ANALYSIS: Is there still a war front for Trump? Why would Mali risk deepening the rift within NATO?

The Trump administration is considering a military action in Mali, targeting a group affiliated with Al-Qaeda known as JNIM, current and former American officials familiar with these discussions have stated, reported The Washington Post in a recent piece, cited by Digi24. Thus, the Trump administration is preparing to extend once again the interventionist architecture of its second term, and Mali could become the African link that connects the war against terrorism to the strategic competition with Russia and the internal tensions within NATO. Potential attacks against JNIM in Mali would add an eighth country to the list of theaters in which Trump orders airstrikes, further amplifying the serious transatlantic frictions already generated by Iran, Venezuela, and extensive campaigns in Somalia, Yemen, or Nigeria.

Trump's second term: the promise of "no new wars" vs. the reality of seven theaters

In the reelection campaign, Trump built his message on the idea of "ending endless wars" and redirecting resources to Americans, yet in the first 18 months of the new term, he authorized strikes in Syria, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, and Venezuela, plus lethal operations against suspected drug traffickers in the Caribbean and the East Pacific. A summary report from the Council on Foreign Relations notes that, after returning to the White House, Trump expanded counterterrorism operations and approved large-scale attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, on ISIS militants in Somalia, and on jihadist networks in Nigeria, which contradicts the publicly displayed "isolationist" profile.

An interactive project by the Washington Post shows that, in the first year of the new term alone, the administration executed 658 airstrikes and drone strikes, nearly equaling the total number of attacks authorized by the Biden administration throughout its entire term. Meanwhile, an inventory conducted by Al Jazeera highlights that these operations have been consistently presented as limited, "surgical" and strictly defensive, although in Iran and Venezuela they have clearly reached the level of "major combat actions," with explicit political objectives of regime change.

Lists of targets: from Yemen and Somalia to Venezuela

According to the Washington Post, the map of bombing theaters in the second term looks like this: Syria, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, Somalia, Venezuela – to which Mali could now be added if plans against JNIM are approved. The Pentagon has expanded air campaigns against ISIS and other groups in Somalia, Time and Al Jazeera report that in 2025 the number of American strikes there exceeded the total authorized by the Bush, Obama, and Biden administrations combined.

In Yemen, Trump resumed and amplified strikes against Houthi rebels, whom the White House described as "Iran-backed terrorists," justifying the operation by the need to protect navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In Iraq and Syria, the bombings were presented as a direct response to attacks against American troops, yet analyses from think tanks like Chatham House and SWP Berlin emphasize that the strikes have been framed within a broader strategy of pressure on Iran and its regional networks. In West Africa, Nigeria has become a pillar of the counterterrorism strategy: the Washington Post describes an intensified cooperation that included airstrikes and a joint ground mission that eliminated one of the top ISIS leaders in Africa. In the Caribbean and the East Pacific, the campaign against alleged "cartel ships" has resulted in dozens of deaths but has largely remained in the shadows of public attention, justified by the White House as part of the "war on drugs."

The case of Mali: JNIM, the Sahel, and the game with Russia

The Washington Post describes a Trump administration divided regarding a potential direct intervention in Mali, with Sebastian Gorka defending within the National Security Council as one of the main proponents of military options against JNIM, according to officials cited by WP. Cited officials note that JNIM – Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin – has become the best-armed militant group in the Sahel, with an increasing capacity to strike coastal states and exploit the fragility of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which form the Alliance of Sahel States. In these states, in recent years, military leaders have ousted democratically elected governments through coups, largely severed ties with the West, and turned to Russia for security support.

In the last two years, Mali has entered a spiral of violence that has practically paralyzed the country. The jihadist group JNIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, has opened a new front in the "economic war": since the fall of 2025, its fighters systematically attack and set fire to fuel tankers heading to the capital Bamako, kidnap drivers, and block vital trade routes. This fuel blockade has left entire cities without transport, affected the functioning of schools and hospitals, and fueled public frustration against the military regime in Bamako.

Militarily, JNIM and its allies have shifted from rural insurgency to coordinated attacks on major cities. In April 2026, jihadists and a separatist Tuareg group launched a simultaneous offensive against garrisons in several strategic centers, claiming control over cities like Kidal and Mopti and even striking near the capital, where the residence of the Minister of Defense was targeted in a suicide attack. Analyses from the Egmont Institute and ICCT describe this wave of attacks as a turning point: JNIM is increasingly behaving like a conventional force, capable of besieging and capturing territory, not just striking through ambushes in rural areas.

All of this is happening against the backdrop of a military junta that has severed relations with the West, forced the withdrawal of the French Barkhane operation, and called in Russian mercenaries from Wagner, later rebranded as Africa Corps. Assessments from Chatham House, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and other institutes show that neither the French nor the Russian intervention has succeeded in stabilizing Mali: Paris has relied almost exclusively on military solutions and ignored the governance crisis, while Wagner/Africa Corps has exacerbated tensions through abuses against civilians and by supporting a deeply unpopular regime.

The arguments of the Trump Administration: terrorism, "Russia's inefficiency" and maritime security

In the case of Mali, a White House official cited by the Washington Post speaks of terrorism in the Sahel as a "multinational problem" and calls on NATO allies to support the "Alliance of Sahel States" (AES) in the fight against JNIM and ISIS, thus placing the operation within a narrative of collective security.

The same source insists on the idea that Russia "has proven to be an inefficient security partner for Mali" and suggests that other African states should draw conclusions from Moscow's "appalling performance" in combating terrorism.

