The interdependencies and competitiveness of the European Union

The year 2025 seemed to be traversed by a whirlwind for everyone, but especially for NATO Europeans and the European Union. The first wave that introduced a cold shock was the speech of American Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference, rolled dizzyingly from the Trump-Zelensky dialogue (Feb 28) at the White House. This was followed by the NATO meeting in The Hague, where President Trump himself laid out the U.S. demands towards Europeans, succeeded by the surprising Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska, an event that demonstrated the existence of a radical change in the way of thinking and action of American foreign policy. And the launch from the Oval Office of a tsunami of trade taxes bewildered all of America's allies and partners. To witness even from the first days of 2026 two episodes that resembled some Hollywood productions—the capture of President Maduro (Venezuela) and the shifting of transatlantic discourses about Greenland. All of these constituted a shock for European leaders who no longer had the energy to relate to the crises in Gaza and Iran.

Interdependence

Since its origins, NATO and the European Community have relied on a solid pillar—the support and guidance of the United States of America—both for the security aspects of Western Europe and for the socio-economic and political evolution of the region. Senator John F. Kennedy, a year before reaching the White House, drew the attention of his colleagues in the U.S. Senate that relations with Western Europe should avoid deepening its dependence on Washington, and should rely on a "creative partnership among equals." On July 4, 1962, in Philadelphia, President Kennedy launched the Declaration of Interdependence, a strategic document urging the construction of a "mutually beneficial partnership" between the U.S. and the European Communities, which had two colonnades: a United Europe and NATO. In his vision, a united and strong Europe could represent America's most valuable partner and would allow for the balancing of the financial burdens of the expenses required by the Cold War. Only such a design of transatlantic policy created frictions both in Washington and in Europe (French President Charles de Gaulle always had before his eyes the specter of American dominance on the European continent, and the "equal partnership" was not well viewed by American industry, while Pentagon strategists had reservations about Paris's initiative to establish a self-sufficient European nuclear force). Thus, the rhetoric of President Kennedy's "peace strategy" had different tonalities, nuances in the foreign policy doctrines of his successors at the White House, up to the current president Donald Trump.

The term interdependence made a separate career in the second half of the last century, after the global energy crisis of 1973, being predominantly associated with regional and international economic, commercial, and financial relations. Regarding transatlantic interactions, we note the systematic reluctance of Washington, which preferred the role of hegemon, even after 1989, while Brussels and the main European capitals openly appreciated the comfort offered by the American security umbrella and the rules of the post-war world order, whose guarantees were the UN and the Great Powers, with the U.S. being in the first place. Interdependence was frequently used in European construction, and after 1992 defined the main levels of evolution of the European Union, not only in building the Internal Market but also in conceiving other common policies. And after the operationalization of the Euro project, it contributed enormously to the advancement of convergence and European integration. Paradoxically, however, European leaders, who used interdependence for the internal construction of the European Union, were unable to extract maximum advantages from managing it on a global scale. They continued to witness how dependencies on the U.S. deepened, and in the last two decades they also found themselves with their intensification towards China, only to now realize that the European Union has quite a few and serious vulnerabilities due to dependencies in relations with the two Great Powers.

Almost half a century has passed since two well-known authors in the field of international relations, Keohane and Nye, argued that in the world there were manifesting "complex interdependencies" and not just simple interdependencies, which required from international actors a different conduct in international relations. Their recommendation was for states to approach interactions between different types of actors through the lens of Realpolitik. Moreover, they warned that states were no longer the only actors in the international system, although they still maintained a dominant role. And power in the system intertwines military and economic-financial components, contributing to the establishment of hierarchies in the interactions of international policies. Keohane and Nye foresaw that relations between states, together with non-governmental actors, would not be established through the classic reference to power, but through "distinctive political processes" in which traditional sources of power are transformed into a different kind of power, namely that of controlling the outcomes of interactions in the system. That is, a kind of "flexible realism," a concept that is increasingly present in the discourses of significant leaders today.

