Romania between opportunity and blockage. European funds for defense require strategy, speed, and institutional discipline.

The European Union has decided to massively accelerate investments in defense. Through the European Commission, 1.07 billion euros are going to 57 projects through the European Defense Fund. The direction is clear: drones, anti-drones, artificial intelligence, cyber, industrial integration, and production. For Romania, this moment is not one of analysis, it is one of execution and a rare window of opportunity.

The opportunity is real: 634 entities involved at the European level, SMEs account for over 38 percent of participants, and more than 15 projects directly support the eastern flank. Here, Romania has a structural advantage related to its geographical position, NATO experience, but also real needs for equipping, which, theoretically, should be a kind of tailwind that makes you understand that if you miss this wave, you will not recover it.

Transparency versus opacity

Access to European funds does not depend only on technical capacity; it depends on trust, which, in turn, is largely related to transparency. Transparency attracts partners, while opacity blocks consortia, and this leads to a lack of predictability, a defect that drives away investors. In defense, there is a temptation for excessive secrecy. This is a major error; European projects require broad collaboration: universities, start-ups, large companies. Without a clear and public framework, Romania remains outside the game.

The European model shows that controlled openness, clear rules, and competitive access are needed; here, often only management makes the difference. Romania does not lack ideas; it lacks execution. We need dedicated units for project writing, mixed teams, technical and financial, rapid decision-making mechanisms, and stable leadership. EDF funds are not won with slow administrative structures; they are won with agile teams, with people who understand both technology and the rules of Brussels. Currently, many institutions in Romania operate fragmented, each actor pulling separately, and the result is predictable: few projects, reduced influence, lost money, and unacceptable delays in equipping our army.

Speed becomes a strategic factor

The European calendar does not wait, as can be seen, competitive calls come in bursts, consortia form quickly, contracts negotiated in short stages. If you react late, you enter as a minor subcontractor, not as a project leader. Romania must move from reaction to initiative and build an ecosystem that is missing and that intersects with the ecosystem being rapidly built in Europe. We need companies capable of writing competitive applications, partnership networks with EU states, real links between industry and research, and access for start-ups. This ecosystem does not appear spontaneously; it is built through coherent public policy, and examples from the West show that the state plays the role of orchestrator, not blocker.

ROMARM between reform and sabotage

The new organizational formula of Romarm offers a very good starting point. Consolidation, orientation towards European projects, openness to partnerships are correct and concrete steps. Romarm can become a national integrator of EDF projects, a platform for international consortia, and a vector for industrial modernization. But there is a major risk: political interference. In the recent past, when there was a minister at the Ministry of Economy who quickly left for a more visible position, a struggle began to block Romarm's activity and politically (or personally?) seize it, and signals from the industry indicated blockages and contradictory decisions. The perception of sabotage does not appear without cause, and the lack of continuity and political interventions have affected the real capacity for action. The defense industry does not operate with political rotation; it operates with long-term strategy. Without stability and with authoritarian interference from the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Defense, Romarm remains a marginal actor.

The need for an applied strategy

Romania has strategic documents, but it lacks coherent implementation; the list of equipping priorities changes very often, sometimes without any logic. Today, there is a need for clear priorities on critical technologies, resource allocation correlated with these priorities, and coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Economy. We will not be able to face competition without measurable objectives and indicators. A strategy without execution does not produce capabilities, and European programs are a tool, not a goal. These fundings are not just about industry; they are about real capabilities: drones and anti-drones for the tactical field, cyber systems for modern defense, integration into the European architecture. The Romanian Army needs accelerated modernization, and active participation in EDF means access to cutting-edge technology, reduced costs through cooperation, and interoperability with allies.

The Romanian Army deserves more

It deserves predictability, it deserves modern equipment, and it needs an industry to support it. Beyond the ambitions or interests of ministers who come and go, Romania has to make a simple choice: build an ecosystem and become a relevant actor or remain a spectator and buy technology from allies. European funds do not solve internal problems; they expose them, and those who adapt quickly win, while those who remain stuck in procedures lose. We need a change of mindset; we must move from control to openness, starting from the realization of a simple truth: Romania does not lose funds due to a lack of intelligence; it loses due to institutional reflexes. The current model is closed, information circulates slowly, access is limited. New actors are kept on the margins, the Ministry of Defense moves slowly due to political struggles or the intersection of diplomatic influences on equipping. This model must be replaced with real openness, broad public information about calls and priorities, distributed quickly, and guidelines must be explained, not hidden in jargon or kept secret. Institutions must actively communicate with the private sector, because we see that, currently, too few companies know how to enter EDF projects, not due to a lack of interest, but due to a lack of access. The socialization of information becomes a strategic objective these days; it is not enough to publish a call; communities must be built, with recurring events dedicated to the defense industry, matchmaking platforms between companies, and especially public databases with competencies and interests. Without these mechanisms, the same actors dominate, and the rest remain outside the system.

