Underground

Four years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, some things are no longer seen as they were at the beginning. The shock of the invasion on that February evening in 2022, when the Russians failed to quickly occupy Kyiv, clarified the image of the conflict very easily at that time. The moral perspective on defending an invaded country prevailed. Likewise, the heroism of the defenders, including the political leaders from the neighboring country.

Gradually, diplomacy, as well as surveys from several Western countries, have attested, brutally but truthfully, to a tempering, both of the subjective support for Ukraine and of the hopes that the invading state would collapse under its own weight. The change in political line in the USA did not help either in maintaining the initial image of the Western public regarding the conflict.

Located at the border of the collective West, a West that is increasingly difficult to understand institutionally, Romania cannot afford the luxury of being indifferent. After all, we are here; there are still 10 countries and peoples between us and the war in question. And we have a certain historical memory regarding Russia.

So, four years after the invasion, INSCOP conducts this survey for the New Strategy Center (the collaboration being older). Let us briefly describe, based on it, how Romanians relate to the war in Ukraine now.

Normalization of the conflict

It’s simple. People have gotten used to the war to the east of us, just as, after a while, 20 years ago, they got used to the one in the former Yugoslavia. The war is no longer the main concern of Romanians; in fact, it is far below social and economic issues.

Realpolitik vs morality

This polarity is not new, but it is a fact in this context of public opinion. The public does not necessarily know that it is inscribed in a long-discussed paradigm in international relations, an inevitable effect of the prolongation of the war beyond the initial hopes. The victimization of Ukraine through the Russian invasion was perceived four years ago through shock and immediate empathy. Empathy and support (objective, attitudinal, and declarative) for the victims.

According to our data, from May 2022 until today, the percentage of those who say that the only guilty party for the war is Russia has decreased from 71% to 55%. The percentage of those who say that Ukraine is guilty has increased from 4.5% to 14%. The blame placed on the EU has increased from 1.7% to 9%. Of course, alongside the phenomena we have placed as subtitles above, we have also seen the evolution of the internal political discourse, the Donald Trump factor, and many others. But it is a fact: people, uninterested in international relations until around 2020, were then impressed by the tragedy of Ukraine, only for, gradually, at least some of them, to lose interest. We can suspect a trend here. Major victimization phenomena quickly generate declarative solidarity and support from the public, but then erode and lose their audience. Indeed, that is why Russia's strategy has been to prolong the conflict at any cost. As a cliché from old romantic movies says, the opposite of love is not hate, but indifference.

Investing in moral opinion is difficult to sustain in the face of usual pressures, not to mention other situations.

42.6% of Romanians today believe that we should not help Ukraine at all against Russia, 31.5% believe that we can continue with humanitarian aid, 12.2% financially, and 10.5% believe that we could help militarily. Since military aid, beyond the delivery of equipment in line with allies, is clearly not an option, it is astonishing how an almost equal percentage agrees only with financial aid.

How do we think the war should be stopped?

Absolutely predictable in the context where empathy for the victim is losing ground, 53.3% of Romanians today believe that the war can only end with the complete withdrawal of Russia (compared to 64.7% in November 2023, a year and a half after the start of the invasion).

35.4% believe that Ukraine must make certain concessions (compared to 24.5% in the same November 2023). Here is a significant jump, in the context where our historical collective mentality is dominated by the image of the small country that has had territories repeatedly and abusively taken away and which has had to constantly defend itself against neighboring empires, managing with difficulty to not disappear from the map of Europe.

“Willingness to defend

The subtitle above translates the name in English of a crucial indicator in surveys on such topics: the willingness to defend / to participate in defense. Many wars have ended quickly precisely due to the lack of willingness of the victim society to defend itself. Moreover, the opposite of this concept was relied upon by the Western world in the spring of 2022, when it hoped that Russian society would refuse to fuel the war in Ukraine. A logic flawed by a strange misunderstanding of the differences between an authoritarian state like Russia and democratic Western states, where public support for certain measures, policies, and practices is fundamental.

Only 48% of Romanians say they would fight to defend their country. Is that a lot, is it little, in the context of today's Europe and in the one where, in general, participation in a war, in almost any country, puts more pressure on certain demographic segments than on others? It remains a topic for discussion.

Of course, behind the declarative refusal of some to participate in defense are arguments that can be discussed and that should perhaps be studied transparently by the authorities: frustration, inequalities, benefits, the treatment of citizens by institutions, who decides who and what does within this defense... Simply put, part of the public perceives (it doesn’t matter how correct this is now, it is just a description) that "they have given" all sorts of "things" and benefits to the institutions of force, to NATO, to the EU, to the Americans, etc. since 2000, and now, as it were, they are calling on civilians to participate. How strong this perception is, we do not know. But it can be studied and must be studied. One thing is clear, however: the force behind rebuilding a resilient national community is social justice, not ideology.

You cannot help but notice, somewhat comically, how 10% of fellow citizens say that, in the hypothetical scenario of an attack on our country, they would hide until the war passes. This cannot help but remind you of Underground, the film by Emir Kusturica.