This type of argument is also found in the justification of other operations during Trump's second term: in Iran, the White House spoke about "preventing a nuclear bomb" and "retaliation" for attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz; in Yemen and Somalia, about freedom of navigation and eliminating regional terrorist threats; in Venezuela, about "restoring democracy" and stopping a "corrupt and criminal regime." Analyses from SWP Berlin describe this line as a mix between a discourse that promised America's withdrawal from conflicts and, in reality, a policy of using force at lower costs, where pinpoint strikes are used to show that the US remains strong without sending a large number of soldiers on the ground.

How does American public opinion react

Even the Washington Post article notes that, in the comments section, many readers accuse a contradiction between Trump's promises to end wars and the new military activism, including the possibility of an intervention in Mali. An analysis piece from Al Jazeera shows that, in the context of strikes against Iran and Venezuela, American public skepticism towards interventions has increased, including in segments of the Republican base that previously resonated with the "America First" message and reducing external involvement.

Polls cited in reports from American think tanks indicate a recurring pattern: Americans are more accepting of limited strikes as a response to direct attacks on personnel or US territory, but quickly become critical when operations seem to slip towards regime change or open wars. The war with Iran, initiated by coordinated US-Israel strikes on nuclear facilities at the end of February 2026, has heightened this tension, with internal protests and heated debates in Congress regarding the legality and costs of the conflict.

NATO between solidarity, war fatigue, and divergences

NATO's positioning regarding these operations has been, since the beginning of the second term, stratified and often tense. In the case of Iran, many European allies refused to provide direct military support, arguing that the strikes do not have a clear mandate under international law and risk fueling regional escalation. At the same time, the UK and some Eastern European allies have offered political support and, in some cases, logistical support, invoking the need to limit the Iranian nuclear program and protect energy flows. It is worth mentioning that Bucharest also provided logistical support (bases and infrastructure) but publicly insisted that it is not a belligerent party in the war with Iran.

In Yemen and Somalia, NATO as an institution was not part of the military operations: the strikes were led by the US, sometimes together with the UK and other allies, in small coalition formats, not under the Alliance's flag. For critics of this approach, the fact that the same allies who participate in these coalitions are also NATO members fuels the perception that the Alliance is informally used as a resource pool for Washington's unilateral agenda, even though, technically, NATO does not appear as a belligerent party. Analyses from former NATO commanders and experts from the Atlantic Council have warned that this practice erodes allied consensus and deepens the rift between states that support Trump's coercive approach without reservations and those that call for an emphasis on diplomacy and international law.

Could a potential attack in Mali further fracture NATO?

A possible Mali dossier would intersect three major fault lines within NATO: European strategic fatigue after the Sahel experience (accumulated over more than a decade of military interventions and EU/NATO missions in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, which have cost much and delivered few visible results), divergences regarding Russia, and the dispute over the Alliance's role outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Chatham House and allied Sahel analysts emphasize that the French intervention – initially welcomed – ended up fueling anti-Western resentments, striking JNIM without a political approach being perceived by the population as a foreign occupation and a selective protection of regional capitals.

France has been ousted, and the military regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have largely closed the door to the West and invited Russia to fill the void. In this context, if Trump were to decide on unilateral strikes in Mali and subsequently call for some form of NATO "alignment" – whether just politically or through support in intelligence and logistics – states like France, Germany, or Italy would likely be reluctant, fearing a repeat of incurring political and security costs without a clear mandate and without an exit strategy.

What do experts say about effectiveness and risks

Experts cited by the Washington Post and in recent reports on the Sahel insist that another strictly military campaign against JNIM has low chances of success and major risks of blowback. Analyst Heni Nsaibia from ACLED shows that the Malian army and its Russian partners killed more civilians than JNIM and IS Sahel combined last year, and supporting such regimes by the US would undermine the legitimacy of Western engagement.

Wassim Nasr, a Sahel specialist at the Soufan Center cited by the Washington Post and active, argues that the real solution in Mali goes through "conflict resolution," through pressures for negotiations between the junta and JNIM, which for now focuses its agenda on the application of Islamic law locally, not on global attacks against the West. He warns that potential American strikes could push JNIM towards a profile closer to central Al-Qaeda and create a new declared theater of war between Washington and a jihadist actor that, until now, has not directly targeted the US.

Mali as a node between counterterrorism and competition with Russia

From a strategic perspective, an American attack in Mali would likely be presented not only as a counterterrorism operation but also as a response to Russia's "catastrophic performance" in the Sahel, as suggested by the language of officials cited by the Washington Post. Recent reports on "Terrorism in the Sahel" emphasize that the collapse of the AES (Alliance of Sahel States) regimes' capacity to control jihadist insurgencies, despite Russian assistance, creates a security vacuum with implications for migrant flows, critical mineral markets, and the stability of coastal states, interests to which both the US and the EU are very sensitive.

For NATO, this would raise the question of how the Alliance should reposition itself in Africa, between the temptation to counter Moscow's and Beijing's influence and the risk of extending beyond its own capabilities, with European public opinion already exhausted by the Ukrainian dossier and the war with Iran.

Potential American strikes in Mali, followed by pressures for allied support, could therefore deepen the divide between states that support Washington's line without reservations and more cautious allies concerned about the legality of interventions within NATO, without providing guarantees that the situation in the Sahel becomes more stable.

****Synthesis made with the help of a data monitoring flow provided by the media monitoring platform NewsVibe Romania. The analysis, data, and images presented have been enhanced with the help of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence tools.