Especially start-ups and SMEs need to be brought into play, because European data is clear: SMEs represent over a third of participants, and innovation comes from this area. We would like to see a leadership from the Ministry of Defense obsessed with creating access programs for tech start-ups, dual-use companies, AI, cyber, seeking companies without military experience but with relevant competencies. This can be done through small grants for entry into the ecosystem, mentoring for project writing, and access to testing and infrastructure. Without this layer, the ecosystem remains rigid; you cannot build only through acquisitions.

Of course, strategic acquisitions are necessary, but they are not sufficient. If you limit yourself to buying, you remain technologically dependent and lose economic value; you do not develop internal competencies. European funds offer an alternative: co-development, co-production, and transfer of know-how. Political influence follows the money; states that invest intelligently gain influence, participate in defining standards, influence technological directions, and protect strategic interests. Romania spends large sums on defense, but influence remains limited because, without active participation in European projects, you remain a client, not a partner.

Reconstruction of industry and research

We need a real industrial base, not just import contracts. And reconstruction means modernizing existing capabilities, attracting investments in production, and integrating into European chains. Research must return to the center of the vision for the future through predictable funding for institutes, applied projects, not just theoretical ones, and especially direct collaboration with industry. Technical universities must be brought into the ecosystem; they are technical centers, have human resources and expertise, but today they are poorly connected to the defense industry. We need to create consortia where universities are real partners in joint research programs with industry to ensure access to European projects for students and researchers. Without this connection, entire generations of specialists are lost, who often leave the country.

The direction is simple: openness, speed, collaboration. Without these three elements, Romania remains outside the European defense ecosystem; with them, it becomes a relevant actor.

Romania's participation in the European Defence Fund. Profile, data, and positioning (2021–2025) In conclusion, a few words about our participation in EDF. Romania's participation in the European Defence Fund shows a real integration into European military research networks. At the same time, it indicates a secondary position in the industrial architecture of the European Union. The available data for the period 2021–2025 outlines a stable profile. Romania consistently participates in projects, attracts moderate funding, and remains, in most cases, a partner, not a coordinator. At the European level, EDF has funded over 200 projects in the first years of implementation. In 2024, the European Commission allocated approximately 1 billion euros for new research and development projects in the field of defense. The same value appears in 2025, confirming the stability of the financial instrument.

Romania appears in these calls with a relatively good success rate. In the first rounds, between 40% and 60% of applications submitted by Romanian entities were funded. This indicator shows technical capacity and adaptation to the program's requirements. The problem arises at the level of volume and influence. Participation is done in large consortia, dominated by actors from France, Germany, or Italy; Romanian entities usually enter as partners. The number of projects coordinated by Romania remains very low. Data from 2024 and early 2025 confirm this model; Romania continues to participate in projects in areas such as drones, autonomous systems, secure communications, and artificial intelligence. However, there do not appear to be major projects related to complex platforms, such as combat aircraft systems or advanced naval technologies.

The structure of the involved actors partially explains this position. Participation mainly comes from research institutes, some public agencies, and a limited number of private companies. Large industrial actors capable of leading European consortia are missing. Another relevant indicator is the distribution of funding. Although there is still no complete public aggregation for Romania, fragmented data shows participation in small and medium-sized projects, and financial contributions per entity are significantly lower than in Western states. In parallel, Romania accesses much larger funds through other European instruments dedicated to equipment acquisitions. This difference suggests a strategic orientation towards import and interoperability rather than towards internal technological development.

From a networking perspective, Romania is connected but not central. It participates in consortia but does not define technological directions; collaborative relationships are still limited and do not form stable industrial clusters. Comparatively, states like Poland or Spain have begun to increase their role in EDF, including by coordinating projects; Romania has not yet taken this step.

The overall profile is clear. Romania is present in the European Defence Fund, has participation capacity, but does not yet have a critical mass to influence the European defense agenda. The next direction depends on three concrete factors: strengthening the national defense industry, creating stable partnerships with major EU actors, and increasing the capacity to coordinate projects. Without these changes, Romania's participation will remain constant but marginal.

https://2eu.brussels/ro/analize/romania-intre-oportunitate-si-blocaj-fondurile-europene-pentru-aparare-cer-strategie-viteza-si-disciplina-institutionala