ANALYSIS How NATO leaders in Europe draw the red lines between the pressures from Washington and the internal costs of the war in Iran

The conflict triggered by American and Israeli strikes on Iran has entered its third week, with missile and drone attacks on American targets and the Strait of Hormuz largely kept closed. The blockade is causing sharp increases in energy and fuel prices, fueling fears of a new global economic crisis and increasing pressure on European governments.

American President Donald Trump has called on NATO allies to join a naval mission to reopen the Strait, explicitly linking Washington's willingness to support Ukraine to European participation in operations in the Gulf. The response has been, with rare exceptions, one of rejection or delay, from London and Berlin to Paris, Madrid, Rome, Copenhagen, and Helsinki, where leaders emphasize the limits of their military involvement in this new front.

Keir Starmer: support for Ukraine, restraint in Iran

In London, Keir Starmer is at the center of a direct dispute with Donald Trump after he refused to send Royal Navy ships to protect oil traffic and help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The American president publicly accused the British prime minister of a lack of engagement, even claiming that he had proposed sending two aircraft carriers to the region, a statement that Downing Street denied, emphasizing that only one aircraft carrier is operational and that it is set to be sent to the Arctic.

Starmer has drawn a clear red line: the United Kingdom will not be "dragged into a wider war" in the Middle East after the initial strikes on Iran, and "will not send ships" to patrol the Strait of Hormuz. London did not participate in the initial bombings of Iran, signaling a controlled distancing from Washington's military strategy, while the prime minister focuses his foreign policy agenda on Ukraine, including meetings in London with Volodymyr Zelensky and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

Domestically, Starmer's position divides public opinion: 41% of Britons believe he has mishandled the outbreak of the war in the Middle East, while 37% think he has done well, and 59% of Labour voters view his response positively. The government announced a £53 million package to support households most affected by rising energy bills, trying to mitigate the social costs of the conflict and bolster the legitimacy of a cautious line towards Iran.

Friedrich Merz: the war in Iran seen from the pump

In Germany, Friedrich Merz addresses the impact of the war through the lens of fuel prices, in a context where the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has led to the strongest increases in fuel prices in the EU. A liter of gasoline costs on average €2.12, and one of diesel €2.18, which amplifies pressure on the Berlin government.

The executive led by Merz accuses oil companies of "theft" at the pump, while experts draw attention to the high proportion of taxes and excise duties in the final price. The government is preparing a package of measures to temper price increases, excluding, however, the introduction of a price cap – an option that has drawn criticism from social organizations. Among the ideas is limiting the possibility of raising pump prices to once a day, a measure designed to combat the perception of speculation, under the coordination of a working group led by CDU deputy Sepp Müller and Social Democrat Armand Zorn.

The war in Iran thus becomes, for Merz, an external factor that accelerates an older internal debate about taxation, the cost of living, and the role of the state in protecting vulnerable consumers, without Berlin assuming any prominent military role in the Gulf. Germany's refusal to participate in the naval mission requested by Trump fits into the general line of major European capitals.

Emmanuel Macron: military prudence, diplomatic activism

Macron addresses the Iranian crisis through the classic institutional tools of the French presidency – defense and national security councils and summit consultations, indicating that Paris treats the conflict as a major strategic file, not as a peripheral episode of foreign policy. The convening of a new defense and national security council dedicated to "the situation in Iran and the Middle East" shows that the war is integrated into the broader calculation of French security, from energy to regional stability.

At the same time, Macron is under double pressure: Donald Trump explicitly demands that France participate in securing the Strait of Hormuz, while Israeli President Isaac Herzog calls for European states to support "any effort to eradicate" Hezbollah. This places Paris between two simultaneous fronts – the Gulf and the Lebanese front, and it forces Macron to weigh both the military risks and the political implications of extensive involvement.

The fact that France is mentioned among the countries that have refused to join the naval mission in the Strait of Hormuz shows that, despite American and Israeli pressure, Macron's current line remains one of military prudence. Paris thus retains its strategic autonomy margin: it remains an ally of the USA and a key player in NATO, but avoids being drawn into an open conflict with Iran that could further destabilize the Middle East and expose French forces.

This attitude complements the positions of Keir Starmer and Friedrich Merz. London openly states that it "will not send ships", Berlin also refuses to participate, and Paris signals through decisions that it does not wish to enter into the logic of an American-led naval mission in the Gulf. Politically, Macron tries to maintain a balance between solidarity with Washington and avoiding an internal perception that France is being pushed into a new war far from the fronts considered priorities.

Pedro Sánchez: Total blockade of military involvement

Pedro Sánchez views the war in Iran through the lens of its economic and social effects on Spain, in a context where the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and rising energy prices threaten the cost of living and social stability. The calls from regional leaders in the Canary Islands and the Basque Country to urgently convene the Conference of Presidents show that, in the perception of domestic political actors, American military intervention in Iran is not a distant file, but a direct risk factor for the Spanish economy and society.

The fact that Sánchez has not yet convened this structure, despite regulations providing for two annual meetings and the last one taking place in June 2025, has drawn criticism and suggests a hesitation to transform the Iranian crisis into a central issue of the domestic political agenda. At the same time, the insistence on "growing concerns" regarding the economic and social consequences indicates increasing pressure for the government to provide a coherent response to the indirect impact of the war, from energy prices to regional budgets.