The theme of interdependencies and dependencies flooded the European public debate in the first months of 2026, of course also under the impulse of international events in recent years and especially from 2025. With particular interest, however, two international meetings that had already become traditional were awaited, organized in two emblematic European locations. Between January 19-23, 2026, the 51st edition of the World Economic Forum took place in Davos, featuring the unmistakable American President Donald Trump as the political star. The recent meeting in Davos focused on global instability and crises, the search for a new European economic model, and relations with the U.S. And on February 13-15, 2026, the 62nd edition of the Munich Security Conference took place, one of the most prestigious gatherings of politicians, military leaders, and economic leaders concerned with European and international security. This year's meeting was attended by dozens of heads of state and government, several hundred ministers, and numerous military and business delegations. I noted that between the two chronological dates, there were formal and informal meetings, both expanded and restricted, of European Union leaders who related to the meanings contained in the debates of the two mentioned international meetings. As expected, European leaders added their own urgent and serious themes to the concerns expressed in the discussions in Davos and Munich. Among these, aspirations for the re-founding of the European Union and achieving a leap in European competitiveness that would allow the Union to perform alongside the United States of America and China, international actors that are already showcasing their advancement and competition at the global level.

Competitiveness

The term "competitiveness" can be defined in many ways, and I do not intend to reiterate a conceptual discussion here. It is easy to see that it most frequently refers to the competitiveness of economies and managers of firms, of large corporations and regional/international organizations with an economic-financial profile. I only assert that the most consistent opinions about competitiveness contain not only economic aspects, especially associated with productivity, trade, prices, etc., but also broader approaches related to the level and quality of life of citizens, sustainable development, improvement of the natural environment, and the level of educational and cultural attainment. Encompassed in market language, the term competitiveness also designates the competitive spirit that companies develop, but also national and regional economies.

Current European leaders no longer see the list of multiple crises they must face shortening, and they are forced to constantly rebuild the hierarchy of priority on their agenda for resolving them. It is regrettable that instead of showing that they have successfully overcome one crisis or another, our leaders find themselves in the position of warning us that yet another crisis situation has arisen that will add to and overlap the other states they declare they are struggling to eliminate. And in the weeks and months to come, we have heard more and more that the European Union has yet another major problem, that of competitiveness. And the subject seems to be so serious that the President of the European Commission has stated that a "shock therapy" is needed at the level of the entire European community. I confess that the use of this terminology brought to my mind the indicative language used, after 1989, by the European Union, several Western European states, and international financial organizations regarding the concepts and methods of reforms in post-communist states. Certainly, the states in Central-Southeastern Europe that are EU members would have lessons to offer to political leaders and euro-bureaucrats in Brussels telling them what not to do. Of course, the problem for all member states is what, how, when, and with what to carry out the internal state reforms and those required by the European Union!

I have written quite a lot on the topic of the crises of the European Union since 2005, but the propagandists of Brussels have always been attentive only to the rustling of the Carpathian forests, the waves of the Black Sea, and I do not have the conviction that they truly wish to bring about a fundamental change in the European Union. Why this skepticism? Because after they halted the Constitutional Treaty project (2005), they kept promising to consult experts and European citizens about the European path of evolution, and each time they hindered not only citizen initiatives but even those that they themselves had been pressured to launch. In 2009, I participated in an EU Council for competitiveness where the results of the Lisbon Agenda were also analyzed, a program assumed even by the European Commission to give the European Union a boost in competitiveness for beneficial participation in the increasingly fierce global competition. Representatives from the old member states especially requested the Commission to come up with initiatives that would restrict the entry of large American, Japanese, etc. corporations into the Internal Market. European Commissioner Gunther Verheugen, responsible for industrial policies and entrepreneurship, was astonished by the protectionist suggestions supported by developed European states. His response was that for the European economy and industry to become competitive, administrative barriers could not be invoked, and it was necessary for European states to cooperate in investment to establish and support "European champions" capable of competing with corporations like Microsoft, Apple, etc. through free market competition. The opposition of several states to Commissioner Verheugen's proposal received an illustrative reply, as he presented the successful case of the European aerospace company Airbus, a champion competing globally with Boeing, thus in a top industrial field. Obviously, all member states had to recognize the fairness of Verheugen's solution, but instead of proceeding accordingly, the mentioned European Commissioner became the target of a low attack from so-called "civic forces" that were suspected of expressing certain corporate interests, politically directed and even from within the Commission.

