Russia recurrently invokes the defense of Russian or Russian-speaking minorities when explaining its political and military interventions in the post-Soviet space, and the case of Transnistria is one of the central links in this pattern. Over the last 35 years, this theme has appeared in various forms, from "Russophobia" invoked in Chișinău to the protection of "Russian citizens" in Georgia and Ukraine, and has been associated with support for separatist movements, military presence, and the alteration of the territorial status quo.
This week, Sergei Shoigu, the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, stated that approximately 220,000 Russian citizens in Transnistria are in a risk situation and that the Russian Federation is prepared to "take all necessary measures" and to resort to "all available methods" to ensure their protection, within the limits of the Russian Constitution. The message, which explicitly mentions the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in connection with alleged "unreasonable" or "irresponsible" actions, is formulated in a register similar to that used by Moscow in other crisis contexts, when political positions or military scenarios have been related to the defense of Russian citizens or Russian-speaking communities in neighboring states.
Referring to the 1992 war on the Dniester shows that the theme of protecting Russian-speaking populations has a longer history in the region, even though interpretations of the conflict differ significantly. In the narrative promoted over time by Russian authorities and the administration in Tiraspol, the crisis is mainly attributed to political and identity changes in Chișinău, described as "Russophobic," while Moscow's involvement is primarily presented in terms of mediation and stopping violence. At the same time, testimonies from former military officials, synthesis works, and press materials from the Republic of Moldova describe the role of the 14th Army units in supporting separatist formations and their influence on the security configuration in the region, including maintaining a Russian military presence on the left bank of the Dniester after the ceasefire.
In the last approximately three decades, references to the protection of Russian citizens or Russian-speaking minorities have constantly appeared in the official discourse from Moscow when addressing political and security crises in the post-Soviet space. From the Dniester conflict to the war in Georgia in 2008, from the annexation of Crimea in 2014 to the large-scale invasion launched in Ukraine in 2022, this theme is used alongside historical, legal, and security arguments, in the context of military interventions, support for separatist structures, or changing the territorial status quo.
The discourse about the defense of "compatriots" has precedents even in the imperial period, when Russia often explained its involvement in the Balkans and the Black Sea through the necessity of protecting Orthodox communities. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in a context where a significant number of Russians and Russian speakers remained outside the borders of the Russian Federation, this theme was adapted to the post-1991 realities and became one of the components through which Moscow defines its role and interests in its neighborhood.
In the 2000s, the continuity of these elements is synthesized in the concept of "Russkiy Mir" – "the Russian world," which brings together linguistic, cultural, religious, and political dimensions, within which the Russian Federation presents itself as the main guarantor. In parallel, part of the Russian political discourse discusses how the borders were drawn after 1991, sometimes considering them the result of unjust or arbitrary decisions; in this context, invoking the protection of Russian or Russian-speaking minorities is repeatedly associated with positions regarding the revision or reinterpretation of the territorial status quo in certain regions of the former Soviet Union.
The War in Transnistria (1990–1992)
The war on the Dniester is often considered the first conflict in which Russia uses, in the new post-Soviet context, the theme of protecting the Russian-speaking population in a neighboring state. In the late 1980s, in the Moldovan SSR, the national revival movement promotes a return to the Romanian language, to the Latin alphabet, and a rapprochement with Romania, which generates tensions with the political and administrative elites in the east of the republic, more connected to Soviet structures and the Russian-speaking space.
Against this backdrop, the separatist structures in Tiraspol emerge, claiming to be the "Transnistrian Moldovan Republic." Political actors in the region and the press close to them frequently invoke the "discrimination" of Russian speakers and present the policies from Chișinău as being unjust against Russian-speaking communities. At the beginning of 1992, tensions turn into armed confrontations between the forces of the Republic of Moldova and the armed separatist formations.
Several analyses published in the Republic of Moldova and Romania describe the role of the 14th Army units, deployed in the region since the Soviet period, as essential for supporting the separatists and for the military outcome of the conflict. After the ceasefire, part of these troops is reorganized, and the Russian military presence is maintained, also participating in "pacification" mechanisms and controlling strategic objectives, such as the depot at Cobasna. Transnistria thus becomes a "frozen conflict," with an internationally unrecognized regime, but politically, economically, and militarily supported by Moscow, and the theme of protecting Russian speakers remains a central element in the justification of this status quo in the official Russian discourse.
