ANALYSIS When strategic oil reserves are not all at home: the risks for Romania, how much alternatives would cost and what it can realistically afford.

Romania is currently in a crisis regarding strategic reserves that, on paper, comply with European rules, but are almost split half-and-half between domestic and other EU state deposits. In the conditions where the Commission asks member states to voluntarily reduce fuel consumption to manage the risk of prolonged disruption, we analyze what alternatives Romania has to the model of maintaining a large quantity of oil reserves outside the state – what are the risks of maintaining a large share of stocks across the border and whether it is justified, including through European funds, costly investments in new storage capacities on national territory, from tank parks to underground solutions, in relation to current costs and constraints.

For a NATO and EU border state, located on the edge of a major conflict and in a region exposed to hybrid risks, this architecture of half in the country, half in deposits from other states raises direct questions about national security vulnerabilities and about the ability to transform an accounting indicator – "90 days of reserves" – into a real operational tool in case of crisis or conflict.

However, the question is what alternatives Romania has and whether other solutions would not be more costly.

Sufficient reserves on paper, fragile structure on the ground

Data publicly communicated at the beginning of March 2026 shows that Romania holds over 2 million tons of fuels in strategic reserves, enough, according to authorities, to cover approximately 90 days of imports, in line with European requirements. Analyses by the Smart Energy Association (AEI), corroborated with economic materials, detail the structure of these stocks: about 56.8–57% are located on Romanian territory, in deposits mainly managed by large companies and state infrastructure, while approximately 43% are stored in other EU member states, through commercial arrangements and storage agreements.

Romanian law, harmonized with the European directive on oil reserves, requires that at least 50% of emergency stocks be kept in the country, the rest can be maintained in other member states on the condition of ensuring rapid access in emergency situations. From this perspective, Romania is above the minimum internal threshold, with a relatively small margin, but it also maximizes the flexibility offered by Brussels to outsource almost half of the volume.

Meanwhile, officials in Brussels and the International Energy Agency send a reassuring message: all member states hold between 85 and 90 days of emergency stocks, and at an aggregate level, the EU "does not see immediate risks" of disruption in oil supply. This assessment concerns the European whole, not the position of each state individually; for Romania, as a border state, the relevant question is how much of these "90 days" is actually on national territory and easily accessible through its own infrastructure.

The Romanian "paradox": large infrastructure, externalized reserves

Energy expert Dumitru Chisăliță, president of the Smart Energy Association, summarizes the problem in a formulation that has quickly become the label of the crisis: "Romania has a large oil infrastructure, but with externalized strategic stocks." In several analyses published in recent weeks, he shows that Romania "does not seem to lack strategic stocks of petroleum products," but "the current model allows for significant structural vulnerability, as a large part of these stocks is located outside the country, and their real efficiency in a severe crisis depends on accessibility, transport, authorizations, and institutional coordination."

A text from AEI vividly describes how the official message has changed: one day "we had reserves to face any oil crisis," another "we had reserves for 5 months," then "for almost 4 months," while in the background, information was emerging that a significant part of these reserves is not located in the country, but in deposits in other states. Chisăliță emphasizes that, from a legal standpoint, the stocks are not necessarily state property – they often belong to economic operators or entities to which the obligation of storage has been delegated – but "the final responsibility for their existence and use lies with the Romanian state."

His key message is that the difference between "we do not have stocks" and "we have stocks, but they are not in the country" is essential for understanding the risks: Romania can formally tick off the consumption days indicators, but it also assumes additional vulnerability by the fact that a large part of the volume depends on the decisions of other states, on the capacity of external infrastructure, and on the functioning of logistical chains that are outside direct territorial control.

What the European comparison says

Eurostat data on emergency stocks show that, in May 2024, only 11.7% of the oil stocks of EU member states were stored in other member states, which means that, on average, almost 9 out of 10 barrels were "at home." Eight states – the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, Greece, Latvia, and Finland – had 100% of their stocks on their own territory, opting for a model of "maximum sovereignty" over strategic reserves.

On the opposite end, Romania is in a small category of states that externalize a significant part of their stocks, with almost 43% of reserves located in other jurisdictions – a proportion almost four times above the European average of externalization. Other large economies, such as Germany, France, or Italy, have massive internal storage capacities and use storage in other states more for logistical optimization, not as a structural pillar of energy security architecture.

The European Commission and member states insist that, at an aggregate level, reserves function as an effective buffer against market shocks, including in the current context of tensions in the Middle East. But the concrete configuration of stocks – how much is internal, how much is external – remains a national decision. Romania has chosen to position itself at the upper end of the externalization range, which can be explained by costs, the availability of infrastructure, and how trade agreements have been negotiated, but also by the fact that until now the discussion has been conducted more in economic terms, not security.

Strategic risks for a NATO border state

From the perspective of national and military security, the main risks of the Romanian model can be summarized in four dimensions:

First, the risk of effective access to stocks in a severe crisis. Even if European agreements provide for obligations of solidarity and availability of stocks among member states, in scenarios of simultaneous crisis – such as a prolonged blockage of supply routes or escalation of conflicts in the vicinity of the EU – host states can introduce emergency measures that prioritize their own needs. In such situations, externalized stocks risk becoming less accessible than official documents suggest.

Second, dependence on the infrastructure of other states and vulnerable logistical corridors. Reserves located in other countries reach Romania through the same ports, pipelines, road, and rail routes that would be under maximum pressure in the event of a crisis or conflict. In conditions where the Black Sea region is already marked by hybrid incidents and threats to energy infrastructure, a model where almost half of the reserves rely on the premise of additional transport in a full-blown crisis represents a fragile logistical construction.

