A network of fake sites and accounts allegedly tried to influence the elections in Malta in favor of the Labour Party.

Five domains, Facebook pages, and Instagram accounts have emerged or changed their identity in the lead-up to the early elections on May 30, 2026. An analysis by the Mediterranean Digital Media Observatory indicates coordinated government promotion, attacks against the opposition, political ads with unclear payers, and interactions largely generated by fake accounts, without identifying the responsible individuals.

A network consisting of at least five websites and six social media pages or accounts would have conducted a coordinated influence operation during the early elections in Malta, promoting the Labour Party government and attacking the opposition through political content, targeted ads, and interactions produced largely by fake accounts.

In short

Five domains were registered between March 19 and May 7, 2026, before and after the calling of the early elections on May 30, and three older Facebook pages changed their names during the same period.

The content presented the achievements of the Labour Party in a favorable light and specifically attacked the leader of the Nationalist Party, Alex Borg, using articles, AI-generated images, and an online game.

Pages associated with the operation published at least 22 ads on Facebook, Instagram, and Threads, all targeted at the audience in Malta, and the true identity of some of the payers could not be established.

A post from the Appostli page received 774 reactions in 16 minutes, and the analysis of the involved accounts indicated that they were fake or automated.

Meta removed the six pages and profiles after a report was sent through the rapid response mechanism, but researchers did not establish who organized or financed the operation.

The Prime Minister of Malta, Robert Abela, announced on April 27, 2026, the organization of early general elections on May 30, nine months before the end of the government's term. In the weeks surrounding the announcement, several websites and accounts presenting themselves as news sources, fact-checking, or political entertainment emerged.

The analysis conducted by the Mediterranean Digital Media Observatory, a project co-financed by the European Union, describes the case as a possible manipulation operation and internal information interference. Researchers believe that the messages, knowledge of the local context, and the way the public was targeted indicate the involvement of a person or group familiar with Maltese politics.

The report does not identify the organizers, funders, or the exact motivation of the operation and does not attribute the activity to the Labour Party or any public institution. The conclusions concern the characteristics of the content, the coordination observed between websites and accounts, the transparency data provided by platforms, and the structure of interactions.

The five identified domains were goodmorningmalta.com, pnmalta.com, appostli.com, factcheckmalta.com, and alexgaffes.com. They were registered between March 19 and May 7, during a period that began more than a month before the calling of the elections and ended ten days after the announcement of the vote.

The domain goodmorningmalta.com was registered on March 19, pnmalta.com on April 9, appostli.com on April 13, and factcheckmalta.com on April 22. Alexgaffes.com was registered on May 7, after the official start of the campaign. By mid-June, two of the sites appeared to be suspended, and one displayed only a message indicating it was under construction.

The timing of their emergence also coincided with the preparation of the official campaign. The domain intmalta.com, which reproduced the government’s electoral slogan, had been registered on April 8, although the Prime Minister had not yet confirmed the organization of elections in 2026.

The sites used different formats, but their messages followed the same direction. They presented the governance of the Labour Party favorably and criticized the Nationalist Party, focusing attacks on the opposition leader, Alex Borg, who could become the youngest prime minister in the country’s history.

Pnmalta.com claimed to fact-check the opposition's statements. Alexgaffes.com offered a browser game in which the user had to "save" Borg from the press and his own statements. Appostli.com promoted the game even on the day of the domain registration, one of the elements considered by researchers as an indication of coordination.

Some sites also took and modified materials from local publications to appear as authentic journalistic sources. The articles were sometimes dated years before the registration of the domains, although technical checks showed that none of the five sites existed before March 2026.

Other materials combined unrelated information or false statements with headlines meant to attract attention. An article published by Appostli suggested the existence of hidden external funding behind the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, although the content did not support the accusation in the title.

The foundation was created by the family of investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, who was killed in a car bomb attack in October 2017. The organization is registered and declares its accounts and funding for projects in accordance with the rules applicable to voluntary organizations in Malta.

The report considers that the choice of this target is inscribed in the continuity of attacks and narratives directed against the journalist and her activity. The public inquiry into her assassination found that state-orchestrated propaganda contributed to the environment in which the crime became possible.

The style and speed of publication indicate a possible use of artificial intelligence, but the report does not confirm its use for managing the sites. The content included precise local references and adapted messages to campaign events, suggesting that the materials were guided or reviewed by individuals familiar with the Maltese public.

Artificial intelligence was visibly used for producing satirical images, described in the report as "slo-paganda." These did not always aim to convince the public through factual statements, being designed to create negative associations and emotional reactions against political opponents.

The images depicted, among other things, Alex Borg as Moses, parting the sea to allow traffic to pass, or looking puzzled in front of a computer. Another image modified an electoral panel and was interpreted by at least one user as a real opposition poster.