I recounted this episode of the debates about European competitiveness because, after a decade and a half, the subject was brought back to the agenda of European institutions by two former Italian prime ministers, Draghi and Letta, the first holding the dignity of leader of the European Central Bank even during the severe financial-economic crisis of 2008-2012. There was enormous pressure on the leaderships of the European Commission and the European Council for Draghi-Letta's proposals for structural reform of the European Union and the Internal Market to be accepted and initiated. For a considerable time, European leaders kept declaring that they agreed with the projects of the two former European dignitaries, to which other reform program reports could be added, but the European Commission delayed initiating the appropriate legislation, most often blaming delays on the attitude of member states. Because now, however, the head of the European Commission is proclaiming the need for a "shock therapy" for the reform of the European Union, arguing with the European gaps in economic and technological competitiveness and the decision-making sclerosis of European institutions. Not infrequently, critics of European leadership have likened the European economy to a "giant with feet of clay," despite the fact that the European Union still holds a significant percentage of international trade, predicting that in a relatively short time it will no longer be able to withstand the market competition of other state or regional actors with already visible competitive advantages. And at other times, the projection of the European Union is that of a museum, due to the loss of progress in the areas of research, innovation, and advanced technologies. This in the context in which research, innovation, and technologies are among the most dynamic impulses of competitiveness, and now when geopolitics is evoked so much, it is asserted that the technological endowment of industries, the defense sector, etc. contributes to the differences in power of states and corporations in the international system.

In short, what has been reproached in terms of competitiveness to the leaders of the European Union is that they have talked more than they have implemented!

Vision, plan, programs

How is this gravity of the situation observed, finally, even by European leaders explained? Simply: they now see what the whole world observes, namely an increasing inadequacy of the European Union to contemporary realities. This despite the fact that the Union has been a success story for several decades and there is vast potential for development in all respects. I have said countless times, and many leaders from Bucharest and Brussels have felt embarrassed, that what has been lacking in the last quarter of a century has been European leadership with a realistic vision of the process of European integration, but also a sincere determination to steer the Union's ship through the turbulent waves of international changes that have agitated even more after 2001. Speaking with European leaders present at the recent Munich Security Conference, including heads of state and government, the president of the Atlantic Council, Mr. Fred Kempe, synthesized very well the fears of Europeans that compel them to a "shock therapy": "Russia threatens the security of the European Union," "China threatens its economy," and the United States of America is perceived as an "unreliable partner."

Now it is important to learn from the lessons of the past and to leave it to the study of historians, while we focus on what needs to be done. Still, there is no agreed vision for the evolution of the European Union among member states and European institutions, but at least there are fragments of prospective thinking that can be encompassed in a coherent plan for the reform of the Union. Personally, I appreciate the concern and insistence with which Mr. Mario Draghi has launched prospective analyses and I am convinced that he has a constructive approach for the medium and long term. Perhaps in Brussels and in some European capitals, Mr. Draghi's approach is seen as aiming for a future leadership position in the European Union, which I consider to be welcome in the Brussels landscape that simulates a party-nomenclature competition, and in many member states there is the perception that sending certain figures to European institutions is to remove them from the internal political game.

Mario Draghi argues that there is a need to establish a new Europe, precisely due to global analyses about interdependencies and competitiveness in a new international order. He believes that the old international order is not coming to its natural end because it was not good, but because of the way the Great Powers have behaved since entering the third millennium. This makes it so that in the next stage, international actors, including the European Union, must adapt to the contextuality of chaos, but a real danger may arise from what will follow in the process of imposing a different international system. In the coming context, Mr. Draghi sees the Union threatened by serious risks, of possible subordination and even deindustrialization, to which is added the inability to effectively support its interests and values. And taken individually, many member states would not be able to cope with the new regional and global conditions, which should prompt them to press for the reform of the Internal Market, monetary policy, trade, competition, etc. Only the old method of coordination, even with a confederal tone, will no longer be able to produce power for the European Union to offer citizens prosperity and defense. It is true that recently there has been a call for the solidarity of member states and for collective action to achieve certain pressing common objectives. But, says Draghi, such approaches will not be able to respond to the attitudes and types of interactions that China and the United States will initiate, which strengthen their power in the international system through accelerated development on certain paths of competitiveness, where the Union is quite delayed, and through the creation of regional and global partnerships in which the asymmetry of interdependencies can become dominant.

The solution of the former president of the European Central Bank is to intensify European integration, based on the common will and mutual access to benefits of member states and European citizens. His proposal is to decide on a formula of "pragmatic federalism," that is, to quickly take steps that are possible under the current circumstances, by member states that wish to intensify European integration and to start with areas that lend themselves to and require accelerated progress. Only if European institutions and the European decision-making process are truly reformed will the European Union be able to project real power in the international environment. Of course, Mario Draghi is aware that his proposal will face resistance from those who oppose organizing the European Union on federalist principles, but he draws attention to the fact that the direction in which the Union is moving is precisely this, only that, I add, it is obstructed by the hypocrisy of politicians from member states, by the lack of courage and the inability of others to build and apply long-term evolution strategies. In any case, those who hide behind independence, sovereignty, and even old intergovernmentalism will soon find that neither geography nor their economic performances in navigating singularly on the waves of the future international system will be able to protect them, nor will they have the necessary resources to cope with the vulnerabilities of all kinds that they will encounter.