Externally, Sánchez's position has quickly crystallized into a clear refusal of military involvement alongside the USA. The Madrid government announced that Spain will not participate in any military operation in the Strait of Hormuz and will not contribute ships, troops, or aircraft to missions related to the conflict with Iran. Additionally, Sánchez rejected Washington's requests to use Spanish military bases for offensive operations, insisting that Spain will not be part of strikes against Iran and that any use of its infrastructure must strictly respect existing agreements and international law.

The rhetoric adopted by the Spanish prime minister, from phrases like "no to war" to emphasizing that the response to the crisis must be "political and diplomatic, not military", deliberately evokes the precedent of Spanish opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Madrid has positioned itself as one of the firmest voices in Europe against the expansion of the war, even at the cost of open tensions with Donald Trump, who has threatened punitive trade measures and a reevaluation of relations with allies who refuse to participate in the military effort.

Thus, for Sánchez, the declared priority is managing the "economic shock" generated by the conflict and protecting internal cohesion, rather than assuming an extensive military role in the Gulf. This approach places him in the same current as Merz and Starmer regarding the refusal of direct military involvement, but distinguishes him through a more vocal and confrontational positioning towards Washington.

Giorgia Meloni: Controlled distancing from the war, defensive support in the region

Giorgia Meloni, often perceived as one of Donald Trump's closest European allies, has had to carefully calibrate her message between solidarity with the USA and the Italian electorate's reluctance towards a new major conflict in the Middle East since the outbreak of the war in Iran. Since the beginning of the crisis, Meloni has repeated that Italy "is not at war with Iran and does not want to enter into a war", insisting that Rome's objective is to avoid regional escalation and protect the security of its own citizens and military deployed in the area.

Italy has explicitly rejected the idea of participating in strikes against Iran and has not joined the naval mission requested by the USA in the Strait of Hormuz, in line with the positions of other major European capitals. At the same time, Meloni emphasized that Rome will respect agreements regarding American bases on Italian territory, clarifying that they will not be automatically used for offensive operations, and any potential extension of Italy's role would require internal political debate and consultation with Parliament.

The Italian government has opted for limited involvement, with a defensive profile: sending naval assets to support the defense of Cyprus, targeted by missile attacks related to the conflict, and the willingness to provide air defense systems to Gulf partners to protect critical infrastructure and civilian populations. This line allows Italy to present itself as a responsible ally, concerned about regional stability and the protection of energy routes, without becoming involved in attacks against Iran.

Meloni thus tries to manage two political fronts simultaneously: externally, maintaining the strategic relationship with the USA and Donald Trump, but distancing herself from the logic of a "war coalition" against Iran; internally, responding to the sensitivities of a public opinion marked by previous intervention experiences and concerned about the risk of uncontrolled escalation in the Middle East. The result is a "controlled distancing": Italy remains in the security equation of the region through defensive and humanitarian instruments, but avoids entering the front line of the conflict, both militarily and symbolically.

Mette Frederiksen and Alexander Stubb: the northern flank and "Russia priority"

On the northern flank of Europe, the response to American pressures is marked by a direct message: the main attention remains focused on Russia. While specific details about the positions of Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Finnish President Alexander Stubb appear only fragmentarily, Helsinki's general approach is explicit, "we have Russia to deal with", indicating a clear reluctance towards involvement in a naval confrontation with Iran.

This formulation summarizes a strategic reality for the Nordic states: military and political resources are calibrated for deterring Moscow and supporting Ukraine, not for opening a new major theater of operations in the Middle East. In this context, both Frederiksen and Stubb align with the general NATO line, rejecting a sudden expansion of military commitment beyond the area of direct interest on the eastern flank.

A European common front: "no" to the naval mission in Iran, "yes" to support for Kiev

The coordinated refusal of European states to participate in the naval mission in the Strait of Hormuz outlines a common front that transcends the internal political differences between Starmer, Merz, Macron, Sánchez, Meloni, Frederiksen, and Stubb. The United Kingdom explicitly announces that it "will not send ships", Germany and France also position themselves against participation in the operation, and the European Union admits that "no one is prepared to put their people in danger" to keep the Strait of Hormuz open.

The head of European diplomacy, Kaja Kallas, summarizes this orientation when she states that "diplomatic channels" must be found to keep the strait open, thus avoiding crises of food, fertilizers, and other global consequences. In parallel, the same European leaders reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, either through direct meetings, as is the case with Starmer and Zelensky, or through internal adjustments aimed at making the economic cost of the war bearable both on the eastern front and in the Middle East.

Strategic convergence, stylistic divergences

When analyzed together, the positions of Friedrich Merz, Keir Starmer, Emmanuel Macron, Pedro Sánchez, Giorgia Meloni, Mette Frederiksen, and Alexander Stubb outline a strategic convergence: no major European capital wishes to transform the war with Iran into a new direct military commitment, with troops and ships exposed on the front line. Differences arise at the level of style and internal priorities, from Starmer's emphasis on energy bills and avoiding a "wider war", to Merz's focus on pump prices or the defense councils convened by Macron.

Behind these nuances, the common message is that European leaders are trying to simultaneously manage three pressures: American requests, global economic risk, and the internal sensitivities of societies weary of wars. The way these leaders will explain and adjust their positions, between solidarity with Washington, loyalty to Kiev, and protecting their own economies, will influence not only the dynamics of the war in Iran but also the overall security architecture of Europe.

*****Synthesis made with the help of a data monitoring flow provided by the media monitoring platform NewsVibe Romania. The analysis, data, and images presented have been enhanced with the help of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence tools.