Hungary, direct line with the Kremlin: How Peter Szijjarto helped Moscow remove oligarchs from the EU sanctions list

Hungary, through Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, has systematically acted in the interest of the Kremlin, both to remove certain oligarchs and close associates of Putin from the EU's sanctions blacklist, as well as to mitigate or block certain sanction packages – including through close coordination with Slovakia, according to an investigation published by The Insider which features audio recordings.

Removal of oligarchs and their relatives from the EU's sanctioned persons lists amid the war

The investigation shows that Szijjártó personally promised Sergei Lavrov that he would help remove Gülbahor Ismailova, the sister of Russian businessman Alisher Usmanov, described as one of Vladimir Putin's favored businessmen and who was placed on the blacklist in March 2022.

In a call on August 30, 2024, Szijjártó tells Lavrov that, together with Slovakia, they will submit a proposal to the EU for her removal and that "they will do everything possible" to have her name removed in the next round of sanctions review.

"Look, I am calling at Alişer’s request and he just asked me to remind you to do something regarding his sister," Lavrov said.

"Yes, absolutely," Szijjártó replied. "The idea is as follows: together with the Slovaks, we are submitting a proposal to the European Union to remove her from the list. We will submit it next week and, as the new review period begins, it will be put on the agenda and we will do everything possible to get her off the list."

Lavrov expressed his appreciation for "Szijjártó's support and your fight for equality in all areas."

Seven months later, Ismailova is indeed removed from the EU list, along with Veaceslav Moşe Kantor, the Russian Minister of Sports, Mikhail Degtiarov, after Hungary and Slovakia threatened to block the extension of the entire individual sanctions regime.

Quoted European diplomats in the material state that Budapest and Bratislava repeatedly come to negotiations with lists of Russian names to be removed from the sanctioned persons list, without legal arguments, but exclusively political ones, gradually reducing the list to two or three cases – as was the case with Ismailova, Kantor, and Degtiarov.

This tactic takes advantage of the unanimity rule in the EU, which allows Hungary to condition the extension of the entire sanctions package on the removal of certain individuals close to the Kremlin.

According to one diplomat, although it has long been suspected that Hungary and Slovakia have leaked details about negotiations to Moscow, it is valuable that there is now concrete evidence to demonstrate this.

"Hungary clearly fulfills political orders from Russia," said this source when reporters showed them excerpts from the phone call transcripts of the two ministers.

Direct lines with Lavrov and leaks of information from the EU

The transcripts highlight an extremely close relationship between Szijjártó and Lavrov, with the Hungarian minister providing him with confidential details from the EU's Foreign Affairs Council and internal discussions in Brussels. Thus, in the call on August 30, 2024, immediately after the discussion about Usmanov's sister, Szijjártó informs Lavrov about the atmosphere and exchanges of remarks from the EU foreign ministers' meeting, including the intervention of Lithuanian Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, who argued that Russia is financing the war partially from profits obtained from gas and oil sold to European clients such as Hungary and Slovakia.

An EU intelligence official, quoted after seeing the transcripts, compares Szijjártó's behavior to that of an "intelligence officer who is working with his agent."

Contacted for a comment, Landsbergis confirmed the details of the behind-the-scenes discussions of the EU foreign ministers' meeting. "I can confirm that this is a real exchange of remarks that took place during one of the Foreign Affairs Councils," Landsbergis said.

Landsbergis says it seems that "Putin has had and has an informant" in all EU and NATO meetings, even suggesting Hungary's exclusion from such formats.

The conversation with the Russian Deputy Minister of Energy

In a separate conversation with Pavel Sorokin, Deputy Minister of Energy of Russia, Szijjártó reports that he is doing "everything possible" to block the 18th EU sanctions package, focused on Russia's phantom tanker fleet and companies involved in circumventing the oil price cap.

In a call on June 30, 2025, Szijjártó complains that Brussels is not providing him with documents regarding the sanctioning of the trader 2Rivers (formerly Coral Energy), a key firm in the re-export of Russian oil through a fleet of tankers under foreign flags to circumvent Western sanctions, and tells the Russians that he is trying to obtain the removal of the company from the list.

Szijjártó tells Sorokin that Hungary and Slovakia have managed to postpone the inclusion of the package on the EU agenda until they obtain an "exception" that will allow them to continue importing Russian oil and gas, thus linking the blocking of sanctions to Budapest's declared energy interest. He explicitly states that he is "fighting against the entire sanctions package" and that he is trying to "save as many Russian entities as possible," specifying that he has managed to remove 72 entities from a total of 128 proposed for sanctioning.

Providing "help" to Moscow regarding entities and banks

In the same discussion, Szijjártó practically asks Sorokin for counterarguments to use in the Council, requesting the Russian side to provide him with evidence of the alleged negative impact on the Hungarian economy, to have more maneuvering space in obstructing the designs. He offers to check the names of Russian banks under EU scrutiny, telling Sorokin that he has managed to remove Sankt Petersburg Bank and another bank linked to the Paks nuclear project from the list, and promises to "do everything he can" to avoid sanctioning other financial institutions indicated by Moscow. Subsequently, after weeks of blockage from Hungary and Slovakia, the 18th sanctions package is adopted in July 2025, including 2Rivers, leading to the beginning of the company's dissolution and a significant blow to the phantom transport fleet, although it remains unclear how many other entities were effectively "saved" through Hungary's interventions.

The role of Hungarian-Slovak coordination and the evolution of veto tactics

The investigation describes how, shortly after the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Budapest – later together with Bratislava – transformed point vetoes in the EU into a semi-institutionalized mechanism for protecting pro-Kremlin figures and entities.

Examples listed include blocking an entire sanctions package to save Patriarch Kirill in 2022, repeated opposition to sanctioning oligarchs with business ties in Hungary, as well as attempts to remove Usmanov, Kantor, Mazepin, or certain Russian sports and banking structures from the sanctions list, in exchange for mutual concessions between Hungary and Slovakia.

In February 2026, Hungary vetoes the 20th sanctions package, and in March 2026, Slovakia threatens to block the renewal of the entire individual sanctions regime if Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman are not removed from the list, although in the end it backed down.

Synthesis made with the help of Perplexity

Response formulated by the legal representatives of Alisher Usmanov:

To the Informat.ro Editorial Team,

We are writing to address incorrect claims about Alisher Usmanov and his sister Gulbakhor Ismailova in the article "Hungary, direct line with the Kremlin: How Peter Szijjarto helped Moscow remove oligarchs from the EU sanctions list" published on your website on 31 March 2026.

Our concerns relate to the following sections: