The European Union Institute for Security Studies warns that Europe is entering years of maximum risk in the face of Russia.
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The European Union Institute for Security Studies warns that Europe must prepare for a period in which Russia is rebuilding its military capabilities, intensifying hybrid pressure, and testing the resilience of European societies, while American support can no longer be considered guaranteed in the same form. The report asserts that Europe has the economic, technological, and industrial resources to defend itself, but must transform them more quickly into military capability, resilient infrastructure, and political will.
Europe is entering a period in which the defense of the continent can no longer be built on the assumption that the United States will remain the same military guarantor available in any scenario. A report from the European Union Institute for Security Studies warns that Russia remains the main threat to European defense, even though it has suffered enormous losses in Ukraine, and European states must prepare to deter it with much less American support.
In short
The EUISS report states that Europe is facing "years of maximum risk," against the backdrop of Russian aggression and uncertainty regarding the future role of the United States in European security.
The document asserts that Russia could pose a significant military challenge to NATO allies as early as 2027, according to assessments from intelligence services of member states.
Europe has increased military spending, and the production of 155 mm ammunition is approaching 2 million shells by 2025, but there remain major gaps in command, control, intelligence, air defense, long-range strikes, and military mobility.
The authors state that credible deterrence depends on three foundations: resources, preparedness, and political will.
The report calls on Europe to learn faster from Ukraine, to reduce dependencies on the United States and China, and to transform energy, digital, and societal resilience into part of defense.
The report "Defending Europe, Deterring Russia," published as a Chaillot Paper by the EUISS, starts from a harsh observation: Russia is not just a military problem at the eastern border, but a threat that combines the rebuilding of armed forces, sabotage, cyberattacks, hybrid pressure, nuclear intimidation, and information manipulation. In this logic, the conflict between Russia and Europe is not only possible in the future but is already unfolding in forms that often remain below the threshold of open war.
The authors show that Russia is the "threat of pace" for Europe, as it has large armed forces, is in proximity to the Union, and has demonstrated that it is willing to use force, coercion, and hybrid tactics. Even though the war in Ukraine has consumed its resources, Moscow continues to adapt, produce, innovate, and rebuild its army for future confrontations.
The report warns that a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine would not eliminate the risk for Europe. On the contrary, a pause could give Russia time to rebuild its military capabilities and prepare a new cycle of pressure on the continent, along an extended line of vulnerability, from the far north to the Black Sea.
One of the central messages is that Europe has the means to defend itself, but is not yet using them coherently enough. The Union and its member states are wealthy, populated, technologically advanced, and have significant industrial bases. The problem is not the absence of resources, but the slow and fragmented transformation of them into credible military power.
The report uses three concepts to explain this transformation: resources, preparedness, and political will. Resources mean money, weapons, industry, technologies, raw materials, infrastructure, and energy. Preparedness means the ability to transform these resources into forces that can act together, quickly and with less American support. Political will means the capacity of European governments and societies to show Russia that they are willing to bear the costs of collective defense.
In recent years, Europe has made real progress. Military spending by European states has increased, defense production is expanding, and the production capacity for 155 mm artillery ammunition is approaching 2 million shells by 2025. At the same time, the report shows that Europe continues to depend on the United States in critical areas such as command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, air defense, space capabilities, and precision strikes at distance.
This dependency becomes riskier as the American role in Europe is changing. The report notes that the United States has been the backbone of European deterrence since World War II, but Washington's priorities, competition with China, crises in other regions, and transatlantic tensions indicate a reduction in the American role on the European theater.
The document does not say that NATO is disappearing or that Europe must replicate everything the American military does. The message is more practical: Europeans must be able to take over all components of conventional deterrence, from weapons and doctrine to command, control, logistics, intelligence, and the ability to operate together in times of crisis.
The lesson of Ukraine is present in almost all chapters. The war has shown that cheap drones, modular systems, rapid adaptation, software, integrated information, and production capacity matter just as much as expensive and sophisticated military systems. The report warns that Europe remains too perfectionist, buying costly equipment, produced slowly and in small numbers, while modern warfare requires mass, speed, flexibility, and "good enough" solutions that can be quickly improved.
Another major vulnerability is the dependence on critical raw materials controlled by China. The report shows that European weapon systems, from long-range missiles and drones to fighter jets, satellites, and servers for artificial intelligence, depend on materials such as gallium, germanium, cobalt, lithium, and rare earths, where China dominates essential refining stages. Without these materials, there are no engines, sensors, communications, batteries, power electronics, or components for modern defense systems.
The authors warn that dependence on China could block European rearmament precisely at the moment when Europe needs to accelerate production. Beijing has already used export controls to restrict access to critical materials, and the report calls on Europe to invest more in diversification, stockpiles, partnerships with allies, and financial support for supply chains that cannot be politically blocked.
Europe's defense also depends on energy. The report shows that energy infrastructure is not just an economic or climate issue, but a component of deterrence. If electricity, gas, fuel, submarine cables, refineries, LNG terminals, or offshore infrastructures can be hit, sabotaged, or paralyzed, then defense industry, military mobility, and civilian life can be affected simultaneously.
The authors propose that Europe reduce its dependence on fuel imports, electrify more transport, heating, and industry, decentralize energy production, and build networks that are harder to paralyze. The lesson drawn from Ukraine is that distributed infrastructure, such as solar, wind, and local microgrids, can be more resilient than large, centralized, and easily targeted installations.
The report also discusses digital defense. Modern warfare depends on what the authors call "infostructure": data, cloud, sensors, communications, software, command, connectivity, analysis, and systems that allow an army to see, decide, and strike. Europe remains dependent on external suppliers, especially American ones, for many of these functions, which can limit operational autonomy in the event of a political or military crisis.
Another chapter emphasizes that European societies must be prepared, not just armies. Russia does not only strike military bases but also electrical grids, hospitals, transport, public institutions, digital infrastructure, public trust, and the morale of societies. The report shows that the willingness of European citizens to fight for their country varies greatly, even though the majority believe that security is threatened and that the Union should play a larger role in protecting citizens.
The Nordic and Baltic models are presented as examples of preparing the entire society. Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have developed forms of total defense, civil resilience, crisis education, psychological defense, infrastructure protection, and voluntary involvement. Ukraine is presented as the strongest example of a society that has mobilized the state, army, local administration, companies, volunteers, and citizens around national defense.
The report also calls for clarification of European solidarity in ambiguous scenarios. Article 42 paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union obliges member states to provide assistance to an attacked state, but remains weakly developed politically and operationally. The authors argue that Europe must know in advance how it would respond to hybrid attacks, sabotage, campaigns below the threshold of war, or attacks on a member state that is not in NATO.
The conclusion of the report is that Europe should not wait for clarifications from Washington to build its defense. If the United States remains involved, a stronger Europe will be a more credible ally. If American support declines, the lack of European preparedness would become a major strategic vulnerability.
The EUISS report does not present European defense as a choice between the European Union and NATO. It asserts that NATO will remain central as long as the Alliance operates in its current form, but the European Union has an increasingly important role as a facilitator: industrial coordination, financing, infrastructure, military mobility, energy, supply chains, combating hybrid threats, and civil resilience.
The final message is that Europe can deter Russia if it aligns its resources, preparedness, and political will. The costs of inaction are presented as being greater than the costs of rearmament: a Europe that cannot defend its infrastructure, industry, borders, and societies will be more vulnerable not only to Russian aggression but also to external pressures from other directions.
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