I would like to draw attention to the opinion of another prominent international financier, Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and former European Commissioner for Budget, also during the great global financial-economic crisis. At the beginning of February this year, Ms. Georgieva presented to the College of European Commissioners an analysis of the current economic-social situation of the European Union, but she infused the dialogue with a positive, optimistic tone that I greatly appreciated. The Managing Director of the IMF drew attention to the fact that the process of European convergence was stagnating due to external and internal factors. In the first category, she wrote about the prolonged conflict in the East, which will have costly long-term consequences and the disturbances of international trade and monetary flows caused by Chinese and American policies. In this context, Ms. Georgieva pointed out that in future international economic-financial developments, the size of the economy will matter a lot, productivity will have a significant say, especially in the context of technological development, to which will be added the dimension and power of corporations that are already significant actors in the international system. From the second category, the IMF dignitary mentioned the quality and functionality of the Single Market, with its famous fundamental freedoms, and the manner in which national economies will relate to the Internal Market and regional and global shocks. Ms. Georgieva also presented practical solutions for remedying the economic situation of the European Union, insisting more on the reform of European financial markets and capital markets, emphasizing the urgent need to create unified systems oriented towards performance, but also to simplify and debureaucratize legislative-procedural frameworks. In three important areas, the head of the IMF pointed out the weaknesses of the European Union and proposed solutions: 1) regarding the Single Market, rapid reform must be decided, which means that European institutions and member states must agree on solutions so that, immediately and consistently, they can move to the application of the adopted decisions; 2) for decisions to be effective, in an era of particularly accelerated transformations, a deadline must be proposed for when the critical issues of the reform of the Single Market will be resolved, but not beyond 2028; 3) the image of the European Union must be changed from that of a "regulatory power" to that of a "new global leader in efficiency and modernization."

From words to deeds

The pressure of the European and international conjuncture from 2025 and the first part of this year, the reconfiguration of the status of Great Power in the international system, as well as the interventions of some well-known personalities from outside the community institutional framework in Brussels seem to have energized the political decision-makers of European institutions and from several member states of the European Union to intensify European integration. However, from the second half of last year, signals have emerged from some European capitals that the states in the Benelux area will propose a project of intensified cooperation, as the European Treaty already provides. And the President of the European Central Bank, Ms. Christine Lagarde, has expressed herself imperatively, stating that European leaders can no longer procrastinate the reform of the European Union. From her position, the ECB head indicated five measures that should be included in the vision for the transformation of the Union: the creation of a union of economies and investments, the evolution of the digital Euro project, the development of the Single Market, encouraging research and innovation, and streamlining the community institutional framework. Politico (February 12, 2026) even had the audacity to headline that "after years of resistance, finally leaders say that the European Union will be given a different speed." The sense of urgency in action was detected in most statements of European leaders at the beginning of this year, gathered in formal and informal meetings (someone called them "group therapy meetings"). And the President of the European Commission, Ms. Ursula von der Leyen, promised to present as soon as possible a strategy about "One Europe, One Market," accompanied by a roadmap and an action plan. Moreover, Ms. VDL mentioned that she also proposes that all objectives of that strategy be achieved by the end of 2027. What we must note, as it sounds good! And in the first part of February 2026, several important dignitaries from developed member states announced the intention to establish a zone of intensified cooperation, including 9 states, but to which other willing member states could also adhere. Naturally, the main objective of this initiative is to enhance the competitiveness of the European Union, which would have a kind of spearhead capable of competitively interacting with the United States and China. Not least, European leaders now seem convinced of the need and utility of creating "European champions," as suggested by Gunther Verheugen, to cover global corporate competition.

