ANALYSIS The Digital Iron Curtain of the Kremlin: online freedom stifled again in Russia

Russia has decided to strike one of the most powerful anti-propaganda tools, or at least the most effective way to circumvent restrictions: VPNs and the technologies surrounding them. For the general public, this means harder access to independent information, unstable messaging, and online services that seem to "disappear" without reason, while for those who are tech-savvy, it is a clear step towards a separate, centrally controlled Russian internet.

How Russia wants to restrict internet access

The Russian Minister of Digitalization, Maksut Shadaev, explicitly stated on the state platform MAX that "the task is to reduce the use of VPNs." At the same time, he spoke about restricting "some foreign platforms" without naming them, which shows that the target is the entire ecosystem of external services, not just a few inconvenient websites.

For context, until now, Russian citizens faced several blockages from the state: Western social networks (such as X, Facebook, or Instagram) have been declared "extremist" and restricted; the YouTube platform has been removed from the national domain system, and direct access, if it exists, is interrupted and unstable (buffering); websites of international media (BBC, Deutsche Welle, etc.) and Russian media in exile have been systematically blocked, with tens of thousands of domains added to the blacklist after 2022; platforms hosting investigations, reports on the war, or NGOs have been blocked or made very hard to access without a VPN; in major cities, there have been periods with mobile internet that is almost unusable or completely shut down, and VPNs have been used as a solution to "route" traffic through other networks or countries; access to Western services (including some online games, platforms like Roblox) has been restricted, and VPNs have become a means to play on external servers and use global game stores.

Legally, the measures are supported from two directions:

-rules that allow heavy fines for those who use "block circumvention" programs (mentioned above) or seek content marked as "extremist" (including via VPN)

-obligations for VPN companies and internet operators to block online content at the order of Roskomnadzor. Practically, in Russia, VPN providers that want to operate legally are required to connect to the official Roskomnadzor system and block the same websites and services prohibited by the state, while internet operators must install special filtering equipment (TSPU) in their networks through which Roskomnadzor directly controls what traffic is allowed or blocked, including traffic to "listening" VPNs.

Technically, the state implements DPI in the networks of operators. DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) is a type of filter that analyzes data packets in detail, not just the address they are going to, but also the "shape" of the traffic, so it can recognize if it is, for example, OpenVPN or WireGuard traffic, even if it is encrypted. Roskomnadzor has received the right to directly use these systems through a government decree (no. 1667/2025), without relying solely on what operators do, becoming a "super-regulator" with technical control over major network nodes.

The authorities are also discussing with telecom operators and major Russian platforms (VK, Yandex, Ozon, Wildberries) the introduction of limits on "external" traffic per month (it is rumored that the threshold would be 15GB) and higher rates beyond these thresholds. Technically, this involves identifying traffic that exits Russia (based on IP routes) and associating it with a specific subscriber, which turns frequent use of VPNs into an expensive or suspicious behavior.

What is specifically blocked: protocols and applications

Not only the names of services are targeted, but entire protocols, meaning the rules by which data flows. OpenVPN (a protocol used by many commercial VPN applications, based on TLS, the same type of technology as HTTPS connections, used by almost all browsers) has begun to be widely blocked, especially on mobile internet, by identifying the encryption pattern and the ports used.

-WireGuard (a modern, very fast VPN protocol, also used in the corporate sector) is also blocked, with reports showing that many WireGuard connections to servers outside Russia can no longer be established.

-L2TP and PPTP (older protocols, also used in simple VPNs, including on routers or in settings on Windows and phones) have been restricted in several waves, being considered easy to target.

-SOCKS5 (a type of proxy used also in torrent applications or for browsing "through another country") and VLESS (part of the XRay/V2Ray protocol family, used to camouflage VPN traffic as regular traffic) are also on Roskomnadzor's blacklist.

Specifically, for civilians, when these protocols are blocked, along with access to the internet "from outside," work-from-home connections (remote access to company servers being thus hindered), video conferencing applications, games, and online streaming, backup services, and cloud storage are affected. On the application side, in March 2026, the authorities went further: they blocked or seriously degraded WhatsApp and Telegram, two of the most used messaging applications in Russia, by filtering traffic and shutting down mobile internet in extensive areas. On this occasion, Russians tested a "whitelist" of websites, meaning a short list of allowed addresses during mobile blockages, which only included state websites, operators, pro-Kremlin media, and a few approved platforms like VK and Odnoklassniki.