Third, there is a risk of opacity and difficulty in verification. The announcement by the Ministry of Energy regarding "urgent verifications" of stocks, including those abroad, suggests that authorities do not have, in real-time, a complete and operationally tested picture of the volumes, quality, and response times for these reserves. In a crisis, the difference between reported quantities and those actually available, pumpable, and transportable can become critical.

Finally, there is the risk of "dilution" of responsibility: between the economic operators who physically hold the stocks, the central storage entity, the Ministry of Energy, and, ultimately, the Government. Even if the law clearly states that the final responsibility for maintaining the minimum level lies with the state, the fragmentation of ownership and management can hinder rapid decision-making and execution in times of maximum tension.

Why doesn't Romania keep all reserves in the country

The question is explicitly posed by Dumitru Chisăliță: "Why does a state with significant oil infrastructure allow almost half of its strategic reserves to be stored abroad?" His answer, although not exhaustive, points to three types of explanations.

On one hand, storage in other states may be cheaper or easier to contract than developing and operating new dedicated internal capacities, especially in a tight budget context. On the other hand, the way the European system was designed – for an integrated market and solidarity – encourages a certain mobility of stocks, especially for large operators who operate regionally.

Moreover, the fact that Romania already has a dense infrastructure of refineries, terminals, and storage does not automatically mean that it has, at reasonable cost and immediate availability, sufficient separate storage capacities with strategic regime, and all the related logistical and financial conditions. Part of the existing infrastructure is heavily used for current commercial flows, and its complete conversion into strategic storage would involve investments, temporary shutdowns, and commercial reconfigurations.

In other words, outsourcing part of the reserves is, at least partially, the result of a combination of dedicated internal capacity constraints, cost considerations, and the inertia of a system designed primarily for economic efficiency and only secondarily for resilience in conflict scenarios.

What can Romania do to reduce its vulnerability

If we accept the premise that, for a border state, the current structure – approximately 57% in the country, 43% abroad – is too risky in the medium term, solutions emerge on several fronts.

The first line is to strengthen the internal capacity dedicated to strategic stocks. This means more efficient use of existing infrastructure (Conpet deposits, refineries, Oil Terminal Constanța) to create clearly defined spaces for emergency stocks, with a distinct legal regime compared to commercial stocks, as well as investments in new storage capacities – from tank parks to possible salt caverns where geology allows. European funds and energy policy instruments can be used as funding sources for these projects, arguing that they enhance the resilience of the entire Union, not just Romania.

The second line aims to rebalance the geographical structure of stocks. The state can establish its own policies – for example, gradually increasing the internal share to 65–70% within a certain timeframe – even if the European directive is satisfied with 50%. As additional capacities are created in the country, storage agreements abroad can be renegotiated to repatriate part of the volumes or to reposition them in host states with infrastructures and logistical arrangements that offer more solid guarantees of access in crisis.

The third direction is to strengthen state control over stocks, including those externalized. The controls announced by the Ministry of Energy can become regular exercises, not just point reactions to crises, and should include not only volume verification but also testing response times – how long it actually takes for an externalized stock to reach the network. Analyses such as those conducted by EY Romania remind that operators who do not comply with storage obligations expose themselves to penalties, and a stricter compliance framework can also stimulate private investments in internal storage.

Finally, integrating the strategic reserve into defense and civil protection planning can help define an internal "strategic minimum," different from the legal threshold of 50%, that reflects the specific scenarios of a border state: logistical blockages, hybrid attacks, prioritization of resources for the military and essential services. Based on these scenarios, the requirement for 50% internal stock can be reconsidered as a technical minimum, not as a sufficiency benchmark.

Would investment in storage tanks and salt caverns be feasible?

Investment may be feasible, but only as part of a clear energy security strategy, not as a punctual reflex to a crisis, and with realistic expectations regarding costs and timelines.

For above-ground tanks, unit investments are smaller and the technology is well known, especially since Romania already has relevant infrastructure (refineries, Oil Terminal, storage networks) that can be expanded or partially converted for strategic stocks. For this reason, tanks are feasible as a first-line solution to relatively quickly increase the share of stocks on national territory, including if there is access to European funds or other concessional financing sources.

Salt caverns bring long-term security and cost benefits (high physical protection, relatively low cost per large volume, long lifespan), but initial investment costs are very high, ranging from tens to hundreds of millions of euros for a large cavern, and projects require detailed geological studies and years of development.

Romania has experience with underground gas storage in salt structures, but there is still no announced program for oil, and any such project should be justified by a clear cost-benefit analysis, related to the goal of reducing long-term dependence on stocks held in other EU states.

In short, the cost-benefit report looks like this:

Benefit: more sovereign control over reserves, lower risk that, in a severe crisis, you depend on decisions and infrastructures from other states, plus better physical protection in the case of underground solutions.

Cost: very high initial investments (tens of millions of euros for tank expansions, up to hundreds of millions for large salt caverns), with a payback period of decades and real budget impact.

Thus, massive investments in salt caverns would only make sense as part of a long-term strategy for a "last resort" reserve, not necessarily as a first response; instead, the smart expansion of tank capacities and the reorganization of storage arrangements seem, at this moment, the more feasible and quicker solutions for Romania.

In conclusion, in the short and medium term, the most effective levers would be better use of existing infrastructure and gradual expansion of tank parks, where economically and logistically logical; rebalancing the geographical structure of stocks (gradually increasing the internal share, renegotiating external storage agreements) and strengthening control over operators who constitute reserves; measures to reduce consumption in crisis and diversify sources, as recommended by the European Commission at the EU level (voluntary reduction of consumption, prioritizing essential uses).

*****Synthesis made with the help of a data monitoring flow provided by the media monitoring platform NewsVibe Romania. The analysis, data, and images presented have been enhanced with the help of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence tools