The Wars in Chechnya
The Chechen wars of the 1990s and 2000s, although taking place within the Russian Federation, provide a reference framework for how Moscow combines security arguments with references to protecting the civilian population. Russian authorities have presented military actions as necessary for restoring constitutional order and combating terrorism, insisting on the state's responsibility to protect citizens in the region from armed violence and instability.
This type of argument, the protection of the population in the face of perceived serious threats, will later appear in the justification of external actions, especially in the post-Soviet space, where the linguistic and identity dimension related to Russian-speaking minorities is added. Chechnya thus becomes a benchmark for how security needs and the state's responsibility towards its own citizens are articulated in the official discourse.
Georgia 2008: "the defense of Russian citizens" in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
The Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 is the first post-Soviet case in which the theme of protecting Russian citizens is explicitly invoked in the context of a military intervention in another state. In the years leading up to the conflict, Russia massively grants citizenship to residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a process known as "passportization."
At the moment of escalating confrontations between Georgian forces and separatist structures in South Ossetia, Moscow claims that it is acting to protect its citizens and its military contingents deployed in the region, presenting the intervention as a reaction to the situation on the ground. After the hostilities cease, Russia recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and strengthens its military presence in both regions. Overall, the Georgian episode shows how the narrative of protecting Russian citizens outside the borders is integrated into a broader package of political, historical, and security arguments used to justify military-diplomatic actions in the immediate neighborhood.
Ukraine 2014: Crimea and Donbas
The crises in Ukraine open a new chapter in the use of the theme of protecting Russian-speaking minorities. After the protests on Maidan and the change of power in Kyiv, the official Russian discourse describes the new Ukrainian authorities in very critical terms, frequently using references to "nationalism" and "extremism." In this context, the Russian-speaking population in southern and eastern Ukraine, especially in Crimea and Donbas, is presented as vulnerable to the political changes in Kyiv.
In Crimea, the emergence of "little green men," military forces without insignia, and the rapid takeover of key institutions are followed by the organization of a referendum not recognized by most states and the official integration of the peninsula into the Russian Federation. The central argument invoked by Moscow is that the local population, predominantly Russian-speaking, expressed its preference for "returning" to Russia, and the Russian authorities acted to protect their interests and security.
In Donbas, Russia claims that the residents of the region need support in the face of the actions of the authorities in Kyiv, and references to protecting Russian speakers and "compatriots" constantly appear in political and media discourse. In the following years, the conflict in eastern Ukraine remains in a state of variable intensity, with episodes of escalation and ceasefire agreements, while the theme of protecting the Russian-speaking population remains in the background of the justifications formulated by Moscow.
The War in Ukraine: "special military operation"
The large-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, is officially presented by Russia as a "special military operation" having, among other objectives, the goal of protecting the population in Donbas. In public communication, Russian authorities combine references to the security of Donbas with declared objectives such as "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine, in a narrative framework that emphasizes the responsibility of the Russian Federation towards Russian-speaking communities and towards its own citizens in the region.
Subsequently, Moscow announces the organization of "referendums" in four Ukrainian regions, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, and declares their integration into the Russian Federation, invoking the will expressed by the local population and the need to ensure their protection. At the same time, Russian officials convey messages stating that the Russian Federation does not intend to return to the borders of 1991, which directly links the theme of protecting Russian-speaking communities to the issue of borders and security architecture in Eastern Europe.
Looking at the last three decades as a whole, a pattern emerges in which the appeal to protect Russian citizens or Russian-speaking minorities is constantly associated with moments of tension, military interventions, and reconfigurations of the territorial status quo in the post-Soviet space. From Transnistria to Georgia and Ukraine, this theme is present, with varying intensities, in the official discourse from Moscow, also underpinning decisions with a major impact on regional security.
For European states, especially those in the eastern neighborhood of the European Union and NATO, understanding this pattern is essential in assessing risks and in constructing their own security and integration policies. As long as the concept of "the Russian world" and references to the borders after 1991 remain active elements in Russian political discourse, it is likely that the theme of protecting Russian or Russian-speaking minorities will continue to play an important role in justifying and explaining Moscow's actions in the region.
Analysis conducted with the support of Perplexity
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