To demonstrate that the members of the European Union are not continuing their "vacation from history," as Chancellor Merz said at the preamble of the Eurogroup meeting on February 16, 2026, thus on the day following the conclusion of the Munich Security Conference, the so-called E6 group, with the initiative of intensified cooperation, to which several developed states, including Poland, were added, organized a meeting in which they reaffirmed their desire to move as quickly as possible to action, with the aim of boosting the competitiveness of the area, further integrating capital markets, strengthening trade and critical mineral flows, streamlining community regulations, etc. Germany and France were at the forefront of this new integrationist impulse that generated quite a few question marks and sometimes concerns. To prove that the new E6 formula will not hinder the decisions of the Eurogroup, since the Euro will become the basic monetary platform of the new enterprise, German Vice Chancellor Lars Klingbeil assured his colleagues in the Eurogroup that the recently established platform will be transparent and will not create problems for other ministerial formats in the European Union (e.g., Ecofin). The new president of the Eurogroup, Mr. Kyriakos Pierrakakis, appreciated that this association of the most developed states in the European Union can have a "positive potential" and will be a "catalyst for the convergence" of the other member states of the Union. From some small and medium states, doubts and concerns have been expressed regarding this initiative, bringing back fears of a "two-speed Europe." For example, the Irish representative in the Eurogroup, Minister Simon Harris, considered that it would be better if all states of the Union were on the same platform in areas where they can reach the formulation of common interests. Other state unions hope that this E6 grouping will have a temporary timeframe, but representatives from Germany refused to comment on this opinion, while French Minister Roland Lescure clearly stated that the new initiative is determined to progress on the path of competitiveness and strengthening the capacity to cope with any international environment, as agreed by European leaders at a recent meeting at Alden Biesen Castle (Belgium), and that there is a need for as rapid an evolution in this direction.

And Romania?!

As can be observed, the more developed member states of the European Union, having a higher degree of integration, have decided to take a step forward to advance European and international competitiveness, to manage global interdependencies more balanced to achieve positive results in the field of economy and defense. The leaders of Romania, after joining the European Union, hesitated (to put it elegantly!) to strategize the European integration of the country, leaving the phenomenon to mere contagion with the Internal Market and some imperative accents of the European Commission. Over a decade and a half has passed since our country managed to enter the Schengen Area, while the criteria for the Euro Zone seem to have been put on indefinite hold. Even in terms of common policies, Bucharest has not been an active and credible partner, rather showing interest only in the share that belonged to it from the European budget. But even here it has not strived to develop its administrative and programming capacity, failing to efficiently invest the funding coming from Brussels, believing that the development gaps of the country could be reduced "through new engines." Therefore, for example, the Anghel Saligny program, based on internal budgetary resources, was preferred by local authorities over programs supported by investments from the EU. And because the case of Poland is often mentioned, a country invited to the G-20 and to E6, it is necessary to emphasize that in the first European budget exercise in Poland, over 2000 km of highway were built, while Romania is barely approaching half of this achievement, but in three multiannual European financial exercises. This says a lot, but not only quantitatively, but especially regarding the quality of governance of the country.

After the recent transformative movements in the European Union, many commentators and Romanian politicians have again begun to lament about the "abandonment" of Romania in the second tier of the Union (referring to the "two-speed European Union"). And we have only just joined the Union for almost two decades! For the correct information of Romanian citizens, our leaders should say that we are not in the second circle, but in the third. The first two circles being occupied by members of the Euro Zone (Eurogroup)! So, if we do not want to enter into a new whirlpool of increasing the level of development gap, even within the European Union, it would be time for us to engage in an intense and effective work to recover the pace and level of European competitiveness, to insist on intensifying both horizontal and vertical integration and to circumscribe ourselves in value in managing interdependencies at the European and global level, both in terms of socio-economic evolution and in the defense of national territory and the EU-NATO space.

At one point, in the leading political discourse in the country, it was said that we should not be afraid of what is happening in the European Union, referring to the format of the "two-speed Europe." This in the conditions in which Romania evolves on the path of European integration, as is often stated, with the brake pulled. In fact, I believe that our leaders are beginning to have a bad feeling about the recently anticipated speed of European integration! And as far as I am concerned, I have no fear of what is happening in the European Union, being indeed a critic of the slowness with which the Union has moved in the last quarter of a century. If I have a feeling of unease, it is given by a small trace of doubt that the current European leaders will indeed respect the promise to rapidly reform the European construction. I hope that this feeling will be eliminated by their future positive and accelerated actions. In contrast, I have a serious concern that today's leaders of Romania understand what is happening in the European Union and especially that they have the will, determination, and knowledge to do what needs to be done in our country to circumscribe ourselves as quickly as possible to the meanings and directions of evolution of the European Union. And here my hope is the most intense and burning, wishing for Romania and its citizens to make European integration at home, not to knock on foreign doors to be individually accepted in the integration process developed by the most advanced member states of the Union.