The European Union is preparing a new European security strategy in a context marked by Russia's war against Ukraine, China's economic and technological pressure, and the transformation of the United States into a more unpredictable partner. In a Carnegie Europe analysis, Pierre Vimont argues that the document should not just be an institutional exercise, but a clarification of European strategic identity, the Union's ambitions, and the partners it wants to engage with to restore a rules-based international order.
The European Union risks being marginalized if the new European security strategy does not clarify what Europe represents, what it wants to become, and with which partners it wants to engage, argues Pierre Vimont in a Carnegie Europe analysis. The former French diplomat and senior fellow at Carnegie Europe states that the future document must go beyond crisis management logic and rebuild trust in the Union's political capacity to act as an international actor.
In short
The European Commission is preparing a new European security strategy, aiming to present it around the State of the Union speech in September.
Carnegie Europe argues that the new document must respond to the changes brought about by Russia's war in Ukraine, the rise of China, and the transformation of the transatlantic relationship.
The analysis warns that the strategy risks causing tensions between the Commission and member states, especially in defense and external funding.
Pierre Vimont argues that the European Union must decide whether to remain focused on crisis management or to take on a leadership role in an alliance of countries that want to reform the multilateral order.
The text links the credibility of the strategy to the EU's ability to inspire confidence within the Union, in candidate countries, and in external partners.
The analysis starts from the European Commission's decision to draft a new European security strategy just a few years after the Union's Strategic Compass. Vimont notes that such a timeline may seem surprising, but it shows that Europe's strategic environment has changed profoundly due to Russia's war against Ukraine, the increasing economic dominance of China, and the evolution of the United States from a reliable ally to an unpredictable and sometimes coercive partner.
In this new international order, Vimont writes, hard power has returned to the center of global politics. The consequence is that security no longer only concerns the military domain but influences industrial policy, energy, digital technologies, critical raw materials, and economic dependencies that can be used for political purposes.
Carnegie Europe presents the upcoming strategy as a test of European identity. Vimont argues that the Union must decide whether to adopt a defensive and inward-looking approach or to try to lead an alliance of states that seek to reform the multilateral order. In the same logic, the EU must choose between managing existing crises and formulating a long-term vision for the future security order of the continent.
The analysis warns that the process is not without internal tensions. Some member states fear that the new strategy could be used by the Commission to expand its powers in sensitive areas, especially in defense, common procurement, and cooperation between defense industries. Vimont links these reservations to the multiannual budget negotiations, where defense, competitiveness, agriculture, and social spending compete for resources.
The relationship with the United States is another central issue. The analysis questions whether the European Union can draw firm conclusions from the ongoing changes in the transatlantic relationship, given that many member states avoid antagonizing the American administration and prefer to buy time in hopes of returning to a more predictable relationship.
Vimont argues that credible strategies must link objectives, means, and methods of action. In the past, European strategies have often avoided a direct description of threats, out of fear of naming adversaries or clarifying the nature of the risks Europe faces. The new strategy should avoid this ambiguity.
The list of challenges is extensive. In geostrategic terms, the analysis mentions strengthening European defense against Russia, managing the difficult transition with the United States, and responding to the economic, political, and military rise of China. In terms of external influence, the text includes EU enlargement, relations with countries in the Global South, artificial intelligence, climate change, migration, and democracy.
Carnegie Europe warns that external partners expect a more credible and ambitious vision from the European Union. Vimont notes that Brussels risks being gradually pushed to the margins, having been absent or insufficiently visible in negotiations related to Ukraine and in the Middle East crisis.
The analysis argues that the new strategy must convey a clear political message about what Europe intends to do at a time when many partners have lost confidence in its capacity to act. The goal is not just to draft a new strategic document but to restore confidence in European leadership.
According to Vimont, this confidence must be rebuilt on multiple levels: among member states, in relations with candidate countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, and in relation to partners seeking stronger ties with the European Union. If successful, the new strategy could transform Europe into a more convincing international actor and could reignite the idea of European leadership.
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