The Black Sea Shield and Europe’s Responsibility

Vasile Dîncu argues that protecting the Black Sea is a European responsibility that must be assumed through funding, deadlines, and verifiable results. In this opinion piece, the MEP explains his proposals for maritime security, community preparedness, and economic resilience, following the commitments announced in Bucharest by Ursula von der Leyen.

I increasingly think that we need to build our European strategies from the bottom up, that is, starting with people and moving up toward the high offices in Brussels. I mean, I think that a sailor departing from a Romanian port must be able to return home, or that a community in the Danube Delta must know what to do when it receives an alert. This is where the discussion about Black Sea security should begin: with concrete obligations toward people and toward the economy that sustains their lives.

Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Bucharest on 9 November brought commitments worth supporting: €50 million to accelerate the maritime security hub developed by Romania and Bulgaria, and another €10 million for Romania’s search-and-rescue capacity. Implementation decisions, the timetable, and the effective use of resources are next.

These commitments open up a broader political discussion. How much of the cost of protecting European interests should be borne by states located close to the war? How do we turn solidarity into a capacity that works on the day of an attack?

In the amendments I am proposing to the AFET report on the Review of the European Union Strategy for the Black Sea, coordinated by Helmut Brandstätter, I am pursuing precisely this: assuming a permanent European responsibility, with measures, funding, and verifiable deadlines.

The costs of a European geographyAggression by Russia against Ukraine has changed the security conditions of the entire region. However, the history of insecurity here began long before February 2022. Transnistria, the conflicts in Georgia, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and the war in eastern Ukraine provided sufficient reasons for a sustained European policy. I included this perspective in the amendments because institutional memory matters: if every escalation is treated as a surprise, we will continue improvising responses to threats we have known about for years.

Romania and Bulgaria face direct exposure, but maritime routes, ports, energy infrastructure, and connections with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova serve interests that extend beyond the economies of the two countries. Their protection must have European support proportionate to these benefits. This is the logic behind my proposal for an identifiable funding component for the Black Sea and the Lower Danube. Allocations must take into account exposure to risk, the additional costs of infrastructure, and the fiscal capacity of affected communities. For some regions, assuming additional security obligations may reduce the money available for public services. European policy must prevent this effect.

What a shield must meanThe term “shield,” as I call it—or “hub,” as the bureaucracy puts it—creates expectations. We have an obligation to explain what each institution can do and where vulnerabilities remain. The maritime security hub is designed as a civilian-led cooperation network for surveillance, information sharing, and responding to risks. Its operation must be coordinated with the responsibilities of national authorities and NATO planning. Its value will be seen in specific situations. How quickly is a threat detected? Who receives the information? Who verifies the data, and who orders the intervention? Can a port continue operating after an incident? Is there capacity for rescue and pollution containment?

I have proposed strengthening drone detection and tracking, interoperable sensors, secure reporting, and joint training, and I have called for support for mine-countermeasure cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye, as well as for drawing on Ukrainian experience. Decisions on interception and the use of force remain within the competence of national authorities, in accordance with the law. Romanian-Bulgarian cooperation must also be judged by its ability to produce these results. Constanța and Varna can have complementary functions. Romania stands to gain from a functioning regional system in which it assumes clear responsibilities supported by investment.

People must be included in planningIn security documents, the population often appears after infrastructure and equipment, but for residents of exposed communities, the order is different, and the first question concerns the safety of their families. I have proposed a preparedness program for communities along the Black Sea and Lower Danube: accessible warnings, sheltering and evacuation plans, medical capacity, continuity of essential services, and exercises for incidents that may combine drones, mines, cyberattacks, and pollution. As a sociologist, I am interested in the distance between the existence of a procedure and people’s ability to follow it. A technically correct message may be useless if it arrives too late or if the recipient does not know where to go. A person with reduced mobility needs organized assistance; an isolated community needs solutions adapted to its access to transport and communications.

Trust in institutions is also built through this concrete experience: people observe whether the authorities know what they are supposed to do.

Security also comes with an economic billA commercial route may remain open and still become difficult to use: risks, insurance premiums, delays, and uncertainty can reduce transport before any physical blockage. That is why I have proposed examining risk-guarantee and risk-sharing mechanisms together with the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and insurers. The aim is to maintain lawful commercial transport on the Black Sea and Danube routes, under transparent conditions and with safety requirements.

The same approach must be applied to energy. The exploitation of offshore resources, interconnections, pipelines, and cables requires joint risk assessments, resilience tests, and intervention plans. Damaged infrastructure must be repairable. An interrupted source must be replaceable.

European investment must also create industrial capacity in the region. Companies, shipyards, and research centers in Romania and Bulgaria must be able to participate in projects involving maritime surveillance, counter-drone capabilities, secure communications, and maintenance. We need local expertise to support the long-term operation of the equipment.

Defending public trustBased on my experience serving on the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield, I consider the link between physical security and public information essential. A maritime incident immediately generates questions, fear, and accusations, while the absence of verified information creates room for manipulation. Authorities must quickly communicate what they know, what they are verifying, and what measures they are taking. Attribution of responsibility must be supported by evidence, and cooperation against interference must include institutions, independent media, researchers, and civil society.

The Republic of Moldova must be included in this cooperation through its energy, trade, and security links. Its democratic stability directly affects the region. Supporting it requires respect for sovereignty, knowledge of local vulnerabilities, and investment in economic resilience.

After the visitI support the commitments announced by Ursula von der Leyen, and I will also insist on the obligation to follow them through to implementation. The hub needs clear governance, a public timetable, identified funding, and periodic evaluation. Communities need preparedness, economic operators need continuity, and the European Parliament must be able to verify the results. Through the amendments proposed in AFET, this is the direction I support: a European strategy capable of organizing protection, distributing costs, and taking responsibility for results.

Romania must come forward with well-prepared projects and institutions capable of delivering them, while Europe must assume its share of responsibility. The safety of a sailor, a port, or a community in the Danube Delta is a concrete European obligation. This is where the credibility of the Black Sea shield begins.

Europe has accumulated strategies, declarations, and commitments for the Black Sea, but it must now be accountable for their implementation. An agreed timetable, available funding, functioning equipment, and trained people give credibility to a promise. For exposed communities, the European future means being able to live safely, work, and invest without the threat of war determining every choice. This is the political meaning of the amendments I am proposing: to turn written commitments into concrete, funded, and verifiable obligations. We have described the future we want sufficiently; it is time to make the decisions that will make it possible.

10.11.2026

Brussels

https://2eu.brussels/ro/opinion/scutul-de-la-marea-neagra-si-responsabilitatea-europei