"Smart boys" represent the "flaw" that contributed to the increase in energy prices, the cause being the institutions that invented it.

Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan said that in the energy system there are "smart speculators" who have blocked real investments through speculative capacity reservations. The "smart speculators" he refers to represent part of the "defect" that led to the increase in energy prices, but the real cause is the institutions that "created" and tolerated them (if not actually supported them). Therefore, here we need actions, not words. Discussions have been signaled for years by associations and experts from civil society. Concrete measures must be taken here, not discussions under the umbrella of which new "smart speculators" may emerge.

Because "smart speculators" do not appear spontaneously in a functional market. They are the product of a permissive framework, of rules written with dedication or poorly applied, and of institutions that had the obligation to prevent exactly this type of distortion.

If today we have tens of thousands of megawatts authorized on paper and real investments blocked, if we have volatility in consumption and price increases, then it must be clear that these are the effects, some generated and some determined by the "smart speculators" (one of them being even the STATE). The causes are, however, administrative, generated by people in the institutions responsible for the energy market.

The capacity to produce electricity does not block itself

A Technical Connection Notice is not an abstract paper. It is issued based on legislation approved by Parliament and/or ANRE. If the legislation allowed massive reservations without serious financial guarantees, without firm deadlines, and without automatic cancellation for non-implementation, then the vulnerability is not with the operator, nor with the speculator. It is with the legislator/regulator.

The operator complied with the legislation. The speculator used the existing rules.

Speculative capacity reservations have blocked access for real investors. But the problem does not stop here. There have also been other tolerated vulnerabilities:

• indefinite extensions for "paper" projects

• lack of correlation between network development plans and the issuance of authorizations

• slow or non-existent reactions to evident distortions

• administrative overbidding of available capacity

• lack of sanctions for non-implementation

Not a single breach. But several. A system with multiple open valves for opportunism.

The responsibility for blocking ATR and increasing prices

The leadership of energy institutions is not modestly paid. The salaries are high precisely because they manage a strategic sector, with a direct impact on energy security and prices. When for years civil society, real investors, and experts signal blockages, and the rules remain permissive, we are no longer talking about surprise. We are talking about:

• political complicity

• administrative passivity

• mismanagement

• convenient tolerance

• possible complicity

In all cases, the responsibility is institutional.

Managerial responsibility cannot be avoided by invoking the "complexity of the system".

The fact that the system allowed speculation does not automatically mean crime. But it does mean possible failure of legislation/regulation. If the rules were poorly constructed, the problem is one of competence and reaction.

If the rules were constructed with dedication, the discussion becomes penal.

In both situations, however, the institutions had the obligation to prevent the blockage, to protect the functioning of the market, and to limit the artificial increase of prices.

"Action", not speech

If action is desired, then the steps must be concrete:

1. A complete and public audit of all mechanisms that allowed distortions — not just the ATR blockages, but also the increase in electricity prices, pressures in the gas market, and regulatory incoherences, carried out by authorized energy experts from third parties. Not the Control Body. Not Parliamentary Committees. Not Big Four.

2. Immediate normative correction, with firm deadlines.

3. Clear establishment of those responsible and deadlines for implementation.

4. Serious managerial evaluation of the involved institutions.

5. Changing the leadership where the report indicates passivity, mistakes, or complicities.

6. Long-term prevention mechanisms to avoid the repetition of the same phenomena in another form.

Condemning the effects is not enough. Eliminating the causes is essential. Not just discussions condemning the effects. Eliminating the causes. Identifying and sanctioning the guilty parties is essential, but not sufficient without changing the rules. But keeping people in the face of a systemic failure without real evaluation sends the same dangerous message that dominates today's society: no one is accountable.

The causes must be eliminated, not just condemned

Blocking investments in production and storage means limited supply. Limited supply means higher prices. Higher prices mean costs borne by citizens and the economy. If these effects were predictable — and they were — then inaction becomes part of the problems. It is not the "smart speculators" that are a big problem. They are a symptom. The disease is a system that allows the administrative capture of a public resource without consequences. Firm statements are welcome. But they create an expectation. If after them follows an audit, reform, accountability, change, then we are talking about actions and not words. If nothing follows, then the discourse about "smart speculators" becomes just a new episode in an old story. Romanians are no longer just paying for energy. They are also paying the cost of institutions that did not prevent the distortion. And here, indeed, there is no need for discussions. There is a need for decision.

Not just ATRs are the problem. We have a system that has allowed energy prices to rise and today no one wants to go back. When we talk about "smart speculators" in energy, we risk dangerously simplifying reality. Speculative ATRs were not the cause. They were just one of the manifestations of a permissive system, tolerated for years by institutions that had the obligation to intervene.

Blocking investments in electricity production did not happen out of the blue. The increase in energy prices was not an isolated accident. Possible pressure on the gas market today is not a surprise. All of these are effects. The causes are clear. And they have institutional names.

"Smart speculators" are the effect of at least a permissive ecosystem. If this ecosystem is not structurally corrected, others will appear. Maybe not through ATR. Maybe through another mechanism.

Romanians can no longer be the ones who pay the bill for administrative errors. It is no longer enough to identify the effect. The causes must be eliminated. Now!