The computer theme had also been used in the official campaign of the Labour Party to attack the opposition's financial estimates. The Minister of Finance, Clyde Caruana, stated during the campaign that a computer could represent the party's mascot and published messages in which the object symbolized the continuity of governance.

The same theme appeared in official materials, posts from supporters, and content published by Appostli and Good Morning Malta. The report describes this overlap as an example of how official campaign messages were reproduced and amplified in unofficial spaces.

The connections were more direct in the case of the Appostli page. It used electoral materials from the Labour Party in videos promoting the party's proposals. Researchers identified in one of the clips a member of the youth organization of the Labour Party.

The video was published a few days before the elections and was shared over 30 times in a single day. All visible shares were made in groups of Labour Party supporters, and the person appearing in the material shared it in turn.

The report also identified technical clues regarding the coordination of the sites. Appostli and Good Morning Malta displayed the same address for headquarters, 142 Republic Street in Valletta. The team checked the location and could not identify the indicated headquarters, concluding that the address was fictitious and likely chosen to lend legitimacy to the projects.

The situation of the Instagram accounts was different. The Appostli and Diary of Āħan profiles were created in April 2026 and were indicated as being managed from Malta. The difference between the locations of the Facebook pages and those of the Instagram profiles contributed to the assessment that the operation combined infrastructure or services from abroad with local coordination.

The report uses this data to describe a possible external element in the technical management, without concluding that the operation was organized by a state, a foreign organization, or individuals from the indicated countries. The location of the administrators of a page does not demonstrate the political origin or the ultimate beneficiary of the activity.

Pages associated with the operation purchased at least 22 ads on Meta platforms during the campaign. Appostli published 11 sponsored materials on Facebook, Instagram, and Threads between the calling of the elections and the voting day. Three of these were explicitly political and promoted the Labour Party.

Good Morning Malta published nine ads in the days leading up to the calling of the elections and up to the vote. Diary of Āħan broadcast two ads, one of which was active throughout the entire campaign and included a clip that mocked the opposition leader.

All ads were targeted at people in Malta. The Meta ad library indicated as payers or advertisers names such as Economia, Supply4Industry Ltd, OKONG Corporation, and DX Care.

Researchers found companies or services using some of these names, including an accounting and financial management firm from Denmark and an industrial supply company registered in the United Kingdom. They could not establish whether the respective entities had any connection to the ads or whether their names were used without their involvement.

The report states that the pages could declare themselves as payers of the ads, but in numerous cases, the names of third parties were displayed. The identity of the actual source of funding and the reason for using these names remained unclear.

Another component of the operation was artificial amplification. The pages had several thousand followers, most of whom were assessed as fake accounts. Some posts received hundreds of reactions in a few minutes, an unusual level for the media market in Malta.

An image depicting Robert Abela and Alex Borg in the posture of characters from a fighting game received 774 reactions in 16 minutes. The accounts that reacted came from several countries and did not attempt to appear as authentic Maltese profiles, according to the analysis.

Some posts also reached real users after being shared by pages favorable to the Labour Party. Among the few accounts considered authentic that followed the Appostli profile on Instagram was the verified account of Maltese European Commissioner Glenn Micallef, former head of the Prime Minister's secretariat.

The presence of an account in the list of followers does not demonstrate participation in the operation, knowledge of its activity, or support for the published materials. The report mentions this element as part of the assessment of the real audience interacting with the profiles, without making an accusation against the commissioner.

Meta removed three Facebook pages and three Instagram profiles after the case was reported through the rapid response system. The ads, however, remained available for consultation in the public library of the platform, even after the accounts were removed.

The report separately mentions that the Facebook page Net News, the publication owned by the Nationalist Party, was temporarily removed at the beginning of May after a wave of reports. The page was restored after the party intervened with Meta. The claim regarding the coordinated nature of the reports comes from the Nationalist Party.

The Labour Party won the elections on May 30 and obtained its fourth consecutive mandate. The difference against the Nationalist Party, however, decreased to 21,721 votes, down from 39,474 in the 2022 elections.

MedDMO considers that the main purpose of the analyzed activity was not to present false information as isolated facts, but to mobilize supporters, attack opponents, and influence perceptions through emotions, polarization, and the repetition of familiar themes.

The conclusions do not establish who commissioned, managed, or paid for the operation, nor whether it influenced the outcome of the elections. Inquiries regarding the organizers, funding, and ultimate beneficiaries remain open.

The Mediterranean Digital Media Observatory monitors disinformation narratives in Greece, Cyprus, and Malta. The project brings together academic institutions, fact-checking organizations, and media institutions and is funded through the Digital Europe program.

The report on "Operation Apostle" was drafted in June 2026 and published in July, after an internal review. The opinions and conclusions belong to the MedDMO consortium and do not represent the position of the European Commission.

https://2eu.brussels/ro/news/o-retea-de-site-uri-si-conturi-false-ar-fi-incercat-sa-influenteze-alegerile-din-malta-in-favoarea-partidului-laburist