I made some crossovers, so you don't have to do them.

I last wrote here about the hypothetical voting preferences of Romanians for parties (since we are not currently in a parliamentary election scenario) and in the meantime, we have also published some interesting cross-references (of this data) with socio-demographics. And it must be said, for any survey circulating in public, the figures are rather reported to the entire sample. The true measure of opinion polarization is seen, however, if we identify those variables that, on a given issue, divide us into contrasting camps.

As a charming publication, but now disappeared from Romania, would have said, we did cross-references with socio-demographic variables, so you don't have to do them yourself. And here are the interesting things we discovered:

1. The young electorate is rewriting the map of elections in Romania. I said young, so, most likely, in 10-15 years it is not certain that these people will still think similarly, but that is another problem. In short, our data shows that, in the 18-29 age segment, AUR still leads (only among seniors does AUR not lead), followed at a great distance by SENS, then USR and PNL. From here, three conclusions: there is a major rupture between the educated young electorate and the rest of the electorate; in itself, the young electorate is very polarized, especially after the education level variable, which is fundamentally important for the long electoral year 2024-2025; one of the major sources of collapse for our two massive mainstream parties (PSD and PNL) has been the young electorate which, although very polarized, is united by rather anti-system opinions.
2. 44% of men vote for AUR and 33% of women. First place as a political preference in both gender categories. Of course, this is relative to those who expressed a voting opinion, but that is, again, another discussion. Two or three years ago, the cleavage between men and women regarding AUR voting was much clearer. The difference is significant today as well, but first place in the ranks of female electoral preferences somehow shows us that people do not read AUR through the radical messages conveyed by some of the party's image vectors. In other words, people who vote for AUR do not see the party as those who do not vote for it see it, or as commentators see it. In the two images, there are different accents that guide two different perceptions. Why some vote for AUR and why others do not are probably different things, not a unitary perception that some value positively and others negatively.
3. The level of education remains the key electoral variable, with higher education as a game changer. What to see, in politics, the seven years at home do not matter that much.
4. The preference for AUR is more present in rural areas than in urban ones. This is explainable if we take into account the observations above and how they overlap with the rural environment. Inexplicable if we think that the rural vote has been under the thumb of the mayor (PSD, PD/PDL and even PNL and UDMR) for entire electoral cycles. The rural vote has been "dominated", not "natural", based at most on community values, if not directly on promises from mayors – and less on reasoning and the own value options of the voters. As they could have been. Now, our electoral system pays the bill for this type of political culture.