraq and Syria) and increased military or defensive reactions from Israel, Gulf states, and the US. A prolonged conflict increases the likelihood of attacks on maritime routes (the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea), energy infrastructure, and Western bases in the region.

Energy shocks and inflationary pressures

Europe is already exposed to the volatility of the energy market, and a prolonged war in Iran – a key player in the oil market and a nodal point of maritime routes – would amplify the risks of rising energy and transport prices. Even though direct imports of Iranian oil to the EU have been limited for years, Europe remains "downstream" of the global dynamics of prices and flows through the Gulf and Red Sea straits.

Political polarization in the West

In the EU, a prolonged crisis will accentuate the rifts between Atlanticist member states (which more firmly support Washington's positions) and the more cautious ones, concerned about escalation and internal costs. In the US, the costs of a long and uncertain war could erode public support for the campaign, creating pressures for negotiated exits that do not meet the initially declared objectives – re-editing the scenario of "forced compromise" from Vietnam or Afghanistan.

What Europe (and Romania) can do

Although the EU is not a belligerent party, European institutions recognize that "non-participation" does not offer immunity: Europe is directly exposed through energy, trade routes, diplomatic positioning, and internal cohesion. Brussels has so far responded with calls for "maximum restraint", civilian protection, and respect for international law, coupled with additional sanctions against Iran – including for military support to Russia in Ukraine.

European measures can be synthesized into a few axes:

Energy policy axes

accelerating the diversification of energy sources (American LNG, Norwegian gas, Mediterranean gas, partnerships with Gulf states, Algeria, West Africa) to cushion price shocks caused by the Iranian crisis;

strengthening common purchasing mechanisms and strategic stocks of gas and oil, to reduce the vulnerability of more dependent states in Eastern EU.

Maritime and military security axes

strengthening European naval missions already present in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, with a clear mandate to protect freedom of navigation and coordinate with the US and coastal states;

adapting NATO planning on the southern and eastern flank, taking into account the possibility of conflict expansion, including through hybrid or cyber attacks related to Iranian actors or proxies.

Diplomatic and crisis management axes

maintaining an autonomous line of dialogue with regional actors (Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, Israel) to create de-escalation channels and to avoid the perception that the EU is merely a "diplomatic annex" of Washington;

strengthening civil protection and evacuation capabilities for European citizens in the region, a mechanism already activated by the EU.

In this framework, Romania fits into the dual logic of being a NATO and EU member, with limited maneuvering space but with some concrete tools:

on the security dimension, Bucharest will continue to support NATO lines regarding deterrence and defense posts, including through facilities on national territory (Deveselu, air bases) and through contributions to maritime or air missions in the eastern Mediterranean proximity, if decided at the allied level;

on the energy dimension, Romania can accelerate the exploitation of resources in the Black Sea, regional interconnections, and investments in renewables, to further reduce its exposure to external shocks and to become a provider of stability in the region, in line with EU directions;

on the diplomatic dimension, Romania can leverage its profile as a predictable, pro-European, and pro-Atlantic state, supporting de-escalation initiatives, respect for international law, and civilian protection, without positioning itself, however, as a singular mediator in a file dominated by the "big three" of the EU (France, Germany, Italy) and the US.

Possible consequences if the EU mismanages this crisis

If Europe does not relatively quickly use its crisis management levers, a prolonged war in Iran could generate:

internal social pressures, through rising energy and consumer goods prices, fueling populist and eurosceptic narratives;

dilution of support for Ukraine, if public opinion perceives that the EU is caught in a new crisis front without an exit;

erosion of the credibility of the European project as a "normative power" capable of preventing and managing conflicts in its extended neighborhood.

In these conditions, the real stakes for Washington and its allies are not just "how quickly can Iran be struck" and how many military infrastructures can be destroyed, but whether the post-conflict architecture will reduce or, on the contrary, amplify strategic chaos in the Middle East and in the international system. Iran risks becoming yet another chapter in a chronology of American interventions where military victory opened the door to long-term political defeats.

Analysis conducted with the support of Perplexity