How ordinary people are affected

For a user who does not spend all day on network settings, the effects look like this:

-Mobile internet "disappears" throughout the city, sometimes for hours or days, including in Moscow and St. Petersburg, under the pretext of combating drone attacks

-WhatsApp and Telegram no longer connect or only work on Wi-Fi, and even there with interruptions

-Many external websites (news, video platforms, Western sites) load slowly or not at all, especially without a VPN

Human Rights Watch documented that, during a period of several weeks, in March 2026, mobile internet and access to data networks were blocked for almost three weeks in areas of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which directly affected millions of people who relied on the connection for work, transport, and communication.

Along with discomfort, legal risks also arise. Recent laws allow sanctioning individuals who use programs to circumvent blockages, including via VPN, on websites declared "extremist," distribute or access content considered "fake news" or "discrediting the army." Technically, this relies on correlating traffic data (from operators) with subscriber data and, sometimes, with other digital evidence (screenshots, application history), which creates a sense of insecurity for ordinary users.

Young people know how pervasive the culture of the game "Counter-Strike" (now CS2) is in Russia. The Steam platform (Valve's game store) operates through encrypted connections to servers outside Russia, uses massive data uploads and downloads, and, for online games like Counter-Strike 2 (CS2), requires low latency and stable connections to global servers. This impacts both gaming communities and e-sports, as well as small content creators who stream CS2 or other games via global platforms (Twitch, YouTube), already targeted by blockages and filters. The gaming, live streaming, and e-sports industry is projected to bring 230 billion rubles (2.4 billion USD) to the budget, with an 18% increase compared to 2021, in rubles (195 billion), but decreasing if calculated in dollars (2.64 billion).

How independent media is affected (again)

Independent media, whether Russian in exile or international, reaches Russia largely through:

-own websites (often blocked)

-Telegram channels

-newsletters and mirror sites accessible only with a VPN

When VPNs and associated protocols are blocked, and Telegram and WhatsApp are restricted, this route narrows: readers can no longer directly access blocked sites without seeking more complicated technical solutions; updates via Telegram arrive slowly or not at all in areas where mobile internet is shut down; journalists inside have difficulties sending materials, documents, or evidence outside the country under safe conditions.

Human Rights Watch and the Council of Europe note that such measures reduce the space for independent media and NGOs, as they depend on encrypted channels and the ability to connect to external platforms (from Google Drive to collaboration tools) that can be framed as "external" or "suspicious" traffic. Technically, any encrypted connection to a storage or collaboration service outside Russia can be monitored in terms of volume and frequency, even if the content remains encrypted, which increases the risk of profiling journalists and sources.

What alternatives does the state offer

The state promotes its own platforms:

-MAX (state super-application) as an alternative to Telegram and WhatsApp

-VK, Odnoklassniki, and other internal networks as alternatives to Facebook, X, Instagram

These services are integrated with the official infrastructure, comply with data storage obligations, and can be more easily subjected to access requests from security services (FSB), based on existing laws. Part of the population adopts these alternatives because they are simpler and "just work." Another part seeks technical solutions:

-VPNs that camouflage as regular web traffic, for example, protocols from the XRay/NaiveProxy or Hysteria family, which make traffic look like regular HTTPS streams

-obfuscation, meaning "masking" VPN traffic so that DPI does not easily detect it. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) represents a method of network filtering that does not limit itself to checking the "address" on the virtual envelope of your data, but opens the envelope to read and analyze the content of the text or files sent

-SIM cards from other countries, connections through less controlled Wi-Fi networks

Experts cited by technical publications warn that Roskomnadzor is massively investing (about 60 billion rubles between 2025 and 2027) in smarter blocking systems, including traffic analysis with AI, which means that this technical game will intensify. For users without IT knowledge, this translates into a difficult choice: either accept filtered internet or expose themselves to an increasingly complex and legally risky environment.

Analysis conducted with the support of Perplexity