The European Union Institute for Security Studies says that Europe must focus on its own defense, not on maintaining Donald Trump's support.

Europe must go to the next NATO summit with a concrete plan for gradually taking on a larger share of its own conventional deterrence, argues Steven Everts in an analysis by the European Union Institute for Security Studies. The text warns that the transatlantic relationship has cracked, that the war initiated by Donald Trump against Iran may divert resources needed for Ukraine and Europe, and that the European debate should not be reduced to trying to please the American president.

Europe must focus on organizing its own defense and reducing military dependencies on the United States, not on building a political message meant to please Donald Trump, argues Steven Everts in a commentary published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies. The analysis warns that the transatlantic relationship has cracked, and the European Union must prepare a concrete plan for conventional deterrence, including with less American support.

In short

1. EUISS argues that Europe must prepare for defense and deterrence with less American support.

2. The analysis warns that the war initiated by Donald Trump against Iran may affect the resources needed for Ukraine and Europe, including air defense, ammunition, and political attention.

3. Steven Everts states that Europe has the economic, technological, and demographic resources to take on conventional deterrence.

4. The proposed plan should cover air defense, long-range strikes, satellites, intelligence, command, and control.

5. The analysis warns that the discussion should not start with the slogan "European army" nor with the nuclear component, but with a European doctrine of deterrence.

The commentary starts from the recurring debate about organizing European defense, accelerated by Donald Trump's return to the White House and the doubts he has expressed about American commitment under Article 5 of NATO. Everts writes that last year's NATO summit in The Hague did not resolve the issue just because European states agreed to reach defense spending of 5% of GDP.

The author argues that the cracks in the transatlantic relationship are real, and distrust is equally real. He cites a trend in European public opinion, according to which 73% of EU citizens say that Europe "must go its own way".

Everts links the urgency of the discussion to Trump's war against Iran. Even if Europeans can say that "this is not our war", the analysis argues that it is still Europe's problem, through risks of energy shortages, slowing economic growth, and possible increases in interest rates.

The military dimension is described as even more serious. The resources that Ukraine and Europe need, from air defense and ammunition to political involvement, can be redirected, delayed, or used as a pressure tool. Washington has already indicated that there will be delays in delivering orders already placed, which affects Ukraine and may create gaps in European defense.

The central issue is not, according to the EUISS analysis, that the United States wants Europe to take on more responsibility for its own defense. Everts considers this change inevitable and justifiable. The risk comes from the fact that Donald Trump treats the transfer of responsibility as a tool for personal reward and punishment, depending on his political relationships with various European governments.

The author also criticizes the risk that the NATO summit will be built around a narrative like: Europe spends more, approaches the 5% threshold, and all this happens due to Trump's leadership. In such a framework, Europe would miss the essential issue: how it organizes deterrence against Russia, where necessary, with much less American support.

Everts argues that Europe is not powerless. The continent has sufficient financial, technological, and demographic resources to take on the task of conventional deterrence. If Ukraine is included in this equation, Europe has drones, electronic warfare capabilities, and about a hundred combat-ready brigades.

The main obstacle is described as psychological. The question posed by the author is whether Europeans are ready to think and act in terms of European power and deterrence, including by overcoming some political taboos.

The central proposal is for Europe to go to the NATO summit with a European transition plan. The goal would not be to push the United States out of European defense, but to avoid a disorderly American withdrawal that would weaken deterrence.

The plan should include an emergency program for the capabilities on which Europe currently depends on Americans: air defense, long-range strikes, satellites, intelligence, command, and control. Everts argues that these capabilities must be acquired and organized at the European level.

The analysis also insists on how the additional money for defense will be spent. The hundreds of billions of euros that are now entering the defense sector should be used largely in Europe, not for buying weapons from the United States. The author notes that about 60% of new arms purchases are currently bought from the US, and this limits both the speed of deliveries and public support for increasing European spending.

The integrated command structure is presented as one of NATO's most important contributions. To defend itself, Europe needs not only weapons and technology but also a structure with experience in planning, training, and joint action. Everts proposes that Europeans discuss concretely how this command structure can be Europeanized, including the possibility that the function of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe could be taken over by a British.

The commentary warns against two traps. The first is starting the discussion under the label of a "European army", whether as a positive project or as a political scarecrow. Everts argues that the goal is not a EU army, but building deterrence and a European doctrine.

The second trap is starting the discussion with the nuclear dimension. The nuclear component is part of deterrence, but, according to the EUISS analysis, it should be the endpoint of European independence, not the starting point of the debate. The American nuclear umbrella remains in place, and the Europeanization of the French nuclear force is still far off.

Everts concludes that Europe must move faster to organize its own defense. Those who focus only on keeping Trump in NATO accept that the American president sets the agenda and terms. Those who come up with their own plan transform European security into a European responsibility.

https://2eu.brussels/ro/stiri/institutul-uniunii-europene-pentru-studii-de-securitate-spune-ca-europa-trebuie-sa-se-concentreze-pe-propria-aparare-nu-pe-mentinerea-sprijinului-lui-donald-trump